What leads you to conclude that the chance of a vote margin of 1 is anywhere near 1/X of the chance of a vote margin of X? That’s not obvious, and your quote doesn’t try to derive it.
The easy-but-not-very-rigorous method is to use the principle of indifference, since there’s no particular reason a tie +/-1 should be much less likely than any other result.
If the election is balanced (the mean of the distribution is a tie), and the distribution looks anything like normal or binomial, 1/X is an underestimate of P(tie | election is within vote margin of X), since a tie is actually the most likely result. A tie +/- 1 is right next to the peak of the curve, so it should also be more than 1/X.
The 10^-90 figure cited in the paper was an example of how the calculation is very sensitive to slight imbalances—a 50⁄50 chance for each voter gave a .00006 chance of tie, while 49.9/50.1 gave the 10^-90. But knowing that an election will be very slightly imbalanced in one direction is a hard epistemic state to get to. Usually we just know something like “it’ll be close”, which could be modeled as a distribution over possible near-balances. If that distribution is not itself skewed either direction, then we again find that individual results near the mean should be at least 1/X.
I recently wrote about why voting is a terrible idea and fell into the same error as Gelman (I assumed 49.9-50.1 a priori is conservative). Wes and gwern, thanks for correcting me! In fact, due to the Median Voter Theorem and with better and better polling and analysis we may assume that the distribution of voter distributions should have a peak at 50-50.
Of course, there are other great reasons not to vote (mainly to avoid “enlisting in the army” and letting your mind be killed. My suggestion is always to find a friend who is a credible threat to vote for the candidate you despise most and invite him to a beer on election day under the condition that neither of you will vote and you will not talk about politics. Thus, you maintain your friendship while cancelling out the votes. I call it the VAVA (voter anti-voter annihilation) principle.
“Politics is the mindkiller” is an argument for why people should avoid getting into political discussion on Lesswrong; it is not an argument against political involvement in general. Rationalists completely retreating from Politics would likely lower the sanity waterline as far as politics is concerned. Rationalists should get more involved in politics (but outside Lesswrong) of course.
If the election is balanced (the mean of the distribution is a tie)...
That’s an important and non-obvious assumption to make.
a 50⁄50 chance for each voter gave a .00006 chance of tie, while 49.9/50.1 gave the 10^-90
So, in short, the 10^-90 figure is based on the explicit assumption that the election is not balanced?
That’s why the two methods you mention produce such wildy different figures; they base their calculations on different basic assumptions. One can argue back and forth about the validity or lack thereof of a given set of assumptions, of course...
That’s an important and non-obvious assumption to make.
Yes, I agree.
I’m much more sympathetic to the 10^-90 estimate in the paper than Gelman’s quote is; I think he misrepresents the authors in claiming they asserted that probability, when actually they offered it as a conditional (if you model it this way, then it’s 10^-90).
One can argue back and forth about the validity or lack thereof of a given set of assumptions, of course...
That is why I posted it as a comment on this particular post, after all. It’s clear that our subjective probability of casting a tie-breaking vote is going to be far less extreme than 10^-90 because our belief in the binomial idealization being correct puts a much less extreme bound on the tie-breaking vote probability than just taking 10^-90 at face value.
What leads you to conclude that the chance of a vote margin of 1 is anywhere near 1/X of the chance of a vote margin of X? That’s not obvious, and your quote doesn’t try to derive it.
The easy-but-not-very-rigorous method is to use the principle of indifference, since there’s no particular reason a tie +/-1 should be much less likely than any other result.
If the election is balanced (the mean of the distribution is a tie), and the distribution looks anything like normal or binomial, 1/X is an underestimate of P(tie | election is within vote margin of X), since a tie is actually the most likely result. A tie +/- 1 is right next to the peak of the curve, so it should also be more than 1/X.
The 10^-90 figure cited in the paper was an example of how the calculation is very sensitive to slight imbalances—a 50⁄50 chance for each voter gave a .00006 chance of tie, while 49.9/50.1 gave the 10^-90. But knowing that an election will be very slightly imbalanced in one direction is a hard epistemic state to get to. Usually we just know something like “it’ll be close”, which could be modeled as a distribution over possible near-balances. If that distribution is not itself skewed either direction, then we again find that individual results near the mean should be at least 1/X.
I recently wrote about why voting is a terrible idea and fell into the same error as Gelman (I assumed 49.9-50.1 a priori is conservative). Wes and gwern, thanks for correcting me! In fact, due to the Median Voter Theorem and with better and better polling and analysis we may assume that the distribution of voter distributions should have a peak at 50-50.
Of course, there are other great reasons not to vote (mainly to avoid “enlisting in the army” and letting your mind be killed. My suggestion is always to find a friend who is a credible threat to vote for the candidate you despise most and invite him to a beer on election day under the condition that neither of you will vote and you will not talk about politics. Thus, you maintain your friendship while cancelling out the votes. I call it the VAVA (voter anti-voter annihilation) principle.
“Politics is the mindkiller” is an argument for why people should avoid getting into political discussion on Lesswrong; it is not an argument against political involvement in general. Rationalists completely retreating from Politics would likely lower the sanity waterline as far as politics is concerned. Rationalists should get more involved in politics (but outside Lesswrong) of course.
That’s an important and non-obvious assumption to make.
So, in short, the 10^-90 figure is based on the explicit assumption that the election is not balanced?
That’s why the two methods you mention produce such wildy different figures; they base their calculations on different basic assumptions. One can argue back and forth about the validity or lack thereof of a given set of assumptions, of course...
Yes, I agree.
I’m much more sympathetic to the 10^-90 estimate in the paper than Gelman’s quote is; I think he misrepresents the authors in claiming they asserted that probability, when actually they offered it as a conditional (if you model it this way, then it’s 10^-90).
That is why I posted it as a comment on this particular post, after all. It’s clear that our subjective probability of casting a tie-breaking vote is going to be far less extreme than 10^-90 because our belief in the binomial idealization being correct puts a much less extreme bound on the tie-breaking vote probability than just taking 10^-90 at face value.