Finding a trusted third-party to make a call on it removes the incentive problems that the transgressor and harmed parties have, and is a good solution if possible.
Indeed, although I would like to emphasize that the way this solution works is by having a pre-existing trusted third party which is already, to begin with, integrated into the framework, and which is seen by the transgressor, the transgressed-against, and all relevant bystanders, as the appropriate arbitrator.[1] If you have to search for some mutually trusted third party after the fact, that is very unlikely to work well.
In other words, this sort of solution works well within the framework of a community. (This is par for the course for the halakha, which is constructed as a body of law by which Jewish communities are to operate and by which Jews ought to live in their communities, not merely as a contextless code of personal conduct.)
This further suggests that the answer to the question in the OP—i.e., what is the proper response to mistakes that have harmed others?—is inseparable from the task of building functioning communities, within which questions of this sort can get workable answers.
Note that “why should any particular person be seen by all and sundry as the appropriate arbitrator in matters like this” is another question which is very hard to answer outside the context of a community of people with some shared understanding of morality.
Indeed, although I would like to emphasize that the way this solution works is by having a pre-existing trusted third party which is already, to begin with, integrated into the framework, and which is seen by the transgressor, the transgressed-against, and all relevant bystanders, as the appropriate arbitrator.[1] If you have to search for some mutually trusted third party after the fact, that is very unlikely to work well.
In other words, this sort of solution works well within the framework of a community. (This is par for the course for the halakha, which is constructed as a body of law by which Jewish communities are to operate and by which Jews ought to live in their communities, not merely as a contextless code of personal conduct.)
This further suggests that the answer to the question in the OP—i.e., what is the proper response to mistakes that have harmed others?—is inseparable from the task of building functioning communities, within which questions of this sort can get workable answers.
Note that “why should any particular person be seen by all and sundry as the appropriate arbitrator in matters like this” is another question which is very hard to answer outside the context of a community of people with some shared understanding of morality.