I have to say that my overall impression here is of someone who manages to talk mostly LW language most of the time, but when his argument requires a step that just completely fails to make sense, like “And this is why if you’re trying to minimize existential risk, you should support a charity that tries to stop tuberculosis” or “And this is where we’re going to assume the worst possible case instead of the expected case and actually act that way”, he’ll just blithely keep going.
Are you reading multifoliaterose carefully? He has made neither of these claims.
He said that supporting a tuberculosis charity is better than donating to SIAI, not that supporting a tuberculosis charity is the best way to fight existential risk.
And he hasn’t advocated using something other than the expected case when evaluating a non-transparent charity. What you may infer is that he believes that the worst case does not significantly differ from the expected case in the context of the amount of money that he would donate. That belief may not be realistic, but it’s not the belief that you impute to him.
He said that supporting a tuberculosis charity is better than donating to SIAI, not that supporting a tuberculosis charity is the best way to fight existential risk.
I hesitate to point to language from an earlier version of the post, since multifoliaterose has taken out this language, but given that EY was responding to the earlier version, it seems fair. The original post included the following language:
I believe that at present GiveWell’s top ranked charities VillageReach and StopTB are better choices than SIAI, even for donors like utilitymonster who take astronomical waste seriously and believe in the ideas expressed in the cluster of blog posts linked under Shut Up and multiply.
(emphasis added)
I believe there originally may have been some links there, but I don’t have them anymore. Nonetheless, if I correctly understand the references to utilitymonster, astronomical waste, and Shut Up and multiply, I do think that that multifoliaterose was arguing that even the sorts of donors most interested in minimizing existential risk should still give to those other charities. Does that reading seem wrong?
Here is my reading: Even in the case of utilitymonster,
his/her concern about tuberculosis (say) in the near term is high enough, and
SIAI’s chances of lowering existential risk by a sufficient amount are low enough,
to imply that utilitymonster would get more expected utility from donating to StopTB than from donating to SIAI.
Also, multi isn’t denying that utilitymonster’s money would be better spent in some third way that directly pertains to existential risk. (However, such a denial may be implicit in multi’s own decision to give to GiveWell’s charities, depending on why he does it.)
I don’t know that we disagree very much, but I don’t want to lose sight of the original issue as to whether EY’s characterization accurately reflected what multifoliaterose was saying. I think we may agree that it takes an extra step in interpreting multifoliaterose’s post to get to EY’s characterization, and that there may be sufficient ambiguity in the original post such that not everyone would take that step:
Also, multi isn’t denying that utilitymonster’s money would be better spent in some third way that directly pertains to existential risk. (However, such a denial may be implicit in multi’s own decision to give to GiveWell’s charities, depending on why he does it.)
I did implicitly read such a denial into the original post. As Carl noted:
The invocation of VillageReach in addressing those aggregative utilitarians concerned about astronomical waste here seems baffling to me.
For me, the references to the Givewell-approved charities and the lack of references to alternate existential risk reducing charities like FHI seemed to suggest that multifoliaterose was implicitly denying the existence of a third alternative. Perhaps EY read the post similarly.
For me, the references to the Givewell-approved charities and the lack of references to alternate existential risk reducing charities like FHI seemed to suggest that multifoliaterose was implicitly denying the existence of a third alternative. Perhaps EY read the post similarly.
I agree that this is the most probable meaning. The only other relevant consideration I know of is multi’s statement upstream that he uses GiveWell in part to encourage transparency in other charities. Maybe he sees this as a way to encourage existential-risk charities to do better, making them more likely to succeed.
And he hasn’t advocated using something other than the expected case when evaluating a non-transparent charity. What you may infer is that he believes that the worst case does not significantly differ from the expected case
That’s not what Multi said. He said we should assume the worst. You only need to assume something when you know that belief would be useful even though you don’t believe it. So he clearly doesn’t believe the worst (or if he does, he hasn’t said so).
He said that supporting a tuberculosis charity is better than donating to SIAI, not that supporting a tuberculosis charity is the best way to fight existential risk.
He also said that he “believe[s] that reducing existential risk is ultimately more important than developing world aid.” How do you go from there to supporting StopTB over SIAI, unless you believe the worst?
And he hasn’t advocated using something other than the expected case when evaluating a non-transparent charity. What you may infer is that he believes that the worst case does not significantly differ from the expected case
That’s not what Multi said. He said we should assume the worst. You only need to assume something when you know that belief would be useful even though you don’t believe it. So he clearly doesn’t believe the worst (or if he does, he hasn’t said so).
I don’t use the word “assume” in the way that you describe, and I would be surprised if multi were.
He also said that he “believe[s] that reducing existential risk is ultimately more important than developing world aid.” How do you go from there to supporting StopTB over SIAI, unless you believe the worst?
Here I think we more-or-less agree. On my reading, multi is saying that, right now, the probability that SIAI is a money pit is high enough to outweigh the good that SIAI would do if it weren’t a money pit, relative to a tuberculosis charity. But multi is also saying that this probability assignment is unstable, so that some reasonable amount of evidence would lead him to radically reassign his probabilities.
Are you reading multifoliaterose carefully? He has made neither of these claims.
He said that supporting a tuberculosis charity is better than donating to SIAI, not that supporting a tuberculosis charity is the best way to fight existential risk.
And he hasn’t advocated using something other than the expected case when evaluating a non-transparent charity. What you may infer is that he believes that the worst case does not significantly differ from the expected case in the context of the amount of money that he would donate. That belief may not be realistic, but it’s not the belief that you impute to him.
I hesitate to point to language from an earlier version of the post, since multifoliaterose has taken out this language, but given that EY was responding to the earlier version, it seems fair. The original post included the following language:
(emphasis added)
I believe there originally may have been some links there, but I don’t have them anymore. Nonetheless, if I correctly understand the references to utilitymonster, astronomical waste, and Shut Up and multiply, I do think that that multifoliaterose was arguing that even the sorts of donors most interested in minimizing existential risk should still give to those other charities. Does that reading seem wrong?
Here is my reading: Even in the case of utilitymonster,
his/her concern about tuberculosis (say) in the near term is high enough, and
SIAI’s chances of lowering existential risk by a sufficient amount are low enough,
to imply that utilitymonster would get more expected utility from donating to StopTB than from donating to SIAI.
Also, multi isn’t denying that utilitymonster’s money would be better spent in some third way that directly pertains to existential risk. (However, such a denial may be implicit in multi’s own decision to give to GiveWell’s charities, depending on why he does it.)
I don’t know that we disagree very much, but I don’t want to lose sight of the original issue as to whether EY’s characterization accurately reflected what multifoliaterose was saying. I think we may agree that it takes an extra step in interpreting multifoliaterose’s post to get to EY’s characterization, and that there may be sufficient ambiguity in the original post such that not everyone would take that step:
I did implicitly read such a denial into the original post. As Carl noted:
For me, the references to the Givewell-approved charities and the lack of references to alternate existential risk reducing charities like FHI seemed to suggest that multifoliaterose was implicitly denying the existence of a third alternative. Perhaps EY read the post similarly.
I agree that this is the most probable meaning. The only other relevant consideration I know of is multi’s statement upstream that he uses GiveWell in part to encourage transparency in other charities. Maybe he sees this as a way to encourage existential-risk charities to do better, making them more likely to succeed.
Well, since multifoliaterose himself has been giving all of his charitable contributions to VillageReach, it’s a sensible reading.
That’s not what Multi said. He said we should assume the worst. You only need to assume something when you know that belief would be useful even though you don’t believe it. So he clearly doesn’t believe the worst (or if he does, he hasn’t said so).
He also said that he “believe[s] that reducing existential risk is ultimately more important than developing world aid.” How do you go from there to supporting StopTB over SIAI, unless you believe the worst?
I don’t use the word “assume” in the way that you describe, and I would be surprised if multi were.
Here I think we more-or-less agree. On my reading, multi is saying that, right now, the probability that SIAI is a money pit is high enough to outweigh the good that SIAI would do if it weren’t a money pit, relative to a tuberculosis charity. But multi is also saying that this probability assignment is unstable, so that some reasonable amount of evidence would lead him to radically reassign his probabilities.