It’s what one gets if one takes all the programs in the computational universe that I studied in A New Kind of Science and runs them together—as a single, giant, multicomputational system. It’s a single, unique object that I call the ruliad, formed as the entangled limit of all possible computations.
This sounds maybe exactly the same as Tegmark Level 4 Multiverse. Does anyone know if there are differences?
I don’t have much technical background, but they’re both so abstract that I’m not sure anyone really does. The only obvious (perhaps superficial) difference is Wolfram’s is a “computation universe” versus Tegmark’s “mathematical universe”.
(I would think that, ultimately, they’re equivalent, but Wolfram has generally considered ‘computation’ to be more general than ‘mathematics’, and that matches my own (weak) intuitions. I suspect tho that it might be more of a difference in emphasis, if not just literally a difference only in the terminology used.)
As I know Tegmark didn’t specify the structure of mathematical universe. Does it include all strange math objects like infinities and categories etc?
There is a different theory of mathematical universe by Mueller in Law without law. In it only observer moments exist, as number strings, connected by Kolmogorov complexity of transition between them. Similar to UDASSA.
In my view, Wolfram suggests a interesting bridge between nothing and all possible physics world. But he neither explain appearance if universe from nothing, nor details of our world.
In my view, Wolfram suggests a interesting bridge between nothing and all possible physics world. But he neither explain appearance if universe from nothing, nor details of our world.
I’m not sure his attempts at the first explanation would suffice (for you, or almost anyone), but it seems rather like a generic ‘anthropic’ explanation AFAICT.
I think he (and his collaborators) are actively working on the “details of our world” part.
This sounds maybe exactly the same as Tegmark Level 4 Multiverse. Does anyone know if there are differences?
I agree!
I don’t have much technical background, but they’re both so abstract that I’m not sure anyone really does. The only obvious (perhaps superficial) difference is Wolfram’s is a “computation universe” versus Tegmark’s “mathematical universe”.
(I would think that, ultimately, they’re equivalent, but Wolfram has generally considered ‘computation’ to be more general than ‘mathematics’, and that matches my own (weak) intuitions. I suspect tho that it might be more of a difference in emphasis, if not just literally a difference only in the terminology used.)
May be Tegmark’s mathematical universe could include uncomputable things?
That seems like it would be a HUGE difference if that were the case.
That reminds me of this, one of my favorite papers/essays:
Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity – Scott Aaronson [PDF]
Yes, great paper.
As I know Tegmark didn’t specify the structure of mathematical universe. Does it include all strange math objects like infinities and categories etc?
There is a different theory of mathematical universe by Mueller in Law without law. In it only observer moments exist, as number strings, connected by Kolmogorov complexity of transition between them. Similar to UDASSA.
In my view, Wolfram suggests a interesting bridge between nothing and all possible physics world. But he neither explain appearance if universe from nothing, nor details of our world.
I’m not sure his attempts at the first explanation would suffice (for you, or almost anyone), but it seems rather like a generic ‘anthropic’ explanation AFAICT.
I think he (and his collaborators) are actively working on the “details of our world” part.
Not mine, since there are uncomputable functions.