That sounds right, but that sounds like I am (or at least could) visualize these levels as separate, since to keep track of the tiny differences that end up being important is impossible for my mind to do. This seems to necessitate that imagining irreducibility is not only possible, but natural (and perhaps unavoidable?).
I’m not entirely clear on what you are saying above. Your mind keeps many overlapping concepts that build on each other. It’s also incapable of introspecting on this process in detail, or of representing one concept explicitly in terms of an arbitrary other concept, even if the model in the mind supports a lawful dependence between them. You can only visualize some concepts in the context of some other closely related concepts. Notice that we are only talking about the algorithm of human mind and its limitations.
Perhaps it would help (since I think I’ve lost you as well) to relate this all back to the original question: is all levels reducing down to a common lowest level a priori logically necessary? My contention is that it’s possible to reduce the levels, but not logically necessary—and I support this contention with the fact that we don’t necessarily collapse the levels in our reasoning, and we can’t collapse the levels in our imagination. If you weren’t disagreeing with this, then I’ve just misunderstood you, and I apologize.
There are at least 3 ways for anti-reductionism to be not only clearly consistent, but with some plausibility, true—in the sense that there is empirical as well as conceptual evidence for every position (This is connected to a quote I posted yesterday):
Ontological monism: The whole universe is prior to its parts (see this paper)
No fundamental level: The descent of levels is infinite (see that paper)
“Causation” is an inconsistent concept (I’m one free afternoon and two karma points away from a top-level post on this ;)
I’m not entirely clear on what you are saying above. Your mind keeps many overlapping concepts that build on each other. It’s also incapable of introspecting on this process in detail, or of representing one concept explicitly in terms of an arbitrary other concept, even if the model in the mind supports a lawful dependence between them. You can only visualize some concepts in the context of some other closely related concepts. Notice that we are only talking about the algorithm of human mind and its limitations.
Perhaps it would help (since I think I’ve lost you as well) to relate this all back to the original question: is all levels reducing down to a common lowest level a priori logically necessary? My contention is that it’s possible to reduce the levels, but not logically necessary—and I support this contention with the fact that we don’t necessarily collapse the levels in our reasoning, and we can’t collapse the levels in our imagination. If you weren’t disagreeing with this, then I’ve just misunderstood you, and I apologize.
There are at least 3 ways for anti-reductionism to be not only clearly consistent, but with some plausibility, true—in the sense that there is empirical as well as conceptual evidence for every position (This is connected to a quote I posted yesterday):
Ontological monism: The whole universe is prior to its parts (see this paper)
No fundamental level: The descent of levels is infinite (see that paper)
“Causation” is an inconsistent concept (I’m one free afternoon and two karma points away from a top-level post on this ;)