There is a perfectly rational reason why a Christian might be more inclined than a non-Christian to help a stranger if that Christian believes they will be rewarded for their actions.
There is a clear incentive in their mind.
The Christian who acts only in order to receive the reward ceases to act altruistically. In this sense, they are no “better” than a non-Christian who doesn’t help.
But to a sincere believer in a certain interpretation of Christianity, the future heavenly rewards attached to good deeds like helping strangers are just as real and motivating as immediate cash rewards. There is no good reason to suspect this wouldn’t motivate them to do more good deeds than a non-believer. It’s just simple economics.
Heh. I think you just proposed an argument why spherical cows in vacuum who are “sincere believer[s] in a certain interpretation” will give more milk than other not-that spherical cows.
However as a matter of empirical reality, are you willing to assert that a bleeding person standing over a broken bike by the side of road will have more random strangers stop to help him in, say, Honduras than in, say, Japan? And that difference will be pronounced and noticeable?
Let me offer some useful terms. One is “social cohesion”. Another is “high-trust society”. Yet another is “collectivism”. Note how none of them refers to religious beliefs or to rewards in the afterlife.
Imagine two people approach the bloodied biker. Person A sincerely believes they will receive a future $100 cash reward for engaging in an act of kindness on that day. Person B holds no such belief.
If our scenario takes place in a collectivist, high-trust society with strong social cohesion, which person do you believe is more likely to act to help the bloodied biker? A or B? Why?
If our scenario takes place in a collectivist, high-trust society with strong social cohesion, which person do you believe is more likely to act to help the bloodied biker?
I believe both will help and the $100 will make no difference. Homo economicus is a fictional creature.
More to the point, if bloody biker X stands by the side of the road in a Christian but low-trust low-cohesion country, and bloody biker Y stands by the side of the road in a heathen high-trust high-cohesion country, I think Y’s chances are better than X’s.
It doesn’t follow that humans don’t ever act based on incentives. What if the $100 was $1,000? Or $1,000,000? The amount is arbitrary. In reality, Christians of a certain ilk believe the rewards they can reap in heaven dwarf any conceivable monetary amount. (Like 3^^^3 times better than $1,000,000...)
More to the point, if bloody biker X stands by the side of the road in a Christian but low-trust low-cohesion country, and bloody biker Y stands by the side of the road in a heathen high-trust high-cohesion country, I think Y’s chances are better than X’s.
In other words, if you place two spherical cows in vastly different scenarios with remarkably different variables, then you can produce an outcome that supports your argument. Fascinating.
In reality, Christians of a certain ilk believe the rewards they can reap in heaven dwarf any conceivable monetary amount.
They will certainly say they do. However, they don’t generally behave as if they really truly deep down believe that. In particular, I can think of very few occasions when I have seen Christians acting more motivated by the prospect of heavenly rewards than they would have been by an offer of $1M in a year’s time.
Note also that a typical Christian facing an injured biker probably doesn’t believe that he will be saved if he helps and damned if he doesn’t, Matthew 25:31ff notwithstanding. Quite right, too; after all, he will be faced with plenty of other opportunities to help or not help, and it can’t possibly be true that each of them determines whether he’s saved or damned.
And note also-also that this isn’t really about Christians versus everyone else; it’s about people who believe in huge post-mortem rewards and punishments versus everyone else. E.g., Muslims’ beliefs on this score are broadly similar to Christians’.
They will certainly say they do. However, they don’t generally behave as if they really truly deep down believe that. In particular, I can think of very few occasions when I have seen Christians acting more motivated by the prospect of heavenly rewards than they would have been by an offer of $1M in a year’s time.
A certain ilk of Christians do behave in ways that indicate they are very motivated by heavenly rewards. Some do not. Some believe a divine tally sheet doesn’t exist. Some believe it is very real and act accordingly. Some say they believe in rewards but there is no evidence indicating that stated belief is sincere. I’ve met all kinds.
Note also that a typical Christian facing an injured biker probably doesn’t believe that he will be saved if he helps and damned if he doesn’t, Matthew 25:31ff notwithstanding. Quite right, too; after all, he will be faced with plenty of other opportunities to help or not help, and it can’t possibly be true that each of them determines whether he’s saved or damned.
True, except I have met Christians who believe that unrepentant sin could lead to hell, and that Matt 25:31 will describe the fate of many, many of the alleged “saved”. In this way, the bold is not necessarily true, as God may rapture at an inopportune time and leave a Christian who has recently turned up her nose at a bloodied biker deserving of hell.
And note also-also that this isn’t really about Christians versus everyone else; it’s about people who believe in huge post-mortem rewards and punishments versus everyone else. E.g., Muslims’ beliefs on this score are broadly similar to Christians’.
It doesn’t follow that humans don’t ever act based on incentives.
And did anyone claim that?
The amount is arbitrary.
Yes, and in the case of both A and B helping the bloody biker, the amount doesn’t matter, even if it’s arbitrary.
In other words, if you place two spherical cows in vastly different scenarios with remarkably different variables
First, no, they are not spherical cows. Bloody people actually do stand by the side of the road from time to time. Strangers stop and help them. It’s an empirical phenomenon which you can empirically investigate.
Second, the “different scenarios” is the entire point. You asserted that Christians will be more likely to help than non-Christians with the implication that this distinction is important. Before that, Alia1d said she’d expect less help in a non-Christian country meaning there would be an observable difference in outcomes.
I think both these positions are wrong. Being a Christian or a heathen is NOT what determines the percentage of random strangers who turn out to be kind-hearted. Other factors, like the ones mentioned by me, are much more important. And similarly, whether you get help on the side of the road or not in a particular country is not driven by whether the population is Christian.
I think both these positions are wrong. Being a Christian or a heathen is NOT what determines the percentage of random strangers who turn out to be kind-hearted. Other factors, like the ones mentioned by me, are much more important. And similarly, whether you get help on the side of the road or not in a particular country is not driven by whether the population is Christian.
There are many, many variables. One obvious, empirical, demonstrable reason for why people choose to behave in certain ways is incentive.
If you control for all the other variables, a person given an incentive to act in a charitable way (cash, heavenly reward, status, etc.) will do so more often than a person given no other incentive besides collectivism. This is, I hope, obvious and uncontroversial.
Of course, how much (or how little) said incentive motivates a person to act depends on the significance of the incentive.
Certain interpretations of Christianity provide this incentive via the promise of rewards in the afterlife and escape from punishment in the afterlife.
It may be true that in Christian Country C a bloodied biker would be less likely to be helped than in Atheist Country A, but that would be because of a host of uncontrolled variables including but not limited to social cohesion, level of social trust, etc. But, if you control for all the other variables, a person given an incentive to act in a charitable way will do so more often than a person who does not receive that same incentive.
Or… Maybe you have some evidence to support the idea that Christians who sincerely believe in accumulating afterlife rewards in exchange for good deeds actually do fewer good deeds than people who have no such heavenly promise of incentive?
Yes, that’s why the spherical cows in vacuum made their appearance in this thread. “Everything else being equal” is an abstraction. In reality everything else is never equal.
The whole thing started because Alia1d said she expects less help in a non-Christian country. That is not an “everything else being equal” claim. We have a small, finite set of countries. They are all different. Alia1d is saying, in technical terms, that if we divide our small diverse set into two subsets using the Christian / non-Christian criterion, her expectations for help are higher in the Christian cluster than in the non-Christian cluster. I also read a causal implication in there: this is so not because of some random fluctuations, but because Christianity makes it so.
I do not believe this assertion to be true—empirically true, on the ground. Discussions of what could possibly happen if one spherical cow floated in vacuum believing in a very particular version of Christianity and another spherical cow floated nearby but did not believe in this version (oh, wait, actually, did not believe in in posthumous rewards? or any incentives? or didn’t expect to get $100? one of those...) don’t look to be particularly useful.
if you control for all the other variables, a person given an incentive to act in a charitable way will do so more often than a person who does not receive that same incentive.
You are not implying that only Christianity gives people incentives to act in a charitable way, are you?
Yes, that’s why the spherical cows in vacuum made their appearance in this thread. “Everything else being equal” is an abstraction. In reality everything else is never equal.
Moot. There are real world scenarios where the variables could be controlled enough to get an idea of whether a given incentive impacts behavior.
It may be true, for instance, in a Christian country where there is great scarcity that an average citizen maybe less likely to help a bloodied biker than a citizen in an atheist country where there is plenty. But we have plenty of evidence to suggest religious conceptions of the afterlife do indeed influence behavior in many people.
And, as a simple, reasonable, non-spherical-cow thought experiment that uses a realistic model of our world, we could imagine a Christian and a non-Christian each approaching a bloodied biker and how they each may act in a case where the other conditions you mentioned (social cohesion, etc.) were generally equal.
The whole thing started because Alia1d said she expects less help in a non-Christian country.
I took issue with you saying there was a bias against non-Christians. That’s where “this thing” started for me. I’m saying, to the contrary, there is a good reason to suspect religious people sincerely believing in the reality of a significant afterlife incentive structure will be motivated to behave in certain ways. I think there is plenty of evidence of this.
I do not believe this assertion to be true—empirically true, on the ground.
...could be controlled …It may be true …we could imagine
You’re still floating in vacuum.
I took issue with you saying there was a bias against non-Christians.
On the basis of what, do you think, she made this statement?
If you’re lumping it all together under “religious people sincerely believing in the reality of a significant afterlife incentive structure”, let’s make a slight change: one should expect to be helped more in a Muslim country than in a non-Muslim country. Is that a true statement? I see no difference with a s/Muslim/Christian version.
Based on what empirical evidence?
Based on my perception of the world which includes personal experience.
On the basis of what, do you think, she made this statement?
I don’t know. I replied to the idea it was “bigoted” and biased. I originally just pointed out it was reasonable to believe someone would behave more charitably if given an incentive.
If you’re lumping it all together under “religious people sincerely believing in the reality of a significant afterlife incentive structure”, let’s make a slight change: one should expect to be helped more in a Muslim country than in a non-Muslim country. Is that a true statement? I see no difference with a s/Muslim/Christian version.
The religion is only important to the extent it’s supernatural incentive structure is significant and sincerely believed. Doesn’t matter what it is. Xtianity and Islam just happen to be super popular.
Based on my perception of the world which includes personal experience.
So, nothing beyond that? Forgive me if I’m not convinced.
By the way, I’ve met lots of Christians who behave charitably explicitly because of their eschatology. I’ve also read a lot about the suicide bombers who are steeped in an interpretation of Islam. In both cases, it’s largely behavior being affected by belief.
Which is the same old shit of atheists being amoral because why would they have morals without incentives.
No. Not one bit. No one said atheists were amoral. I think we all have incentives to act morally.
Do you have any empirical evidence to suggest the promise of reward in the afterlife is not an incentive to many sincere religious people? Or that it doesn’t affect their willingness to engage in charitable behavior? Or that helping out someone who crashed their bike is not an example of the type of charitable behavior that a sincere religious person may believe will benefit them in said afterlife?
Or do you reject that incentives affect behavior?
If I lie to someone and tell them I will give them $1,000,000 in 10 years if they walk one old lady across everyday, to the extent the person believes me, this will affect their behavior, right?
This all seems pretty obvious to me and it feels like you know something I don’t about human behavior. You said:
Based on my perception of the world which includes personal experience.
What experiences have you had? What is your perception of the world in regard to this issue?
We’ve wandered far afield. I’ll sum up my position and bail.
Yes, people respond to incentives. Of course. But if you are going to pull out one specific incentive and look at it carefully, the question becomes whether it’s relevant and does it make any noticeable difference. Statistically speaking, you’re interested in the effect size and not merely in p-value proving the existence of something.
Human actions are the net sum of a very large variety of forces, some of which are incentives and there are a lot of different ones, too. Does the particular incentive that you’re interested in make a detectable difference in the outcome you care about? If not, then why are you talking about it? Quantum effects exist and affect the trajectory of the golf ball and yet no one incorporates them into the optimization of their golf swing—for a very good reason.
“Exists but irrelevant” is a description that can (and should) be applied to many things.
I have no idea how anyone could deny religious afterlife beliefs have no significant impact in human motivation and, thereby, human behavior. I think we have abundant evidence to the contrary, and you’ve provided no evidence for your view.
I have at least noticed a change in incentives in my own life, and yes, it makes a detectable difference in outcomes. I am certainly not about to become a serial killer, but there are many good things that I am less motivated to do than I used to be, and consequently, noticeably less likely to actually do.
I agree with Brillyant that his argument is basically obviously, and arguing against it is simply wishful thinking.
No.
There is a perfectly rational reason why a Christian might be more inclined than a non-Christian to help a stranger if that Christian believes they will be rewarded for their actions.
There is a clear incentive in their mind.
The Christian who acts only in order to receive the reward ceases to act altruistically. In this sense, they are no “better” than a non-Christian who doesn’t help.
But to a sincere believer in a certain interpretation of Christianity, the future heavenly rewards attached to good deeds like helping strangers are just as real and motivating as immediate cash rewards. There is no good reason to suspect this wouldn’t motivate them to do more good deeds than a non-believer. It’s just simple economics.
Heh. I think you just proposed an argument why spherical cows in vacuum who are “sincere believer[s] in a certain interpretation” will give more milk than other not-that spherical cows.
However as a matter of empirical reality, are you willing to assert that a bleeding person standing over a broken bike by the side of road will have more random strangers stop to help him in, say, Honduras than in, say, Japan? And that difference will be pronounced and noticeable?
Let me offer some useful terms. One is “social cohesion”. Another is “high-trust society”. Yet another is “collectivism”. Note how none of them refers to religious beliefs or to rewards in the afterlife.
Imagine two people approach the bloodied biker. Person A sincerely believes they will receive a future $100 cash reward for engaging in an act of kindness on that day. Person B holds no such belief.
If our scenario takes place in a collectivist, high-trust society with strong social cohesion, which person do you believe is more likely to act to help the bloodied biker? A or B? Why?
I believe both will help and the $100 will make no difference. Homo economicus is a fictional creature.
More to the point, if bloody biker X stands by the side of the road in a Christian but low-trust low-cohesion country, and bloody biker Y stands by the side of the road in a heathen high-trust high-cohesion country, I think Y’s chances are better than X’s.
It doesn’t follow that humans don’t ever act based on incentives. What if the $100 was $1,000? Or $1,000,000? The amount is arbitrary. In reality, Christians of a certain ilk believe the rewards they can reap in heaven dwarf any conceivable monetary amount. (Like 3^^^3 times better than $1,000,000...)
In other words, if you place two spherical cows in vastly different scenarios with remarkably different variables, then you can produce an outcome that supports your argument. Fascinating.
They will certainly say they do. However, they don’t generally behave as if they really truly deep down believe that. In particular, I can think of very few occasions when I have seen Christians acting more motivated by the prospect of heavenly rewards than they would have been by an offer of $1M in a year’s time.
Note also that a typical Christian facing an injured biker probably doesn’t believe that he will be saved if he helps and damned if he doesn’t, Matthew 25:31ff notwithstanding. Quite right, too; after all, he will be faced with plenty of other opportunities to help or not help, and it can’t possibly be true that each of them determines whether he’s saved or damned.
And note also-also that this isn’t really about Christians versus everyone else; it’s about people who believe in huge post-mortem rewards and punishments versus everyone else. E.g., Muslims’ beliefs on this score are broadly similar to Christians’.
A certain ilk of Christians do behave in ways that indicate they are very motivated by heavenly rewards. Some do not. Some believe a divine tally sheet doesn’t exist. Some believe it is very real and act accordingly. Some say they believe in rewards but there is no evidence indicating that stated belief is sincere. I’ve met all kinds.
True, except I have met Christians who believe that unrepentant sin could lead to hell, and that Matt 25:31 will describe the fate of many, many of the alleged “saved”. In this way, the bold is not necessarily true, as God may rapture at an inopportune time and leave a Christian who has recently turned up her nose at a bloodied biker deserving of hell.
Noted.
And did anyone claim that?
Yes, and in the case of both A and B helping the bloody biker, the amount doesn’t matter, even if it’s arbitrary.
First, no, they are not spherical cows. Bloody people actually do stand by the side of the road from time to time. Strangers stop and help them. It’s an empirical phenomenon which you can empirically investigate.
Second, the “different scenarios” is the entire point. You asserted that Christians will be more likely to help than non-Christians with the implication that this distinction is important. Before that, Alia1d said she’d expect less help in a non-Christian country meaning there would be an observable difference in outcomes.
I think both these positions are wrong. Being a Christian or a heathen is NOT what determines the percentage of random strangers who turn out to be kind-hearted. Other factors, like the ones mentioned by me, are much more important. And similarly, whether you get help on the side of the road or not in a particular country is not driven by whether the population is Christian.
There are many, many variables. One obvious, empirical, demonstrable reason for why people choose to behave in certain ways is incentive.
If you control for all the other variables, a person given an incentive to act in a charitable way (cash, heavenly reward, status, etc.) will do so more often than a person given no other incentive besides collectivism. This is, I hope, obvious and uncontroversial.
Of course, how much (or how little) said incentive motivates a person to act depends on the significance of the incentive.
Certain interpretations of Christianity provide this incentive via the promise of rewards in the afterlife and escape from punishment in the afterlife.
It may be true that in Christian Country C a bloodied biker would be less likely to be helped than in Atheist Country A, but that would be because of a host of uncontrolled variables including but not limited to social cohesion, level of social trust, etc. But, if you control for all the other variables, a person given an incentive to act in a charitable way will do so more often than a person who does not receive that same incentive.
Or… Maybe you have some evidence to support the idea that Christians who sincerely believe in accumulating afterlife rewards in exchange for good deeds actually do fewer good deeds than people who have no such heavenly promise of incentive?
Can you provide any evidence?
Yes, that’s why the spherical cows in vacuum made their appearance in this thread. “Everything else being equal” is an abstraction. In reality everything else is never equal.
The whole thing started because Alia1d said she expects less help in a non-Christian country. That is not an “everything else being equal” claim. We have a small, finite set of countries. They are all different. Alia1d is saying, in technical terms, that if we divide our small diverse set into two subsets using the Christian / non-Christian criterion, her expectations for help are higher in the Christian cluster than in the non-Christian cluster. I also read a causal implication in there: this is so not because of some random fluctuations, but because Christianity makes it so.
I do not believe this assertion to be true—empirically true, on the ground. Discussions of what could possibly happen if one spherical cow floated in vacuum believing in a very particular version of Christianity and another spherical cow floated nearby but did not believe in this version (oh, wait, actually, did not believe in in posthumous rewards? or any incentives? or didn’t expect to get $100? one of those...) don’t look to be particularly useful.
You are not implying that only Christianity gives people incentives to act in a charitable way, are you?
Moot. There are real world scenarios where the variables could be controlled enough to get an idea of whether a given incentive impacts behavior.
It may be true, for instance, in a Christian country where there is great scarcity that an average citizen maybe less likely to help a bloodied biker than a citizen in an atheist country where there is plenty. But we have plenty of evidence to suggest religious conceptions of the afterlife do indeed influence behavior in many people.
And, as a simple, reasonable, non-spherical-cow thought experiment that uses a realistic model of our world, we could imagine a Christian and a non-Christian each approaching a bloodied biker and how they each may act in a case where the other conditions you mentioned (social cohesion, etc.) were generally equal.
I took issue with you saying there was a bias against non-Christians. That’s where “this thing” started for me. I’m saying, to the contrary, there is a good reason to suspect religious people sincerely believing in the reality of a significant afterlife incentive structure will be motivated to behave in certain ways. I think there is plenty of evidence of this.
Based on what empirical evidence?
You’re still floating in vacuum.
On the basis of what, do you think, she made this statement?
If you’re lumping it all together under “religious people sincerely believing in the reality of a significant afterlife incentive structure”, let’s make a slight change: one should expect to be helped more in a Muslim country than in a non-Muslim country. Is that a true statement? I see no difference with a s/Muslim/Christian version.
Based on my perception of the world which includes personal experience.
I don’t know. I replied to the idea it was “bigoted” and biased. I originally just pointed out it was reasonable to believe someone would behave more charitably if given an incentive.
The religion is only important to the extent it’s supernatural incentive structure is significant and sincerely believed. Doesn’t matter what it is. Xtianity and Islam just happen to be super popular.
So, nothing beyond that? Forgive me if I’m not convinced.
By the way, I’ve met lots of Christians who behave charitably explicitly because of their eschatology. I’ve also read a lot about the suicide bombers who are steeped in an interpretation of Islam. In both cases, it’s largely behavior being affected by belief.
Jiro said it “borders on bigotry”. I said it was a bias. I still think it’s a bias.
Which is the same old shit of atheists being amoral because why would they have morals without incentives.
I’m not trying to convince you.
Really, which bias are you referring to.
Well, a lot of atheists are amoral.
Original thread here.
No. Not one bit. No one said atheists were amoral. I think we all have incentives to act morally.
Do you have any empirical evidence to suggest the promise of reward in the afterlife is not an incentive to many sincere religious people? Or that it doesn’t affect their willingness to engage in charitable behavior? Or that helping out someone who crashed their bike is not an example of the type of charitable behavior that a sincere religious person may believe will benefit them in said afterlife?
Or do you reject that incentives affect behavior?
If I lie to someone and tell them I will give them $1,000,000 in 10 years if they walk one old lady across everyday, to the extent the person believes me, this will affect their behavior, right?
This all seems pretty obvious to me and it feels like you know something I don’t about human behavior. You said:
What experiences have you had? What is your perception of the world in regard to this issue?
We’ve wandered far afield. I’ll sum up my position and bail.
Yes, people respond to incentives. Of course. But if you are going to pull out one specific incentive and look at it carefully, the question becomes whether it’s relevant and does it make any noticeable difference. Statistically speaking, you’re interested in the effect size and not merely in p-value proving the existence of something.
Human actions are the net sum of a very large variety of forces, some of which are incentives and there are a lot of different ones, too. Does the particular incentive that you’re interested in make a detectable difference in the outcome you care about? If not, then why are you talking about it? Quantum effects exist and affect the trajectory of the golf ball and yet no one incorporates them into the optimization of their golf swing—for a very good reason.
“Exists but irrelevant” is a description that can (and should) be applied to many things.
I have no idea how anyone could deny religious afterlife beliefs have no significant impact in human motivation and, thereby, human behavior. I think we have abundant evidence to the contrary, and you’ve provided no evidence for your view.
Good chat.
I have at least noticed a change in incentives in my own life, and yes, it makes a detectable difference in outcomes. I am certainly not about to become a serial killer, but there are many good things that I am less motivated to do than I used to be, and consequently, noticeably less likely to actually do.
I agree with Brillyant that his argument is basically obviously, and arguing against it is simply wishful thinking.