Here is my reading: Even in the case of utilitymonster,
his/her concern about tuberculosis (say) in the near term is high enough, and
SIAI’s chances of lowering existential risk by a sufficient amount are low enough,
to imply that utilitymonster would get more expected utility from donating to StopTB than from donating to SIAI.
Also, multi isn’t denying that utilitymonster’s money would be better spent in some third way that directly pertains to existential risk. (However, such a denial may be implicit in multi’s own decision to give to GiveWell’s charities, depending on why he does it.)
I don’t know that we disagree very much, but I don’t want to lose sight of the original issue as to whether EY’s characterization accurately reflected what multifoliaterose was saying. I think we may agree that it takes an extra step in interpreting multifoliaterose’s post to get to EY’s characterization, and that there may be sufficient ambiguity in the original post such that not everyone would take that step:
Also, multi isn’t denying that utilitymonster’s money would be better spent in some third way that directly pertains to existential risk. (However, such a denial may be implicit in multi’s own decision to give to GiveWell’s charities, depending on why he does it.)
I did implicitly read such a denial into the original post. As Carl noted:
The invocation of VillageReach in addressing those aggregative utilitarians concerned about astronomical waste here seems baffling to me.
For me, the references to the Givewell-approved charities and the lack of references to alternate existential risk reducing charities like FHI seemed to suggest that multifoliaterose was implicitly denying the existence of a third alternative. Perhaps EY read the post similarly.
For me, the references to the Givewell-approved charities and the lack of references to alternate existential risk reducing charities like FHI seemed to suggest that multifoliaterose was implicitly denying the existence of a third alternative. Perhaps EY read the post similarly.
I agree that this is the most probable meaning. The only other relevant consideration I know of is multi’s statement upstream that he uses GiveWell in part to encourage transparency in other charities. Maybe he sees this as a way to encourage existential-risk charities to do better, making them more likely to succeed.
Here is my reading: Even in the case of utilitymonster,
his/her concern about tuberculosis (say) in the near term is high enough, and
SIAI’s chances of lowering existential risk by a sufficient amount are low enough,
to imply that utilitymonster would get more expected utility from donating to StopTB than from donating to SIAI.
Also, multi isn’t denying that utilitymonster’s money would be better spent in some third way that directly pertains to existential risk. (However, such a denial may be implicit in multi’s own decision to give to GiveWell’s charities, depending on why he does it.)
I don’t know that we disagree very much, but I don’t want to lose sight of the original issue as to whether EY’s characterization accurately reflected what multifoliaterose was saying. I think we may agree that it takes an extra step in interpreting multifoliaterose’s post to get to EY’s characterization, and that there may be sufficient ambiguity in the original post such that not everyone would take that step:
I did implicitly read such a denial into the original post. As Carl noted:
For me, the references to the Givewell-approved charities and the lack of references to alternate existential risk reducing charities like FHI seemed to suggest that multifoliaterose was implicitly denying the existence of a third alternative. Perhaps EY read the post similarly.
I agree that this is the most probable meaning. The only other relevant consideration I know of is multi’s statement upstream that he uses GiveWell in part to encourage transparency in other charities. Maybe he sees this as a way to encourage existential-risk charities to do better, making them more likely to succeed.