This post touches on several issues I’ve been thinking about since my early work on anthropic decision theory and UDT. Let me break this down:
1. The measure-decline problem is actually more general than just quantum mechanics. It appears in any situation where your decision algorithm gets instantiated multiple times, including classical copying, simulation, or indexical uncertainty. See my old posts on anthropic probabilities and probability-as-preference.
2. The “functional identity” argument being used here to dismiss certain types of splitting is problematic. What counts as “functionally identical” depends on your decision theory’s level of grain. UDT1.1 would treat seemingly identical copies differently if they’re in different computational states, while CDT might lump them together.
Some relevant questions that aren’t addressed:
- How do we handle preference aggregation across different versions of yourself with different measures? - Should we treat quantum branching differently from other forms of splitting? (I lean towards “no” these days) - How does this interact with questions of personal identity continuity? - What happens when we consider infinite branches? (This relates to my work on infinite ethics)
The real issue here isn’t about measure per se, but about how to aggregate preferences across different instances of your decision algorithm. This connects to some open problems in decision theory:
1. The problem of preference aggregation across copies 2. How to handle logical uncertainty in the context of anthropics 3. Whether “caring about measure” can be coherently formalized
I explored some of these issues in my paper on UDT, but I now think the framework needs significant revision to handle these cases properly.
Stuart · 2h > The problem of preference aggregation across copies
This seems key. Have you made any progress on formalizing this since your 2019 posts?
Wei · 2h Some progress on the math, but still hitting fundamental issues with infinity. Might post about this soon.
Abram · 1h Curious about your current thoughts on treating decision-theoretic identical copies differently. Seems related to logical causation?
Wei · 45m Yes—this connects to some ideas about logical coordination I’ve been developing. The key insight is that even “identical” copies might have different logical roles...
[Edit: For those interested in following up, I recommend starting with my sequence on decision theory and anthropics, then moving to the more recent work on logical uncertainty.]
Wei· 3h
This post touches on several issues I’ve been thinking about since my early work on anthropic decision theory and UDT. Let me break this down:
1. The measure-decline problem is actually more general than just quantum mechanics. It appears in any situation where your decision algorithm gets instantiated multiple times, including classical copying, simulation, or indexical uncertainty. See my old posts on anthropic probabilities and probability-as-preference.
2. The “functional identity” argument being used here to dismiss certain types of splitting is problematic. What counts as “functionally identical” depends on your decision theory’s level of grain. UDT1.1 would treat seemingly identical copies differently if they’re in different computational states, while CDT might lump them together.
Some relevant questions that aren’t addressed:
- How do we handle preference aggregation across different versions of yourself with different measures?
- Should we treat quantum branching differently from other forms of splitting? (I lean towards “no” these days)
- How does this interact with questions of personal identity continuity?
- What happens when we consider infinite branches? (This relates to my work on infinite ethics)
The real issue here isn’t about measure per se, but about how to aggregate preferences across different instances of your decision algorithm. This connects to some open problems in decision theory:
1. The problem of preference aggregation across copies
2. How to handle logical uncertainty in the context of anthropics
3. Whether “caring about measure” can be coherently formalized
I explored some of these issues in my paper on UDT, but I now think the framework needs significant revision to handle these cases properly.
Stuart · 2h
> The problem of preference aggregation across copies
This seems key. Have you made any progress on formalizing this since your 2019 posts?
Wei · 2h
Some progress on the math, but still hitting fundamental issues with infinity. Might post about this soon.
Abram · 1h
Curious about your current thoughts on treating decision-theoretic identical copies differently. Seems related to logical causation?
Wei · 45m
Yes—this connects to some ideas about logical coordination I’ve been developing. The key insight is that even “identical” copies might have different logical roles...
[Edit: For those interested in following up, I recommend starting with my sequence on decision theory and anthropics, then moving to the more recent work on logical uncertainty.]