I see getting safe and useful reasoning about exact imitations as a weird special case or maybe a reformulation of X-and-only-X efficient imitation. Anchoring to exact imitations in particular makes accurate prediction more difficult than it needs to be, as it’s not the thing we care about, there are many irrelevant details that influence outcomes that accurate predictions would need to take into account. So a good “prediction” is going to be value-laden, with concrete facts about actual outcomes of setups built out of exact imitations being unimportant, which is about the same as the problem statement of X-and-only-X efficient imitation.
If such “predictions” are not good enough by themselves, underlying actual process of reflection (people living in the world) won’t save/survive this if there’s too much agency guided by the predictions. Using an underlying hypothetical process of reflection (by which I understand running a specific program) is more robust, as AI might go very wrong initially, but will correct itself once it gets around to computing the outcomes of the hypothetical reflection with more precision, provided the hypothetical process of reflection is defined as isolated from the AI.
I’m not sure what difference between hypothetical and actual processes of reflection you are emphasizing (if I understood what the terms mean correctly), since the actual civilization might plausibly move in into a substrate that is more like ML reasoning than concrete computation (let alone concrete physical incarnation), and thus become the same kind of thing as hypothetical reflection. The most striking distinction (for AI safety) seems to be the implication that an actual process of reflection can’t be isolated from decisions of the AI taken based on insufficient reflection.
There’s also the need to at least define exact imitations or better yet X-and-only-X efficient imitation in order to define a hypothetical process of reflection, which is not as absolutely necessary for actual reflection, so getting hypothetical reflection at all might be more difficult than some sort of temporary stability with actual reflection, which can then be used to define hypothetical reflection and thereby guard from consequences of overly agentic use of bad predictions of (on) actual reflection.
It seems to me like “Reason about a perfect emulation of a human” is an extremely similar task to “reason about a human,” to me it does not feel closely related to X-and-only-X efficient imitation. For example, you can make calibrated predictions about what a human would do using vastly less computing power than a human (even using existing techniques), whereas perfect imitation likely requires vastly more computing power.
The point is that in order to be useful, a prediction/reasoning process should contain mesa-optimizers that perform decision making similar in a value-laden way to what the original humans would do. The results of the predictions should be determined by decisions of the people being predicted (or of people sufficiently similar to them), in the free-will-requires-determinism/you-are-part-of-physics sense. The actual cognitive labor of decision making needs to in some way be an aspect of the process of prediction/reasoning, or it’s not going to be good enough. And in order to be safe, these mesa-optimizers shouldn’t be systematically warped into something different (from a value-laden point of view), and there should be no other mesa-optimizers with meaningful influence in there. This just says that prediction/reasoning needs to be X-and-only-X in order to be safe. Thus the equivalence. Prediction of exact imitation in particular is weird because in that case the similarity measure between prediction and exact imitation is hinted to not be value-laden, which it might have to be in order for the prediction to be both X-and-only-X and efficient.
This is only unimportant if X-and-only-X is the likely default outcome of predictive generalization, so that not paying attention to this won’t result in failure, but nobody understands if this is the case.
The mesa-optimizers in the prediction/reasoning similar to the original humans is what I mean by efficient imitations (whether X-and-only-X or not). They are not themselves the predictions of original humans (or of exact imitations), which might well not be present as explicit parts of the design of reasoning about the process of reflection as a whole, instead they are the implicit decision makers that determine what the conclusions of the reasoning say, and they are much more computationally efficient (as aspects of cheaper reasoning) than exact imitations. At the same time, if they are similar enough in a value-laden way to the originals, there is no need for better predictions, much less for exact imitation, the prediction/reasoning is itself the imitation we’d want to use, without any reference to an underlying exact process. (In a story simulation, there are no concrete states of the world, only references to states of knowledge, yet there are mesa-optimizers who are the people inhabiting it.)
If prediction is to be value-laden, with value defined by reflection built out of that same prediction, the only sensible way to set this up seems to be as a fixpoint of an operator that maps (states of knowledge about) values to (states of knowledge about) values-on-reflection computed by making use of the argument values to do value-laden efficient imitation. But if this setup is not performed correctly, then even if it’s set up at all, we are probably going to get bad fixpoints, as it happens with things like bad Nash equilibria etc. And if it is performed correctly, then it might be much more sensible to allow an AI to influence what happens within the process of reflection more directly than merely by making systematic distortions in predicting/reasoning about it, thus hypothetical processes of reflection wouldn’t need the isolation from AI’s agency that normally makes them safer than the actual process of reflection.
I see getting safe and useful reasoning about exact imitations as a weird special case or maybe a reformulation of X-and-only-X efficient imitation. Anchoring to exact imitations in particular makes accurate prediction more difficult than it needs to be, as it’s not the thing we care about, there are many irrelevant details that influence outcomes that accurate predictions would need to take into account. So a good “prediction” is going to be value-laden, with concrete facts about actual outcomes of setups built out of exact imitations being unimportant, which is about the same as the problem statement of X-and-only-X efficient imitation.
If such “predictions” are not good enough by themselves, underlying actual process of reflection (people living in the world) won’t save/survive this if there’s too much agency guided by the predictions. Using an underlying hypothetical process of reflection (by which I understand running a specific program) is more robust, as AI might go very wrong initially, but will correct itself once it gets around to computing the outcomes of the hypothetical reflection with more precision, provided the hypothetical process of reflection is defined as isolated from the AI.
I’m not sure what difference between hypothetical and actual processes of reflection you are emphasizing (if I understood what the terms mean correctly), since the actual civilization might plausibly move in into a substrate that is more like ML reasoning than concrete computation (let alone concrete physical incarnation), and thus become the same kind of thing as hypothetical reflection. The most striking distinction (for AI safety) seems to be the implication that an actual process of reflection can’t be isolated from decisions of the AI taken based on insufficient reflection.
There’s also the need to at least define exact imitations or better yet X-and-only-X efficient imitation in order to define a hypothetical process of reflection, which is not as absolutely necessary for actual reflection, so getting hypothetical reflection at all might be more difficult than some sort of temporary stability with actual reflection, which can then be used to define hypothetical reflection and thereby guard from consequences of overly agentic use of bad predictions of (on) actual reflection.
It seems to me like “Reason about a perfect emulation of a human” is an extremely similar task to “reason about a human,” to me it does not feel closely related to X-and-only-X efficient imitation. For example, you can make calibrated predictions about what a human would do using vastly less computing power than a human (even using existing techniques), whereas perfect imitation likely requires vastly more computing power.
The point is that in order to be useful, a prediction/reasoning process should contain mesa-optimizers that perform decision making similar in a value-laden way to what the original humans would do. The results of the predictions should be determined by decisions of the people being predicted (or of people sufficiently similar to them), in the free-will-requires-determinism/you-are-part-of-physics sense. The actual cognitive labor of decision making needs to in some way be an aspect of the process of prediction/reasoning, or it’s not going to be good enough. And in order to be safe, these mesa-optimizers shouldn’t be systematically warped into something different (from a value-laden point of view), and there should be no other mesa-optimizers with meaningful influence in there. This just says that prediction/reasoning needs to be X-and-only-X in order to be safe. Thus the equivalence. Prediction of exact imitation in particular is weird because in that case the similarity measure between prediction and exact imitation is hinted to not be value-laden, which it might have to be in order for the prediction to be both X-and-only-X and efficient.
This is only unimportant if X-and-only-X is the likely default outcome of predictive generalization, so that not paying attention to this won’t result in failure, but nobody understands if this is the case.
The mesa-optimizers in the prediction/reasoning similar to the original humans is what I mean by efficient imitations (whether X-and-only-X or not). They are not themselves the predictions of original humans (or of exact imitations), which might well not be present as explicit parts of the design of reasoning about the process of reflection as a whole, instead they are the implicit decision makers that determine what the conclusions of the reasoning say, and they are much more computationally efficient (as aspects of cheaper reasoning) than exact imitations. At the same time, if they are similar enough in a value-laden way to the originals, there is no need for better predictions, much less for exact imitation, the prediction/reasoning is itself the imitation we’d want to use, without any reference to an underlying exact process. (In a story simulation, there are no concrete states of the world, only references to states of knowledge, yet there are mesa-optimizers who are the people inhabiting it.)
If prediction is to be value-laden, with value defined by reflection built out of that same prediction, the only sensible way to set this up seems to be as a fixpoint of an operator that maps (states of knowledge about) values to (states of knowledge about) values-on-reflection computed by making use of the argument values to do value-laden efficient imitation. But if this setup is not performed correctly, then even if it’s set up at all, we are probably going to get bad fixpoints, as it happens with things like bad Nash equilibria etc. And if it is performed correctly, then it might be much more sensible to allow an AI to influence what happens within the process of reflection more directly than merely by making systematic distortions in predicting/reasoning about it, thus hypothetical processes of reflection wouldn’t need the isolation from AI’s agency that normally makes them safer than the actual process of reflection.