we don’t think that we should attribute to the ball whatever sort of authorship we wish to talk about with reference to free will.
That is because the billiard ball doesn’t have sufficient inner complexity and processes. I think the necessary complexity is the computational ability to a) model parts of the future world state and b) base behavior on that and c) model the modelling of this. The problem arises when your model of your model goes from iniuition (sensation of free will) to symbolic form which allows detection of the logical inconsistencies at some higher modelling level.
Actually little is needed to ascribe agency to ‘balls’. Just look at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sZBKer6PMtM and tell me what inner processes you infer about the ‘ball’ due to its complex interactions.
That is because the billiard ball doesn’t have sufficient inner complexity and processes.
I agree that your (a)-(c) are necessary (and maybe sufficient) conditions on having free will.
The problem arises when your model of your model goes from iniuition (sensation of free will) to symbolic form which allows detection of the logical inconsistencies at some higher modelling level.
What do you mean by this?
sensation of free will
To my knowledge, I’ve never had this sensation, so I don’t know what to say about it. So far as I understand what is meant by free will, it’s not the sort of thing of which one could have a sensation.
To my knowledge, I’ve never had this sensation, so I don’t know what to say about it. So far as I understand what is meant by free will, it’s not the sort of thing of which one could have a sensation.
Further to the other subthread, I suppose what most people mean when they talk about the sensation of free will is imagining multiple possible worlds and feeling control over which one will become actual before it does. Do you not have this?
I suppose what most people mean when they talk about the sensation of free will is imagining multiple possible worlds and feeling control over which one will become actual before it does. Do you not have this?
I wouldn’t call that a sensation or a feeling, but yes. I do think I act freely, and I can recall times when I’ve acted freely. If I don’t have free will, then I’m wrong about all that.
That is because the billiard ball doesn’t have sufficient inner complexity and processes. I think the necessary complexity is the computational ability to a) model parts of the future world state and b) base behavior on that and c) model the modelling of this. The problem arises when your model of your model goes from iniuition (sensation of free will) to symbolic form which allows detection of the logical inconsistencies at some higher modelling level.
Actually little is needed to ascribe agency to ‘balls’. Just look at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sZBKer6PMtM and tell me what inner processes you infer about the ‘ball’ due to its complex interactions.
I agree that your (a)-(c) are necessary (and maybe sufficient) conditions on having free will.
What do you mean by this?
To my knowledge, I’ve never had this sensation, so I don’t know what to say about it. So far as I understand what is meant by free will, it’s not the sort of thing of which one could have a sensation.
Further to the other subthread, I suppose what most people mean when they talk about the sensation of free will is imagining multiple possible worlds and feeling control over which one will become actual before it does. Do you not have this?
I wouldn’t call that a sensation or a feeling, but yes. I do think I act freely, and I can recall times when I’ve acted freely. If I don’t have free will, then I’m wrong about all that.