I think there is another reason SJWs (and others) may dislike “rationality” that is getting buried here:
The author is not a good reasoner, and while arguing over these experiences, often says stupid things, and gets told ze is irrational
There is a difference between an argument not being phrased in a reasonable way and the argument itself being stupid.
When my husband and I were first married I would win must of the arguments NOT because I was necessarily right (as later came to realize) but because I was a better rhetorician. I could lay out my case in an orderly fashion. I could work commonly agreed statements into my arguments. I could anticipate counter arguments and set-up to counter them. I could model possible external circumstances and present those that supported my view.
This lead to a situation where my husband constantly felt steam rolled. He might not be able to articulate logical fallacies but he could feel the effects of his preferences constantly being overruled by mine. I needed to learn to back off and respect his views even if they weren’t phrased as elegantly as mine.
Even though I could use a rationality is winning approach to maneuver the situation so that “we spend all the entertainment money on sci-fi books and none on cable” looked like the “rational” decision, I eventually came to realize that, to serve my overarching goal of a flourishing marriage, our hedonic preferences needed to be weighted equally and split the money between our preferences
“I really, really want X,” is never stupid or irrational in and of itself. It’s just a preference. To the extent that some SJWs seem to want to say “I really, really want X,” and leave their argument at that, then rationality is irrelevant to them.
To the extent that some SJWs seem to want to say “I really, really want X,” and leave their argument at that, then rationality is irrelevant to them.
The problem is that some SJWs say “I really, really want you/everyone to do X” but the rest of the world is not married to them and is not particularly interested in their hedonic preferences. This means that they need to negotiate for what they want and at this point rationality jumps right back in.
“I really want X and don’t care about anything else” is the attitude of a small child.
You are right that there is commonly an implicate argument for action on someone else’s part that is irrational. There was originally an argument from Mainline Protestantism* that somewhat bridged the gap from. But most SJWs don’t want the rest of the baggage from Christianity and so don’t want to examine that foundation.
But SJWs do commonly carry forward as assumptions ideas like “true” desires aren’t going to be contradictory and therefor don’t need to be put in a hierarchy:
This is not to say that there are many roles [sic] to be filled among those who resist, none of which should be placed in a hierarchy of value. People come from different places of knowledge, ability, and history which makes each person equipped to participate (if they so choose) based on their unique position in society.
In the meantime, the main audience that SJWs are talking to has the cultural value (inherited from Christianity) that we want to increase people’s happiness. So saying you want something, and therefore it would make you happy, is at least some small amount of weight in favor of that thing.
*(God loves all humans greatly and as imitators of Christ we should love all humans too. Also Christ has redeemed people from their sins and therefore they are going to be (and already are in some non-manifest way) made perfect. Since they are made perfect, their deepest and truest desires will partake of the Good. The Good is non-self-contradictory and innately desirable. Therefore these “true” desires, which are in the process of being brought out in them by the grace of God, should be catered to.)
There was originally an argument from Mainline Protestantism* that somewhat bridged the gap from.
Interesting. Do you think it was a sort of convergent evolution or there’s actually a traceable line of descent from this bit of Protestant theology to SJWs?
SJWs do commonly carry forward as assumptions ideas like “true” desires aren’t going to be contradictory and therefor don’t need to be put in a hierarchy
Yes, but I read it as, basically, refusal to consider the consequences. It’s like you make a list of what you want and pay no attention to the costs or likelihood or even whether things you like are compatible with each other.
SJWs certainly do have utopian tendencies and utopias rarely tolerate close scrutiny.
the cultural value (inherited from Christianity) that we want to increase people’s happiness.
I think this value is deeper and more ancient that Christianity—it’s a consequence of being social animals. If I scratch your back, I make it more probable that you’ll scratch mine when I need it. As long at the cost is not high, sure, whatever makes you happy.
Do you think it was a sort of convergent evolution or there’s actually a traceable line of descent from this bit of Protestant theology to SJWs?
Yes, they weren’t the only influence but they were an influential and founding one. All the seven sisters have on going involvement with Social Justice today.
I read it as, basically, refusal to consider the consequences
There is certainly a lot of that, especially among the more extreme radicals, which Pham’s article is certainly part of. But the reason this can flourish in the discourse community is that it is being buttressed from the side by a sort of ‘men of good will can always come to a reasonable agreement’ article of faith. Even though Pham themself would reject this believe the fact that others in this community hold it enables Pham’s disregard of feasibility. This is one big contribution that Mainline Christianity has been making to Social Justice, providing cohesion with this sort of ballast.
this value is deeper and more ancient … As long at the cost is not high, sure, whatever makes you happy.
I would agree that this is an ancient value with regards to my family/my friends/my tribe , predicated on their continued acceptable behavior as members of the in group. But I’m doubtful about how far beyond that it would extend. In fact for those defiantly identified as out-group I would think it would be more “As long as the cost is not too high, whatever makes you miserable.”
Christianity, as part of its universalizing, had a founding goal of drawing all peoples, languages, and tribes into one family group. Treating everyone as brothers and sisters meant having a care for their happiness.
I agree that SJWs don’t seem very interested in making people happy (in fact I think this is one of those Moloch situations and everyone is actually producing unhappiness because of their incentives inside the situation) But SJWs do rely on general happiness goals in their audience. I do also think a lot of Social Justice thinking started out as a genuine desire to help people and make them happier, regardless of how that goal turned back on itself do to inconsistencies in other places in the philosophy.
‘men of good will can always come to a reasonable agreement’ article of faith
That’s an interesting observation given that SJWs are very… forceful about separating everyone into sheep and goats. They have come to heavily depend upon the existence of “the enemy” fighting which constitutes most of their raison d’etre. There are, of course, parallels with the devil, but the machinations of Satan figure much more prominently in Catholicism and are (almost?) completely absent in the UU doctrine.
this is an ancient value with regards to my family/my friends/my tribe… But I’m doubtful about how far beyond that it would extend.
For low-cost help I think pretty far. Imagine yourself travelling in some non-Christian country where you are clearly not a native (say, China for most people here). You had a minor accident and you are standing at the side of the road over, say, a broken bike and bleeding from a minor gash. You think random strangers won’t stop and help you?
I do also think a lot of Social Justice thinking started out as a genuine desire to help people and make them happier
I’ve come to realize that my view of SJ is insufficiently steely. Do you happen to know of some text that presents SJ in a reasonable way and:
Is not written by an idiot
Is not written for idiots
Handwaves as little as possible
Does not descend into the post-modernism morass
Does not reduce SJ to humanism and/or XIX-century liberalism writ large
Not sure if this guy is sufficiently SJW, but once in a while I notice him writing something smart. Here are some quotes:
A few months back I got into a Twitter argument about the uselessness of complaints about cultural appropriation, in particular a muscular form that takes it as offensive to consume the goods of cultures to which one does not belong — food, clothing, music, and so on. I pointed out the usual problems with this thinking. All culture is hybrid; there is no place where legitimate appreciation ends and shameful appropriation begins; a world without cultural borrowing is a bleak and terrible place; and as I’ve said many times, saying “you should only consume that which comes from your own culture” is functionally identical to the efforts of white supremacists to keep the people pure.
One of American liberalism’s many abundant problems is an ingrained sense that the people it most needs to convince are somehow not worthy of the effort.
My many unhappy debates with liberals have demonstrated to me that, for every one of them that is motivated by a sincere desire to help everyone, another is motivated by the base instinct to place him or herself above others on the hierarchy of righteousness. American liberalism has become so deeply habituated to the practice of ceaseless and totalizing moral judgment that it seems incapable of expressing itself with any other kind of vocabulary. And the inevitable outcome of a politics of personal righteousness is an ideology made up only of commissars, an army of inquisitors who must by necessity believe in a vast throng of sinners and a small band of saints, with themselves standing as the greatest among this latter group. That’s the opposite of what I’m interested in. I’m not invested in politics out of a desire to be one of the elect. I am invested in politics because I want to destroy the concept of the elect.
For good or for bad (and you can guess how I’d adjudicate that), progressive politics have adopted cruelty as a core function. Those who are deemed politically unclean — often, I will fully admit, for very good reason, as the world is full of people with shitty opinions that are naturally offensive — are widely believed to be worthy targets of mass character assassination, subject to petty personal insults and existential moral denunciations. I find that so banal a statement of reality I’m not sure anyone could deny that it happens with a straight face. (...) It’s remarkable, on social media, how many of the insults and attacks boil down to more-or-less naked statements of, “I am a member in good standing of this group, and you aren’t, and my group has agreed on your irrelevance and your lack of value.”
The guy is criticizing them. Lots of liberals are uncomfortable with SJWs. I’m looking for a steelmanning, for someone to explain why they are doing the right thing (bonus points for linking it to Christianity or UU specifically).
In case you’re still looking, I think you might find Chris Brecheen’s “Social Justice Bard” blog edifying, though he doesn’t connect social justice ideas to Christianity that I’ve seen. For that, some of the blogs on the Progressive Christian Channel at Patheos.com might help (Slacktivist is particularly social-justice-oriented), as well as some of the ones on the Atheist Channel whose authors are ex-Christians and still draw inspiration from what they see as Christianity’s good points (e.g. Love Joy Feminism, Roll to Disbelieve and An Atheist in Dixie).
On a quick glance he seems enthusiastic and voluble (smartness TBD) and I don’t really want to dig through his piles of content in the hope of finding a pearl or two.
I’m looking not for a blog, but for a piece of text, a thoughtful write-up of reasonable size. An single essay, if you wish.
In case you’re still looking, I think you might find Chris Brecheen’s “Social Justice Bard” blog edifying
Looking at this blog I’m having trouble not coming to the conclusion that he’s an idiot. Could you cite some of his posts you found particularly edifying?
That’s an interesting observation given that SJWs are very… forceful about separating everyone into sheep and goats. They have come to heavily depend upon the existence of “the enemy” fighting which constitutes most of their raison d’etre
Of course people of good will come to agree with them, isn’t it self evident that if any normal person realizes here is someone who as had a life accident and is doing the emotional equivalent of bleeding, of course they would stop and help, giving what ever validation and encouragement that want. It’s hard to imagine how anyone could think so callously. They must be down right evil and we don’t want them around. Of course it’s only a few people who are like that, most people just haven’t realized there is really someone hurting in their feelings here, they will gather round to help and kick the few bad people out of decent society.
Seriously, even though are plenty of instances of SJWs doing the normal human thing and lashing out with hurtful words and people they are angry at, I also think a lot of them would expect most people to agree with them, if only they understood. They see the specific small group they are targeting at the moment and think of that as the problem and don’t step back and view the SJM as a whole and realize how many people are targets or potential targets.
In a non-Christian country I would not expect the majority of people to stop and help me after an accident, though I would expect some. But I would expect more of the people who stopped to help to be think that I looked like a rich westerner at that either my high-status would boost theirs through even a brief association or that I was a good opportunity for a hustle.
As for the reference req request, I don’t know of any. This is possibly because I am not part of the SJM and don’t know as much as an insider. But I can think of a couple of reasons such a reference might not exist. One is that generally the people in the movement don’t want to examine their assumptions and open them up to criticism. Second is that, while from the outside the SJM is identifiable as a distinct thing, from within I think SJM just looks like the right way to act on liberalism writ large or the natural progression of progressivism.
I would also note that an emotional impulse to make someone who is sad feel better, however genuine, is not the same thing as an intellectual commitment understand the problem and find ways to solve it.
They see the specific small group they are targeting at the moment
The SJ movements tends to target what they see as large oppressive systems. Cis white men is not a particularly small group, for example. Or take the commonly expressed sentiment that everyone has a racist inside so we have to be constantly on guard and fight it (a very Christian notion, by the way).
In a non-Christian country I would not expect the majority of people to stop and help me after an accident
That’s curious. I would encourage a bit of self-reflection about how you came to believe that :-/ To remove the “rich westerner” part, let’s replace China with Japan, for example.
from within I think SJM just looks like the right way to act on liberalism writ large
That might be so, but given that I lack the inside view, I don’t know. However the militant left-wing streak is just too strong to be compatible with straight XIX century liberalism...
To clarify I wouldn’t expect most people in a Christian country to help without an alterative motive either. ( this study comes to mind though I think my option was formed more from general experience.) I have met a few people how genuinely like to help for helping’s sake but I think a larger percentage need some additional motivation like an expectation of a likelihood of reciprocation or perceiving the person to be helped as in-group like.
Also, I apologize but my dyslexia kicked in and I mis-read 19th canter as 21st century. If you’re willing to settle for 21st century liberalism that is the intellectual foundation of social justice activism I have heard interesting things about “The Givingness of Things: Essay” though I haven’t read it.
Well, Christianity, according to many traditional interpretations, involves an omniscient, omnipotent Observer who keeps tally of such good Samaritan-esque acts and provides a reward in a paradisaical life after death. This same Observer might also deny you entry into said paradise if you show a consistent disregard for the welfare of others.
Seems to me this is a pretty rational reason why Christians, among others with similar metaphysical beliefs about the universe, might be more likely to help.
There is a perfectly rational reason why a Christian might be more inclined than a non-Christian to help a stranger if that Christian believes they will be rewarded for their actions.
There is a clear incentive in their mind.
The Christian who acts only in order to receive the reward ceases to act altruistically. In this sense, they are no “better” than a non-Christian who doesn’t help.
But to a sincere believer in a certain interpretation of Christianity, the future heavenly rewards attached to good deeds like helping strangers are just as real and motivating as immediate cash rewards. There is no good reason to suspect this wouldn’t motivate them to do more good deeds than a non-believer. It’s just simple economics.
Heh. I think you just proposed an argument why spherical cows in vacuum who are “sincere believer[s] in a certain interpretation” will give more milk than other not-that spherical cows.
However as a matter of empirical reality, are you willing to assert that a bleeding person standing over a broken bike by the side of road will have more random strangers stop to help him in, say, Honduras than in, say, Japan? And that difference will be pronounced and noticeable?
Let me offer some useful terms. One is “social cohesion”. Another is “high-trust society”. Yet another is “collectivism”. Note how none of them refers to religious beliefs or to rewards in the afterlife.
Imagine two people approach the bloodied biker. Person A sincerely believes they will receive a future $100 cash reward for engaging in an act of kindness on that day. Person B holds no such belief.
If our scenario takes place in a collectivist, high-trust society with strong social cohesion, which person do you believe is more likely to act to help the bloodied biker? A or B? Why?
If our scenario takes place in a collectivist, high-trust society with strong social cohesion, which person do you believe is more likely to act to help the bloodied biker?
I believe both will help and the $100 will make no difference. Homo economicus is a fictional creature.
More to the point, if bloody biker X stands by the side of the road in a Christian but low-trust low-cohesion country, and bloody biker Y stands by the side of the road in a heathen high-trust high-cohesion country, I think Y’s chances are better than X’s.
It doesn’t follow that humans don’t ever act based on incentives. What if the $100 was $1,000? Or $1,000,000? The amount is arbitrary. In reality, Christians of a certain ilk believe the rewards they can reap in heaven dwarf any conceivable monetary amount. (Like 3^^^3 times better than $1,000,000...)
More to the point, if bloody biker X stands by the side of the road in a Christian but low-trust low-cohesion country, and bloody biker Y stands by the side of the road in a heathen high-trust high-cohesion country, I think Y’s chances are better than X’s.
In other words, if you place two spherical cows in vastly different scenarios with remarkably different variables, then you can produce an outcome that supports your argument. Fascinating.
In reality, Christians of a certain ilk believe the rewards they can reap in heaven dwarf any conceivable monetary amount.
They will certainly say they do. However, they don’t generally behave as if they really truly deep down believe that. In particular, I can think of very few occasions when I have seen Christians acting more motivated by the prospect of heavenly rewards than they would have been by an offer of $1M in a year’s time.
Note also that a typical Christian facing an injured biker probably doesn’t believe that he will be saved if he helps and damned if he doesn’t, Matthew 25:31ff notwithstanding. Quite right, too; after all, he will be faced with plenty of other opportunities to help or not help, and it can’t possibly be true that each of them determines whether he’s saved or damned.
And note also-also that this isn’t really about Christians versus everyone else; it’s about people who believe in huge post-mortem rewards and punishments versus everyone else. E.g., Muslims’ beliefs on this score are broadly similar to Christians’.
They will certainly say they do. However, they don’t generally behave as if they really truly deep down believe that. In particular, I can think of very few occasions when I have seen Christians acting more motivated by the prospect of heavenly rewards than they would have been by an offer of $1M in a year’s time.
A certain ilk of Christians do behave in ways that indicate they are very motivated by heavenly rewards. Some do not. Some believe a divine tally sheet doesn’t exist. Some believe it is very real and act accordingly. Some say they believe in rewards but there is no evidence indicating that stated belief is sincere. I’ve met all kinds.
Note also that a typical Christian facing an injured biker probably doesn’t believe that he will be saved if he helps and damned if he doesn’t, Matthew 25:31ff notwithstanding. Quite right, too; after all, he will be faced with plenty of other opportunities to help or not help, and it can’t possibly be true that each of them determines whether he’s saved or damned.
True, except I have met Christians who believe that unrepentant sin could lead to hell, and that Matt 25:31 will describe the fate of many, many of the alleged “saved”. In this way, the bold is not necessarily true, as God may rapture at an inopportune time and leave a Christian who has recently turned up her nose at a bloodied biker deserving of hell.
And note also-also that this isn’t really about Christians versus everyone else; it’s about people who believe in huge post-mortem rewards and punishments versus everyone else. E.g., Muslims’ beliefs on this score are broadly similar to Christians’.
It doesn’t follow that humans don’t ever act based on incentives.
And did anyone claim that?
The amount is arbitrary.
Yes, and in the case of both A and B helping the bloody biker, the amount doesn’t matter, even if it’s arbitrary.
In other words, if you place two spherical cows in vastly different scenarios with remarkably different variables
First, no, they are not spherical cows. Bloody people actually do stand by the side of the road from time to time. Strangers stop and help them. It’s an empirical phenomenon which you can empirically investigate.
Second, the “different scenarios” is the entire point. You asserted that Christians will be more likely to help than non-Christians with the implication that this distinction is important. Before that, Alia1d said she’d expect less help in a non-Christian country meaning there would be an observable difference in outcomes.
I think both these positions are wrong. Being a Christian or a heathen is NOT what determines the percentage of random strangers who turn out to be kind-hearted. Other factors, like the ones mentioned by me, are much more important. And similarly, whether you get help on the side of the road or not in a particular country is not driven by whether the population is Christian.
I think both these positions are wrong. Being a Christian or a heathen is NOT what determines the percentage of random strangers who turn out to be kind-hearted. Other factors, like the ones mentioned by me, are much more important. And similarly, whether you get help on the side of the road or not in a particular country is not driven by whether the population is Christian.
There are many, many variables. One obvious, empirical, demonstrable reason for why people choose to behave in certain ways is incentive.
If you control for all the other variables, a person given an incentive to act in a charitable way (cash, heavenly reward, status, etc.) will do so more often than a person given no other incentive besides collectivism. This is, I hope, obvious and uncontroversial.
Of course, how much (or how little) said incentive motivates a person to act depends on the significance of the incentive.
Certain interpretations of Christianity provide this incentive via the promise of rewards in the afterlife and escape from punishment in the afterlife.
It may be true that in Christian Country C a bloodied biker would be less likely to be helped than in Atheist Country A, but that would be because of a host of uncontrolled variables including but not limited to social cohesion, level of social trust, etc. But, if you control for all the other variables, a person given an incentive to act in a charitable way will do so more often than a person who does not receive that same incentive.
Or… Maybe you have some evidence to support the idea that Christians who sincerely believe in accumulating afterlife rewards in exchange for good deeds actually do fewer good deeds than people who have no such heavenly promise of incentive?
Yes, that’s why the spherical cows in vacuum made their appearance in this thread. “Everything else being equal” is an abstraction. In reality everything else is never equal.
The whole thing started because Alia1d said she expects less help in a non-Christian country. That is not an “everything else being equal” claim. We have a small, finite set of countries. They are all different. Alia1d is saying, in technical terms, that if we divide our small diverse set into two subsets using the Christian / non-Christian criterion, her expectations for help are higher in the Christian cluster than in the non-Christian cluster. I also read a causal implication in there: this is so not because of some random fluctuations, but because Christianity makes it so.
I do not believe this assertion to be true—empirically true, on the ground. Discussions of what could possibly happen if one spherical cow floated in vacuum believing in a very particular version of Christianity and another spherical cow floated nearby but did not believe in this version (oh, wait, actually, did not believe in in posthumous rewards? or any incentives? or didn’t expect to get $100? one of those...) don’t look to be particularly useful.
if you control for all the other variables, a person given an incentive to act in a charitable way will do so more often than a person who does not receive that same incentive.
You are not implying that only Christianity gives people incentives to act in a charitable way, are you?
Yes, that’s why the spherical cows in vacuum made their appearance in this thread. “Everything else being equal” is an abstraction. In reality everything else is never equal.
Moot. There are real world scenarios where the variables could be controlled enough to get an idea of whether a given incentive impacts behavior.
It may be true, for instance, in a Christian country where there is great scarcity that an average citizen maybe less likely to help a bloodied biker than a citizen in an atheist country where there is plenty. But we have plenty of evidence to suggest religious conceptions of the afterlife do indeed influence behavior in many people.
And, as a simple, reasonable, non-spherical-cow thought experiment that uses a realistic model of our world, we could imagine a Christian and a non-Christian each approaching a bloodied biker and how they each may act in a case where the other conditions you mentioned (social cohesion, etc.) were generally equal.
The whole thing started because Alia1d said she expects less help in a non-Christian country.
I took issue with you saying there was a bias against non-Christians. That’s where “this thing” started for me. I’m saying, to the contrary, there is a good reason to suspect religious people sincerely believing in the reality of a significant afterlife incentive structure will be motivated to behave in certain ways. I think there is plenty of evidence of this.
I do not believe this assertion to be true—empirically true, on the ground.
...could be controlled …It may be true …we could imagine
You’re still floating in vacuum.
I took issue with you saying there was a bias against non-Christians.
On the basis of what, do you think, she made this statement?
If you’re lumping it all together under “religious people sincerely believing in the reality of a significant afterlife incentive structure”, let’s make a slight change: one should expect to be helped more in a Muslim country than in a non-Muslim country. Is that a true statement? I see no difference with a s/Muslim/Christian version.
Based on what empirical evidence?
Based on my perception of the world which includes personal experience.
On the basis of what, do you think, she made this statement?
I don’t know. I replied to the idea it was “bigoted” and biased. I originally just pointed out it was reasonable to believe someone would behave more charitably if given an incentive.
If you’re lumping it all together under “religious people sincerely believing in the reality of a significant afterlife incentive structure”, let’s make a slight change: one should expect to be helped more in a Muslim country than in a non-Muslim country. Is that a true statement? I see no difference with a s/Muslim/Christian version.
The religion is only important to the extent it’s supernatural incentive structure is significant and sincerely believed. Doesn’t matter what it is. Xtianity and Islam just happen to be super popular.
Based on my perception of the world which includes personal experience.
So, nothing beyond that? Forgive me if I’m not convinced.
By the way, I’ve met lots of Christians who behave charitably explicitly because of their eschatology. I’ve also read a lot about the suicide bombers who are steeped in an interpretation of Islam. In both cases, it’s largely behavior being affected by belief.
Which is the same old shit of atheists being amoral because why would they have morals without incentives.
No. Not one bit. No one said atheists were amoral. I think we all have incentives to act morally.
Do you have any empirical evidence to suggest the promise of reward in the afterlife is not an incentive to many sincere religious people? Or that it doesn’t affect their willingness to engage in charitable behavior? Or that helping out someone who crashed their bike is not an example of the type of charitable behavior that a sincere religious person may believe will benefit them in said afterlife?
Or do you reject that incentives affect behavior?
If I lie to someone and tell them I will give them $1,000,000 in 10 years if they walk one old lady across everyday, to the extent the person believes me, this will affect their behavior, right?
This all seems pretty obvious to me and it feels like you know something I don’t about human behavior. You said:
Based on my perception of the world which includes personal experience.
What experiences have you had? What is your perception of the world in regard to this issue?
We’ve wandered far afield. I’ll sum up my position and bail.
Yes, people respond to incentives. Of course. But if you are going to pull out one specific incentive and look at it carefully, the question becomes whether it’s relevant and does it make any noticeable difference. Statistically speaking, you’re interested in the effect size and not merely in p-value proving the existence of something.
Human actions are the net sum of a very large variety of forces, some of which are incentives and there are a lot of different ones, too. Does the particular incentive that you’re interested in make a detectable difference in the outcome you care about? If not, then why are you talking about it? Quantum effects exist and affect the trajectory of the golf ball and yet no one incorporates them into the optimization of their golf swing—for a very good reason.
“Exists but irrelevant” is a description that can (and should) be applied to many things.
I have no idea how anyone could deny religious afterlife beliefs have no significant impact in human motivation and, thereby, human behavior. I think we have abundant evidence to the contrary, and you’ve provided no evidence for your view.
I have at least noticed a change in incentives in my own life, and yes, it makes a detectable difference in outcomes. I am certainly not about to become a serial killer, but there are many good things that I am less motivated to do than I used to be, and consequently, noticeably less likely to actually do.
I agree with Brillyant that his argument is basically obviously, and arguing against it is simply wishful thinking.
I agree that SJWs don’t seem very interested in making people happy (in fact I think this is one of those Moloch situations and everyone is actually producing unhappiness because of their incentives inside the situation) But SJWs do rely on general happiness goals in their audience. I do also think a lot of Social Justice thinking started out as a genuine desire to help people and make them happier, regardless of how that goal turned back on itself do to inconsistencies in other places in the philosophy.
I see it as a set of originally well-meant goals that later spiralled into virtue-signalling competition. Now they run on the classical cultish behavioral patterns.
To the extent that some SJWs seem to want to say “I really, really want X,” and leave their argument at that, then rationality is irrelevant to them.
Rationality is also irrelevant to my daughter, and for the same reason, as for example in this exchange:
Daughter: I want TV.
Me: No more TV now.
Daughter: But I want it!
This is rather a common ‘argument’ of hers; from the outside it looks like she models me as not having understood her preference, and tries to clarify the preference. To be sure, she has the excuse of being four.
I’m not saying that a little more rationality wouldn’t be helpful. I’m saying the pointing to this and saying it’s irrational and maybe stupid is not the most interesting thing that can be said about it. It is more fascinating to look for what is incentivizing the irrationality.
There’s a very rational (in the sence of effective for getting what you want) negotiating tactic I heard about in one of Eric Flint’s books. The negotiator points at Crazy Joe muttering to himself in the corner and says ‘He and his friends are saying that if you don’t double their salaries they are not only going to strike, they’re going to be throwing rotten eggs at you come into the office and showing up at your house at midnight with bullhorns. But I know these people and can talk their language. I can get them to calm down. But you have to give me something in exchange. A ten percent raise doesn’t sound so crazy compared to double the salaries, does it? And besides, if you don’t make a deal with me, you’ll end up having to negotiate with Crazy Joe.’ And the business manager is so aghast by Crazy Joe’s demands that he ends up agreeing that ten percent is not as extreme as he first thought.
The fact that there is a crazy extreme getting a lot of attention, can make the only rationally extreme seem moderate. This sort of tactic doesn’t have to be disingenuous, or even conscious. In fact, If you eject (or steam roll into moderation) too many people for being more extreme than you are, not only do you weaken your negotiating position, you can get evaporative cooling in the direction of agreeing with your opponent.
Of course the people of the extreme extreme don’t need to know, and certainly can’t admit in public, that they are just being used to make other positions look good. When you combine that with the fact the SJWs have trouble coming to terms with the fact you can’t make everyone happy all of the time, the extreme extreme can spiral out of control in a way that is very hard to stop.
Nor is the basic tactic of preference statement counter productive on its own, if there is a significant enough presence of preference utilitarians in the audience to produce a reasonable hit rate. The problem is a coordination one where with enough people pursuing that strategy they end on having to be shriller and more negative to compete with one another. So they have to dwell on their misery, increasing its impact, and he audience gets bombarded. So even though everyone started out just wanting to create a little happiness actually end up creating a fair amount of unhappiness. And that’s a much more complex problem solving situation then just pointing out that some people are being irrational.
This is the difference between simple epistemic rationality (having good arguments) and the virtue of actuzlly being a good negotiator (and ‘good’ encompasses both a narrowly instrumental and an ethical viewpoint, as you’ve learned. Norms of all sorts and at all scales tend to align incentives—who would’ve thought!). But to the extent that good negotiation skills lead to good consequences for oneself, being a good negotiator is rational in an instrumental sense. Politics is really just the real-world art of negotiation writ large, so this sort of instrumental rationality (what some people would perhaps call ‘the art of the deal’) is nearly as important there.
I think there is another reason SJWs (and others) may dislike “rationality” that is getting buried here:
There is a difference between an argument not being phrased in a reasonable way and the argument itself being stupid. When my husband and I were first married I would win must of the arguments NOT because I was necessarily right (as later came to realize) but because I was a better rhetorician. I could lay out my case in an orderly fashion. I could work commonly agreed statements into my arguments. I could anticipate counter arguments and set-up to counter them. I could model possible external circumstances and present those that supported my view. This lead to a situation where my husband constantly felt steam rolled. He might not be able to articulate logical fallacies but he could feel the effects of his preferences constantly being overruled by mine. I needed to learn to back off and respect his views even if they weren’t phrased as elegantly as mine. Even though I could use a rationality is winning approach to maneuver the situation so that “we spend all the entertainment money on sci-fi books and none on cable” looked like the “rational” decision, I eventually came to realize that, to serve my overarching goal of a flourishing marriage, our hedonic preferences needed to be weighted equally and split the money between our preferences “I really, really want X,” is never stupid or irrational in and of itself. It’s just a preference. To the extent that some SJWs seem to want to say “I really, really want X,” and leave their argument at that, then rationality is irrelevant to them.
The problem is that some SJWs say “I really, really want you/everyone to do X” but the rest of the world is not married to them and is not particularly interested in their hedonic preferences. This means that they need to negotiate for what they want and at this point rationality jumps right back in.
“I really want X and don’t care about anything else” is the attitude of a small child.
You are right that there is commonly an implicate argument for action on someone else’s part that is irrational. There was originally an argument from Mainline Protestantism* that somewhat bridged the gap from. But most SJWs don’t want the rest of the baggage from Christianity and so don’t want to examine that foundation. But SJWs do commonly carry forward as assumptions ideas like “true” desires aren’t going to be contradictory and therefor don’t need to be put in a hierarchy:
In the meantime, the main audience that SJWs are talking to has the cultural value (inherited from Christianity) that we want to increase people’s happiness. So saying you want something, and therefore it would make you happy, is at least some small amount of weight in favor of that thing.
*(God loves all humans greatly and as imitators of Christ we should love all humans too. Also Christ has redeemed people from their sins and therefore they are going to be (and already are in some non-manifest way) made perfect. Since they are made perfect, their deepest and truest desires will partake of the Good. The Good is non-self-contradictory and innately desirable. Therefore these “true” desires, which are in the process of being brought out in them by the grace of God, should be catered to.)
Interesting. Do you think it was a sort of convergent evolution or there’s actually a traceable line of descent from this bit of Protestant theology to SJWs?
Yes, but I read it as, basically, refusal to consider the consequences. It’s like you make a list of what you want and pay no attention to the costs or likelihood or even whether things you like are compatible with each other.
SJWs certainly do have utopian tendencies and utopias rarely tolerate close scrutiny.
I think this value is deeper and more ancient that Christianity—it’s a consequence of being social animals. If I scratch your back, I make it more probable that you’ll scratch mine when I need it. As long at the cost is not high, sure, whatever makes you happy.
But I don’t think that’s what SJWs are all about.
Yes, they weren’t the only influence but they were an influential and founding one. All the seven sisters have on going involvement with Social Justice today.
There is certainly a lot of that, especially among the more extreme radicals, which Pham’s article is certainly part of. But the reason this can flourish in the discourse community is that it is being buttressed from the side by a sort of ‘men of good will can always come to a reasonable agreement’ article of faith. Even though Pham themself would reject this believe the fact that others in this community hold it enables Pham’s disregard of feasibility. This is one big contribution that Mainline Christianity has been making to Social Justice, providing cohesion with this sort of ballast.
I would agree that this is an ancient value with regards to my family/my friends/my tribe , predicated on their continued acceptable behavior as members of the in group. But I’m doubtful about how far beyond that it would extend. In fact for those defiantly identified as out-group I would think it would be more “As long as the cost is not too high, whatever makes you miserable.”
Christianity, as part of its universalizing, had a founding goal of drawing all peoples, languages, and tribes into one family group. Treating everyone as brothers and sisters meant having a care for their happiness.
I agree that SJWs don’t seem very interested in making people happy (in fact I think this is one of those Moloch situations and everyone is actually producing unhappiness because of their incentives inside the situation) But SJWs do rely on general happiness goals in their audience. I do also think a lot of Social Justice thinking started out as a genuine desire to help people and make them happier, regardless of how that goal turned back on itself do to inconsistencies in other places in the philosophy.
That’s an interesting observation given that SJWs are very… forceful about separating everyone into sheep and goats. They have come to heavily depend upon the existence of “the enemy” fighting which constitutes most of their raison d’etre. There are, of course, parallels with the devil, but the machinations of Satan figure much more prominently in Catholicism and are (almost?) completely absent in the UU doctrine.
For low-cost help I think pretty far. Imagine yourself travelling in some non-Christian country where you are clearly not a native (say, China for most people here). You had a minor accident and you are standing at the side of the road over, say, a broken bike and bleeding from a minor gash. You think random strangers won’t stop and help you?
I’ve come to realize that my view of SJ is insufficiently steely. Do you happen to know of some text that presents SJ in a reasonable way and:
Is not written by an idiot
Is not written for idiots
Handwaves as little as possible
Does not descend into the post-modernism morass
Does not reduce SJ to humanism and/or XIX-century liberalism writ large
?
Not sure if this guy is sufficiently SJW, but once in a while I notice him writing something smart. Here are some quotes:
-- the sublime narcissism of getting offended on other people’s behalf
-- I wonder why people are so angry
-- in the simple foundation
-- if you’re not careful who’s in and who’s out becomes the only question
The guy is criticizing them. Lots of liberals are uncomfortable with SJWs. I’m looking for a steelmanning, for someone to explain why they are doing the right thing (bonus points for linking it to Christianity or UU specifically).
In case you’re still looking, I think you might find Chris Brecheen’s “Social Justice Bard” blog edifying, though he doesn’t connect social justice ideas to Christianity that I’ve seen. For that, some of the blogs on the Progressive Christian Channel at Patheos.com might help (Slacktivist is particularly social-justice-oriented), as well as some of the ones on the Atheist Channel whose authors are ex-Christians and still draw inspiration from what they see as Christianity’s good points (e.g. Love Joy Feminism, Roll to Disbelieve and An Atheist in Dixie).
On a quick glance he seems enthusiastic and voluble (smartness TBD) and I don’t really want to dig through his piles of content in the hope of finding a pearl or two.
I’m looking not for a blog, but for a piece of text, a thoughtful write-up of reasonable size. An single essay, if you wish.
Looking at this blog I’m having trouble not coming to the conclusion that he’s an idiot. Could you cite some of his posts you found particularly edifying?
Original thread here.
Of course people of good will come to agree with them, isn’t it self evident that if any normal person realizes here is someone who as had a life accident and is doing the emotional equivalent of bleeding, of course they would stop and help, giving what ever validation and encouragement that want. It’s hard to imagine how anyone could think so callously. They must be down right evil and we don’t want them around. Of course it’s only a few people who are like that, most people just haven’t realized there is really someone hurting in their feelings here, they will gather round to help and kick the few bad people out of decent society.
Seriously, even though are plenty of instances of SJWs doing the normal human thing and lashing out with hurtful words and people they are angry at, I also think a lot of them would expect most people to agree with them, if only they understood. They see the specific small group they are targeting at the moment and think of that as the problem and don’t step back and view the SJM as a whole and realize how many people are targets or potential targets.
In a non-Christian country I would not expect the majority of people to stop and help me after an accident, though I would expect some. But I would expect more of the people who stopped to help to be think that I looked like a rich westerner at that either my high-status would boost theirs through even a brief association or that I was a good opportunity for a hustle.
As for the reference req request, I don’t know of any. This is possibly because I am not part of the SJM and don’t know as much as an insider. But I can think of a couple of reasons such a reference might not exist. One is that generally the people in the movement don’t want to examine their assumptions and open them up to criticism. Second is that, while from the outside the SJM is identifiable as a distinct thing, from within I think SJM just looks like the right way to act on liberalism writ large or the natural progression of progressivism.
I would also note that an emotional impulse to make someone who is sad feel better, however genuine, is not the same thing as an intellectual commitment understand the problem and find ways to solve it.
The SJ movements tends to target what they see as large oppressive systems. Cis white men is not a particularly small group, for example. Or take the commonly expressed sentiment that everyone has a racist inside so we have to be constantly on guard and fight it (a very Christian notion, by the way).
That’s curious. I would encourage a bit of self-reflection about how you came to believe that :-/ To remove the “rich westerner” part, let’s replace China with Japan, for example.
That might be so, but given that I lack the inside view, I don’t know. However the militant left-wing streak is just too strong to be compatible with straight XIX century liberalism...
To clarify I wouldn’t expect most people in a Christian country to help without an alterative motive either. ( this study comes to mind though I think my option was formed more from general experience.) I have met a few people how genuinely like to help for helping’s sake but I think a larger percentage need some additional motivation like an expectation of a likelihood of reciprocation or perceiving the person to be helped as in-group like.
Also, I apologize but my dyslexia kicked in and I mis-read 19th canter as 21st century. If you’re willing to settle for 21st century liberalism that is the intellectual foundation of social justice activism I have heard interesting things about “The Givingness of Things: Essay” though I haven’t read it.
Why? Is there something special about non-Christians in this regard which makes them less likely to help you after an accident?
Well, Christianity, according to many traditional interpretations, involves an omniscient, omnipotent Observer who keeps tally of such good Samaritan-esque acts and provides a reward in a paradisaical life after death. This same Observer might also deny you entry into said paradise if you show a consistent disregard for the welfare of others.
Seems to me this is a pretty rational reason why Christians, among others with similar metaphysical beliefs about the universe, might be more likely to help.
If that’s what he meant, he should have said “nonreligious” rather than “non-Christian”.
And it still borders on bigotry, because it’s equivalent to “non-religious people aren’t moral”.
Ok, define “bigotry”, also explain why “bigotry” as you just defined it is a bad thing.
Original thread here.
It’s bigotry?
It’s specifically a bias against non-Christians.
No.
There is a perfectly rational reason why a Christian might be more inclined than a non-Christian to help a stranger if that Christian believes they will be rewarded for their actions.
There is a clear incentive in their mind.
The Christian who acts only in order to receive the reward ceases to act altruistically. In this sense, they are no “better” than a non-Christian who doesn’t help.
But to a sincere believer in a certain interpretation of Christianity, the future heavenly rewards attached to good deeds like helping strangers are just as real and motivating as immediate cash rewards. There is no good reason to suspect this wouldn’t motivate them to do more good deeds than a non-believer. It’s just simple economics.
Heh. I think you just proposed an argument why spherical cows in vacuum who are “sincere believer[s] in a certain interpretation” will give more milk than other not-that spherical cows.
However as a matter of empirical reality, are you willing to assert that a bleeding person standing over a broken bike by the side of road will have more random strangers stop to help him in, say, Honduras than in, say, Japan? And that difference will be pronounced and noticeable?
Let me offer some useful terms. One is “social cohesion”. Another is “high-trust society”. Yet another is “collectivism”. Note how none of them refers to religious beliefs or to rewards in the afterlife.
Imagine two people approach the bloodied biker. Person A sincerely believes they will receive a future $100 cash reward for engaging in an act of kindness on that day. Person B holds no such belief.
If our scenario takes place in a collectivist, high-trust society with strong social cohesion, which person do you believe is more likely to act to help the bloodied biker? A or B? Why?
I believe both will help and the $100 will make no difference. Homo economicus is a fictional creature.
More to the point, if bloody biker X stands by the side of the road in a Christian but low-trust low-cohesion country, and bloody biker Y stands by the side of the road in a heathen high-trust high-cohesion country, I think Y’s chances are better than X’s.
It doesn’t follow that humans don’t ever act based on incentives. What if the $100 was $1,000? Or $1,000,000? The amount is arbitrary. In reality, Christians of a certain ilk believe the rewards they can reap in heaven dwarf any conceivable monetary amount. (Like 3^^^3 times better than $1,000,000...)
In other words, if you place two spherical cows in vastly different scenarios with remarkably different variables, then you can produce an outcome that supports your argument. Fascinating.
They will certainly say they do. However, they don’t generally behave as if they really truly deep down believe that. In particular, I can think of very few occasions when I have seen Christians acting more motivated by the prospect of heavenly rewards than they would have been by an offer of $1M in a year’s time.
Note also that a typical Christian facing an injured biker probably doesn’t believe that he will be saved if he helps and damned if he doesn’t, Matthew 25:31ff notwithstanding. Quite right, too; after all, he will be faced with plenty of other opportunities to help or not help, and it can’t possibly be true that each of them determines whether he’s saved or damned.
And note also-also that this isn’t really about Christians versus everyone else; it’s about people who believe in huge post-mortem rewards and punishments versus everyone else. E.g., Muslims’ beliefs on this score are broadly similar to Christians’.
A certain ilk of Christians do behave in ways that indicate they are very motivated by heavenly rewards. Some do not. Some believe a divine tally sheet doesn’t exist. Some believe it is very real and act accordingly. Some say they believe in rewards but there is no evidence indicating that stated belief is sincere. I’ve met all kinds.
True, except I have met Christians who believe that unrepentant sin could lead to hell, and that Matt 25:31 will describe the fate of many, many of the alleged “saved”. In this way, the bold is not necessarily true, as God may rapture at an inopportune time and leave a Christian who has recently turned up her nose at a bloodied biker deserving of hell.
Noted.
And did anyone claim that?
Yes, and in the case of both A and B helping the bloody biker, the amount doesn’t matter, even if it’s arbitrary.
First, no, they are not spherical cows. Bloody people actually do stand by the side of the road from time to time. Strangers stop and help them. It’s an empirical phenomenon which you can empirically investigate.
Second, the “different scenarios” is the entire point. You asserted that Christians will be more likely to help than non-Christians with the implication that this distinction is important. Before that, Alia1d said she’d expect less help in a non-Christian country meaning there would be an observable difference in outcomes.
I think both these positions are wrong. Being a Christian or a heathen is NOT what determines the percentage of random strangers who turn out to be kind-hearted. Other factors, like the ones mentioned by me, are much more important. And similarly, whether you get help on the side of the road or not in a particular country is not driven by whether the population is Christian.
There are many, many variables. One obvious, empirical, demonstrable reason for why people choose to behave in certain ways is incentive.
If you control for all the other variables, a person given an incentive to act in a charitable way (cash, heavenly reward, status, etc.) will do so more often than a person given no other incentive besides collectivism. This is, I hope, obvious and uncontroversial.
Of course, how much (or how little) said incentive motivates a person to act depends on the significance of the incentive.
Certain interpretations of Christianity provide this incentive via the promise of rewards in the afterlife and escape from punishment in the afterlife.
It may be true that in Christian Country C a bloodied biker would be less likely to be helped than in Atheist Country A, but that would be because of a host of uncontrolled variables including but not limited to social cohesion, level of social trust, etc. But, if you control for all the other variables, a person given an incentive to act in a charitable way will do so more often than a person who does not receive that same incentive.
Or… Maybe you have some evidence to support the idea that Christians who sincerely believe in accumulating afterlife rewards in exchange for good deeds actually do fewer good deeds than people who have no such heavenly promise of incentive?
Can you provide any evidence?
Yes, that’s why the spherical cows in vacuum made their appearance in this thread. “Everything else being equal” is an abstraction. In reality everything else is never equal.
The whole thing started because Alia1d said she expects less help in a non-Christian country. That is not an “everything else being equal” claim. We have a small, finite set of countries. They are all different. Alia1d is saying, in technical terms, that if we divide our small diverse set into two subsets using the Christian / non-Christian criterion, her expectations for help are higher in the Christian cluster than in the non-Christian cluster. I also read a causal implication in there: this is so not because of some random fluctuations, but because Christianity makes it so.
I do not believe this assertion to be true—empirically true, on the ground. Discussions of what could possibly happen if one spherical cow floated in vacuum believing in a very particular version of Christianity and another spherical cow floated nearby but did not believe in this version (oh, wait, actually, did not believe in in posthumous rewards? or any incentives? or didn’t expect to get $100? one of those...) don’t look to be particularly useful.
You are not implying that only Christianity gives people incentives to act in a charitable way, are you?
Moot. There are real world scenarios where the variables could be controlled enough to get an idea of whether a given incentive impacts behavior.
It may be true, for instance, in a Christian country where there is great scarcity that an average citizen maybe less likely to help a bloodied biker than a citizen in an atheist country where there is plenty. But we have plenty of evidence to suggest religious conceptions of the afterlife do indeed influence behavior in many people.
And, as a simple, reasonable, non-spherical-cow thought experiment that uses a realistic model of our world, we could imagine a Christian and a non-Christian each approaching a bloodied biker and how they each may act in a case where the other conditions you mentioned (social cohesion, etc.) were generally equal.
I took issue with you saying there was a bias against non-Christians. That’s where “this thing” started for me. I’m saying, to the contrary, there is a good reason to suspect religious people sincerely believing in the reality of a significant afterlife incentive structure will be motivated to behave in certain ways. I think there is plenty of evidence of this.
Based on what empirical evidence?
You’re still floating in vacuum.
On the basis of what, do you think, she made this statement?
If you’re lumping it all together under “religious people sincerely believing in the reality of a significant afterlife incentive structure”, let’s make a slight change: one should expect to be helped more in a Muslim country than in a non-Muslim country. Is that a true statement? I see no difference with a s/Muslim/Christian version.
Based on my perception of the world which includes personal experience.
I don’t know. I replied to the idea it was “bigoted” and biased. I originally just pointed out it was reasonable to believe someone would behave more charitably if given an incentive.
The religion is only important to the extent it’s supernatural incentive structure is significant and sincerely believed. Doesn’t matter what it is. Xtianity and Islam just happen to be super popular.
So, nothing beyond that? Forgive me if I’m not convinced.
By the way, I’ve met lots of Christians who behave charitably explicitly because of their eschatology. I’ve also read a lot about the suicide bombers who are steeped in an interpretation of Islam. In both cases, it’s largely behavior being affected by belief.
Jiro said it “borders on bigotry”. I said it was a bias. I still think it’s a bias.
Which is the same old shit of atheists being amoral because why would they have morals without incentives.
I’m not trying to convince you.
Really, which bias are you referring to.
Well, a lot of atheists are amoral.
Original thread here.
No. Not one bit. No one said atheists were amoral. I think we all have incentives to act morally.
Do you have any empirical evidence to suggest the promise of reward in the afterlife is not an incentive to many sincere religious people? Or that it doesn’t affect their willingness to engage in charitable behavior? Or that helping out someone who crashed their bike is not an example of the type of charitable behavior that a sincere religious person may believe will benefit them in said afterlife?
Or do you reject that incentives affect behavior?
If I lie to someone and tell them I will give them $1,000,000 in 10 years if they walk one old lady across everyday, to the extent the person believes me, this will affect their behavior, right?
This all seems pretty obvious to me and it feels like you know something I don’t about human behavior. You said:
What experiences have you had? What is your perception of the world in regard to this issue?
We’ve wandered far afield. I’ll sum up my position and bail.
Yes, people respond to incentives. Of course. But if you are going to pull out one specific incentive and look at it carefully, the question becomes whether it’s relevant and does it make any noticeable difference. Statistically speaking, you’re interested in the effect size and not merely in p-value proving the existence of something.
Human actions are the net sum of a very large variety of forces, some of which are incentives and there are a lot of different ones, too. Does the particular incentive that you’re interested in make a detectable difference in the outcome you care about? If not, then why are you talking about it? Quantum effects exist and affect the trajectory of the golf ball and yet no one incorporates them into the optimization of their golf swing—for a very good reason.
“Exists but irrelevant” is a description that can (and should) be applied to many things.
I have no idea how anyone could deny religious afterlife beliefs have no significant impact in human motivation and, thereby, human behavior. I think we have abundant evidence to the contrary, and you’ve provided no evidence for your view.
Good chat.
I have at least noticed a change in incentives in my own life, and yes, it makes a detectable difference in outcomes. I am certainly not about to become a serial killer, but there are many good things that I am less motivated to do than I used to be, and consequently, noticeably less likely to actually do.
I agree with Brillyant that his argument is basically obviously, and arguing against it is simply wishful thinking.
I see it as a set of originally well-meant goals that later spiralled into virtue-signalling competition. Now they run on the classical cultish behavioral patterns.
There is a simpler and stronger argument to that end from evolution.
Rationality is also irrelevant to my daughter, and for the same reason, as for example in this exchange:
Daughter: I want TV. Me: No more TV now. Daughter: But I want it!
This is rather a common ‘argument’ of hers; from the outside it looks like she models me as not having understood her preference, and tries to clarify the preference. To be sure, she has the excuse of being four.
I’m not saying that a little more rationality wouldn’t be helpful. I’m saying the pointing to this and saying it’s irrational and maybe stupid is not the most interesting thing that can be said about it. It is more fascinating to look for what is incentivizing the irrationality.
There’s a very rational (in the sence of effective for getting what you want) negotiating tactic I heard about in one of Eric Flint’s books. The negotiator points at Crazy Joe muttering to himself in the corner and says ‘He and his friends are saying that if you don’t double their salaries they are not only going to strike, they’re going to be throwing rotten eggs at you come into the office and showing up at your house at midnight with bullhorns. But I know these people and can talk their language. I can get them to calm down. But you have to give me something in exchange. A ten percent raise doesn’t sound so crazy compared to double the salaries, does it? And besides, if you don’t make a deal with me, you’ll end up having to negotiate with Crazy Joe.’ And the business manager is so aghast by Crazy Joe’s demands that he ends up agreeing that ten percent is not as extreme as he first thought.
The fact that there is a crazy extreme getting a lot of attention, can make the only rationally extreme seem moderate. This sort of tactic doesn’t have to be disingenuous, or even conscious. In fact, If you eject (or steam roll into moderation) too many people for being more extreme than you are, not only do you weaken your negotiating position, you can get evaporative cooling in the direction of agreeing with your opponent.
Of course the people of the extreme extreme don’t need to know, and certainly can’t admit in public, that they are just being used to make other positions look good. When you combine that with the fact the SJWs have trouble coming to terms with the fact you can’t make everyone happy all of the time, the extreme extreme can spiral out of control in a way that is very hard to stop.
Nor is the basic tactic of preference statement counter productive on its own, if there is a significant enough presence of preference utilitarians in the audience to produce a reasonable hit rate. The problem is a coordination one where with enough people pursuing that strategy they end on having to be shriller and more negative to compete with one another. So they have to dwell on their misery, increasing its impact, and he audience gets bombarded. So even though everyone started out just wanting to create a little happiness actually end up creating a fair amount of unhappiness. And that’s a much more complex problem solving situation then just pointing out that some people are being irrational.
This is the difference between simple epistemic rationality (having good arguments) and the virtue of actuzlly being a good negotiator (and ‘good’ encompasses both a narrowly instrumental and an ethical viewpoint, as you’ve learned. Norms of all sorts and at all scales tend to align incentives—who would’ve thought!). But to the extent that good negotiation skills lead to good consequences for oneself, being a good negotiator is rational in an instrumental sense. Politics is really just the real-world art of negotiation writ large, so this sort of instrumental rationality (what some people would perhaps call ‘the art of the deal’) is nearly as important there.