Finding a trusted third-party to make a call on it removes the incentive problems that the transgressor and harmed parties have, and is a better solution than the one I named (if involving such a third-party with an appropriate cost is possible).
My preferred way of dealing with this is not to say “I have decided that I have been forgiven for my act” but instead to say “I believe I have done enough to make up for my behavior, and while Bob has not forgiven me, I’ve made the decision to move on. I’m sad this is the outcome but I think this is the right call.”
Is there any material difference between these…?
There is not a material difference, but from my definition of forgiveness the first epistemic state involves deceiving yourself about whether you have been forgiven.
Another way of phrasing my point: you may decide to give up on being forgiven by the person you have wronged, but for goodness’ sake don’t also deceive yourself about whether you actually have been forgiven.
Finding a trusted third-party to make a call on it removes the incentive problems that the transgressor and harmed parties have, and is a good solution if possible.
Indeed, although I would like to emphasize that the way this solution works is by having a pre-existing trusted third party which is already, to begin with, integrated into the framework, and which is seen by the transgressor, the transgressed-against, and all relevant bystanders, as the appropriate arbitrator.[1] If you have to search for some mutually trusted third party after the fact, that is very unlikely to work well.
In other words, this sort of solution works well within the framework of a community. (This is par for the course for the halakha, which is constructed as a body of law by which Jewish communities are to operate and by which Jews ought to live in their communities, not merely as a contextless code of personal conduct.)
This further suggests that the answer to the question in the OP—i.e., what is the proper response to mistakes that have harmed others?—is inseparable from the task of building functioning communities, within which questions of this sort can get workable answers.
Note that “why should any particular person be seen by all and sundry as the appropriate arbitrator in matters like this” is another question which is very hard to answer outside the context of a community of people with some shared understanding of morality.
Finding a trusted third-party to make a call on it removes the incentive problems that the transgressor and harmed parties have, and is a better solution than the one I named (if involving such a third-party with an appropriate cost is possible).
There is not a material difference, but from my definition of forgiveness the first epistemic state involves deceiving yourself about whether you have been forgiven.
Another way of phrasing my point: you may decide to give up on being forgiven by the person you have wronged, but for goodness’ sake don’t also deceive yourself about whether you actually have been forgiven.
Indeed, although I would like to emphasize that the way this solution works is by having a pre-existing trusted third party which is already, to begin with, integrated into the framework, and which is seen by the transgressor, the transgressed-against, and all relevant bystanders, as the appropriate arbitrator.[1] If you have to search for some mutually trusted third party after the fact, that is very unlikely to work well.
In other words, this sort of solution works well within the framework of a community. (This is par for the course for the halakha, which is constructed as a body of law by which Jewish communities are to operate and by which Jews ought to live in their communities, not merely as a contextless code of personal conduct.)
This further suggests that the answer to the question in the OP—i.e., what is the proper response to mistakes that have harmed others?—is inseparable from the task of building functioning communities, within which questions of this sort can get workable answers.
Note that “why should any particular person be seen by all and sundry as the appropriate arbitrator in matters like this” is another question which is very hard to answer outside the context of a community of people with some shared understanding of morality.