The brute fact of our existence is that some things work and others don’t, that some things seem right and others seem wrong. If someone is insistent upon denying reality, then that’s their affair, but they should know that there are consequences to this rejection. I consider the rejection of reality to be viceful, because those who do so reject their own current values and intutions in favor of an embrace of an abstract form of nihilism. Nihilism is much easier than acknowledging reality, but it’s also much worse, in my opinion.
This paragraph moves from (rightly) noting that we cannot establish certainty to, in the very next sentence, a confident assertion of truth without so much as an attempt at justification. Repeating unjustified claims ad nauseam is, despite the LessWrong belief that simply repeating a claim is enough to make it so, only illustrates why this project fails: the lack of justification (minus the invocation of Putnam’s “no miracles” argument, which is not as ironclad as you believe) is a very real problem for the brash and sweeping generalization that “philosophy is diseased and useless”.
As an aside, I find it interesting that you speak to me of “nihilism” given the argument for reductionism of the worst sort. Talk about “values devaluing themselves”; your own position is incompatible with value and meaning!
The lack of respect for philosophy here is telling; the consensus arguments here aren’t even consistent, let alone capable of making informed claims to truth. You cannot simply put forth a metaphysical position—and you are most certainly doing so despite the unwillingness to acknowledge your beliefs—and then handwave it away as “well we think it works so we’re right”.
The fact that it does work, or that it seems to work, is enough for me.
Works for what? In trivial cases of “common sense” where induction is more or less “right”? For some instances of medicine, electronics, other assorted applications of technology? I’ll grant you that too.
As a totalizing and unassailable account of humanity, the natural world, all possible knowledge? Absolutely not. Given that the consensus around here is that life and mind are reducible to rationality and technology metaphors, I hardly find this position surprising, although it is all but indefensible by your own stated positions.
This paragraph moves from (rightly) noting that we cannot establish certainty to, in the very next sentence, a confident assertion of truth without so much as an attempt at justification. Repeating unjustified claims ad nauseam is, despite the LessWrong belief that simply repeating a claim is enough to make it so, only illustrates why this project fails: the lack of justification (minus the invocation of Putnam’s “no miracles” argument, which is not as ironclad as you believe) is a very real problem for the brash and sweeping generalization that “philosophy is diseased and useless”.
There is no logical way that I can prove to you that reality exists. If you want one, I am sorry. Nonetheless, my senses tell me that reality exists and that logic works and that my values are good. I accept those senses because the alternative is to embrace groundlessness and the total destruction of meaning.
You do not show how other philosophies can solve the problems I outline. You have no offense against rationalism. Rationalism has offense against other philosophies because rationalism works. Even if rationalism doesn’t work, it appears to, and is the inescapable condition of my life. I can’t help but think in terms of logic and induction and empiricism, and I refuse to embrace any abstract form of truth without a tangible connection to my own internal understanding of the universe.
The choice isn’t between one philosophy and many, which are equally justified, but between one philosophy which is my own and the one that I can’t help but believe, and others which are so abstract and deconnected from my own experiences and understanding that they fail to provide any sort of value in my life.
As an aside, I find it interesting that you speak to me of “nihilism” given the argument for reductionism of the worst sort. Talk about “values devaluing themselves”; your own position is incompatible with value and meaning!
I don’t believe that reductionism destroys value. That seems like a separate debate, anyways.
The lack of respect for philosophy here is telling; the consensus arguments here aren’t even consistent, let alone capable of making informed claims to truth. You cannot simply put forth a metaphysical position—and you are most certainly doing so despite the unwillingness to acknowledge your beliefs—and then handwave it away as “well we think it works so we’re right”.
I’m not trying to do that. I’m saying that my reality is inescapably the way it currently is. If I didn’t accept the metaphysical condition that I currently accept, I would believe things indiscriminately and have no ability to judge things or discern things or to make choices. However, I want to do those things. Therefore, I accept rationality. This isn’t pretty, from a logical standpoint. But it’s basically inevitable for anyone who wants purpose in their life.
Your alternative philosophy, whatever it might be, is at least as groundless as rationality, if not more so. If you want to reject rationality, please pick a specific paradigm and explain how it would provide an answer to the problem of induction and turtles all the way down. Otherwise, you’re being unfair in your evaluation, because you place a higher burden of proof on rationality than you do on other positions.
Works for what? In trivial cases of “common sense” where induction is more or less “right”? For some instances of medicine, electronics, other assorted applications of technology? I’ll grant you that too.
As a totalizing and unassailable account of humanity, the natural world, all possible knowledge? Absolutely not. Given that the consensus around here is that life and mind are reducible to rationality and technology metaphors, I hardly find this position surprising, although it is all but indefensible by your own stated positions.
Can you give me an example of somewhere where rationality doesn’t work, where some other paradigm does? In my experience, if rationality doesn’t work, it’s in an area where nothing else works either. Moreover, rationality has a history of solving problems that were previously thought to be unsolvable. Therefore, I currently trust it more than alternative positions.
There is no logical way that I can prove to you that reality exists. If you want one, I am sorry. Nonetheless, my senses tell me that reality exists and that logic works and that my values are good. I accept those senses because the alternative is to embrace groundlessness and the total destruction of meaning.
I have no exceptional quarrel with scientific realism nor the existence of an objective and mind-independent reality. I am however skeptical, firstly, of the idea that restricting inquiry into that domain to “rationality” is needlessly constraining, and secondly that privileging “objective” modes of inquiry leaves out very important matters—like consciousness, ethics, and aesthetics, to name a few.
You do not show how other philosophies can solve the problems I outline. You have no offense against rationalism. Rationalism has offense against other philosophies because rationalism works. Even if rationalism doesn’t work, it appears to, and is the inescapable condition of my life. I can’t help but think in terms of logic and induction and empiricism, and I refuse to embrace any abstract form of truth without a tangible connection to my own internal understanding of the universe.
Indeed, I do not show how other philosophies may solve the problems because I question their status as problems at all. To treat everything as a “problem” that can and must be solved by Mighty Intellect is to implicitly endorse a particular epistemic, if not metaphysical, position—a position that takes for granted a particular status of thinking subjects as they relate to mind-independent reality and other beings—and I simply choose not to endorse that position, or more to the point, not to endorse it as uncritically as the locals here are wont to do.
To repeat my earlier point: why should rationalism be given privileged grounds? The no-miracles argument is about the only thing you’ve got to hang a hat on, and it is trivial to point out that there are many instances just in science alone where we don’t have knowledge and may never be able to acquire it. This is without even getting into arguments about why “progress” and “doing things” should be the ultimate measuring stick of usefulness, let alone truth.
The choice isn’t between one philosophy and many, which are equally justified, but between one philosophy which is my own and the one that I can’t help but believe, and others which are so abstract and deconnected from my own experiences and understanding that they fail to provide any sort of value in my life.
I can’t speak for everyone of course but I find immense value in aesthetics and in other non-rational modes of human experience, and equally, I find myself wary of philosophies that exclude such values and treat them as meaningless.
In reality all this article has done is show that philosophy is far from dead; LessWrong has simply chosen to adopt a particularly limiting form of it and decry everything outside that sphere.
I have no exceptional quarrel with scientific realism nor the existence of an objective and mind-independent reality. I am however skeptical, firstly, of the idea that restricting inquiry into that domain to “rationality” is needlessly constraining, and secondly that privileging “objective” modes of inquiry leaves out very important matters—like consciousness, ethics, and aesthetics, to name a few.
I think that rationality encompasses all of those things entirely and don’t understand why you believe differently. Rationality is the tool that we use to distinguish the claims about aesthetics and consciousness and ethics that make sense from the ones that don’t. A refusal to use this tool seems like it would be crippling. Other tools might still prove useful, and there are issues as to what we should do if our tools conflict, but I think rationality is the ultimate tool because it is very good at making comparisons between different things, because it uses such generalized ideas like logic. If one aesthetic claim contradicts another, only rationality can recognize that as a problem and work towards solving it.
Indeed, I do not show how other philosophies may solve the problems because I question their status as problems at all. To treat everything as a “problem” that can and must be solved by Mighty Intellect is to implicitly endorse a particular epistemic, if not metaphysical, position—a position that takes for granted a particular status of thinking subjects as they relate to mind-independent reality and other beings—and I simply choose not to endorse that position, or more to the point, not to endorse it as uncritically as the locals here are wont to do.
This epistemic condition is inevitable, because you ARE a thinking subject. If you prioritize a different epistemic condition above this one I don’t understand how you can go about living your life.
To repeat my earlier point: why should rationalism be given privileged grounds? The no-miracles argument is about the only thing you’ve got to hang a hat on, and it is trivial to point out that there are many instances just in science alone where we don’t have knowledge and may never be able to acquire it. This is without even getting into arguments about why “progress” and “doing things” should be the ultimate measuring stick of usefulness, let alone truth.
There’s no logical reason to give rationality privileged grounds. But I think that people should choose epistemic systems which connect to their own understanding of the way reality works. I think this on a value-level basis, not a logical metaphysical one. (Side Note: I believe that values, not logical truths, are the ultimate metaphysical justification because they inherently connect to motivational states. However, I arrived at this position through the heavy use of logic, such as by trying to think of a solution to the is-ought problem. Values are the ultimate metaphysical foundation but rationality is the ultimate metaphysical tool that we use to weigh values against each other and to consider the implications of certain values, etc.)
I can’t speak for everyone of course but I find immense value in aesthetics and in other non-rational modes of human experience, and equally, I find myself wary of philosophies that exclude such values and treat them as meaningless.
I don’t believe that aesthetics is meaningless. I don’t know why you think rationality believes that.
In reality all this article has done is show that philosophy is far from dead; LessWrong has simply chosen to adopt a particularly limiting form of it and decry everything outside that sphere.
Please show me the quote. I don’t believe that LessWrong has disavowed anything that you’ve said you valued.
I think that rationality encompasses all of those things entirely and don’t understand why you believe differently.
I don’t believe it because I am persuaded by arguments against treating consciousness and some features of consciousness as rational (that “useless” Continental philosophy as well as related arguments by John Searle, if you’d like a look).
This epistemic condition is inevitable, because you ARE a thinking subject. If you prioritize a different epistemic condition above this one I don’t understand how you can go about living your life.
It clearly isn’t inevitable if I am a thinking subject and do not accept that everything in reality boils down to formal rationality, which I do not.
There’s no logical reason to give rationality privileged grounds. But I think that people should choose epistemic systems which connect to their own understanding of the way reality works. I think this on a value-level basis, not a logical metaphysical one.
I have no issue with this reasoning (although I obviously disagree with it). The issue arises from bold claims to capital-T Truth status, which are built on flimsy grounds.
I don’t believe that aesthetics is meaningless. I don’t know why you think rationality believes that.
I don’t know, the process of recognizing beauty seems pretty rational to me. I may not have introspective access to my modules that calculate beauty, but introspective access and rationality are different things.
This is why these arguments are not taken seriously.
Why should I (or anyone outside this circle) accept that this is a claim to be taken seriously? It sounds like you’ve found a fine metaphor that you believe can encompass any and all forms of mental activity and thus can “explain” anything put to it.
Freudian psychoanalysis can make the same claim to truth about the mind, of course, so you’ve offered up on rational case for why anyone should accept this as true.
Why should I (or anyone outside this circle) accept that this is a claim to be taken seriously?
Do you think this is a pretty piece of music? Please just listen to it, without being primed by the description, comments, or related videos; it’ll only take 2 minutes.
First, you claim that rationality is exclusive and ignores other legitimate fields of inquiry. Now, you claim that rationality is overly inclusive, trying to incorporate too many things. You’re a bit of an idiot.
I think you’re using a different definition of rationality than is common on this site.
I don’t believe it because I am persuaded by arguments against treating consciousness and some features of consciousness as rational (that “useless” Continental philosophy as well as related arguments by John Searle, if you’d like a look).
I need more detail to be able to evaluate what you are saying here.
It clearly isn’t inevitable if I am a thinking subject and do not accept that everything in reality boils down to formal rationality, which I do not.
I think you might accept it but have hidden flaws within your reasoning process that lead you to misunderstand your own beliefs. I think that if you truly rejected this position then you would be unable to make decisions or understand arguments in aesthetic or ethical or consciousness related domains. I think getting to such a rejection would be impossible for a human being but that some human beings might mislead themselves to believe in arguments for that conclusion and to selectively believe in that conclusion, and to believe that they believe in that conclusion fully. This is why I said such a rejection would be a form of abstract nihilism.
I have no issue with this reasoning (although I obviously disagree with it). The issue arises from bold claims to capital-T Truth status, which are built on flimsy grounds.
I think that rationality is capital-T insofar as it is the best paradigm. It has no ultimate foundation, but the foundation that it does have is intrinsic to the very mode of our existence and our values, and that makes it the best.
Also, I don’t understand why you disagree with this reasoning. It seems very similar to what you claim.
Because aesthetic enjoyment is non-rational.
I don’t understand what you mean by “non-rational” or why you believe that aesthetics is that. Also, rationality doesn’t believe that values are logical truths, but that doesn’t mean that rationality thinks that values are valueless. Anyone who isn’t using rationality extremely badly will recognize that values are valuable and not valueless. Your thinking is confused.
I think you might accept it but have hidden flaws within your reasoning process that lead you to misunderstand your own beliefs.
Prove it.
I think that if you truly rejected this position then you would be unable to make decisions or understand arguments in aesthetic or ethical or consciousness related domains.
This speaks more to the limitations of your ability to think outside your box than it does to problems with my, or anyone else’s, thinking. You’re so married to the Computer Metaphor that the possibility of thought and experience outside of it is simply inconceivable; of course this leaves you wide-open to charges of pseudo-science.
It has no ultimate foundation, but the foundation that it does have is intrinsic to the very mode of our existence and our values, and that makes it the best.
If it is intrinsic to our mode of existence then it does have a foundation, so which is it?
I still find it hilarious (and not in a good way) that you’re so insistent on treating your particular notion of values as justification for what is “best”; as if there is no such thing as a historical contingency or accident that might just call that into question on a deep level.
Even Kant figured this out in the 1700s. Score one more for philosophy.
Well, I can’t do so all by myself. You’ll need to do some introspection to help me out. I don’t feel like you’re considering my arguments fairly, you’ve been combative and demanding and hostile throughout this conversation. This means I might stop wasting my time on you soon.
This speaks more to the limitations of your ability to think outside your box than it does to problems with my, or anyone else’s, thinking. You’re so married to the Computer Metaphor that the possibility of thought and experience outside of it is simply inconceivable; of course this leaves you wide-open to charges of pseudo-science.
What do you think we could use to make arguments, if not logic?
A big part of my argument is that we are limited. I don’t have the ability to use things other than logic to make decisions, my decisions never seem to work out when I don’t. If you do, then you are a superhero and you should definitely use your powers to the fullest extent.
If it is intrinsic to our mode of existence then it does have a foundation, so which is it?
It has a foundation. It doesn’t justify itself in terms of an undeniable logical proof but in terms of a process that cannot be escaped and which is intrinsic to every aspect of human behavior.
I still find it hilarious (and not in a good way) that you’re so insistent on treating your particular notion of values as justification for what is “best”; as if there is no such thing as a historical contingency or accident that might just call that into question on a deep level.
“Best” is a brute fact about what my values say. If your values are different, I can’t argue with you.
On a side note, I’m pretty convinced that you’re an arrogant asshole. You don’t seem to be on a quest for truth, you seem to be on a quest to show that you are smarter than me. You came into this conversation claiming that you wanted to teach LessWrongers about the value of epistemic tolerance, but you’ve mocked me and my arguments throughout this entire discussion. I think you’re more about proving to yourself how smart you are than actually figuring out the way the world works and how you should live your life. Fuck off.
On a side note, I’m pretty convinced that you’re an arrogant asshole. You don’t seem to be on a quest for truth, you seem to be on a quest to show that you are smarter than me. You came into this conversation claiming that you wanted to teach LessWrongers about the value of epistemic tolerance, but you’ve mocked me and my arguments throughout this entire discussion. I think you’re more about proving to yourself how smart you are than actually figuring out the way the world works and how you should live your life. Fuck off.
You said this on lesswrong and got away with it without sanction (as of the time of the post). That says a lot. Specifically it says you are probably right and blatantly so! I haven’t read the preceding discussion but if I do so and find that I don’t agree with your assessment then I will be shocked and confused.
Testing the limits of LessWrong’s tolerance. I was curious under what circumstances I could get away with language.
Trying to alter the motivational state of the commenter by pointing out that they were being rude and hypocritical. I think the root of the problem is that there’s no real incentive for the commenter to change their beliefs, because they didn’t seem to be thinking through what I was saying. I also wanted it to be memorable, so that they might think back to this at a later point in time when they’re more amenable to the kind of arguments I’ve been making.
Also: I think there are times when LessWrong does need greater epistemic tolerance and that the commenter was making it harder for those times to happen. I was trying to signal that I support pragmatism now, so that I would be more likely to be trusted while arguing for epistemic tolerance in other situations.
Why should this language deserve sanction? It asserts that the counter-party to the debate isn’t interested in discussion leading to improved thinking—a grave insult in this community. But simply making the accusation doesn’t deserve punishment. Falsely making the accusation deserves substantial rebuke, but given the systematic high variance in the value of true and false accusations, why should we care about the average value of these types of accusations.
Alternatively, I am entirely missing your intended point.
Or they are not a member of the in-group. Both are probably relevant, in this instance.
Imagine if I did that to Yudkowsky.
When Eliezer behaves poorly criticizm of said behavior tends to be well received. People pay a lot of attention to Eliezer when he makes his rationality posts but also care a lot more when he does things they don’t like. Because what it says and does (in this context) matters a lot more.
If in doubt either that direct criticism of Yudkowsky can be well received or that said comments can be upvoted dramatically grab Wei_Dai’s user comments script, grab mine, and sort by vote. Last time I checked a couple of the top ten are actually examples of just that.
Sure, I have never called Yudkowsky an asshole (because he isn’t one) and even when I have criticized him I criticized a specific behavior rather than alleging an innate trait. I also have never told him to “fuck off”, although I have given him (sincere) advice to delegate his moderation authority to a SingInst minion who has better social skills and is more equipped to translate his goals into achieved outcomes.
I reject the claim that Eliezer gets anti-criticism privileges.
My comment was tongue in cheek, just a joke. I’m not planning to curse out Eliezer anytime soon. It was enjoyable from my perspective to imagine a stream of hundreds of downvotes flooding my comment and making this profile unusable.
I don’t think that Eliezer is immune to criticism. I do think he gets extra respect and politeness. The reasons for this are tied very closely to his past history of good content, but I bet that being a de facto leader of this site is also somewhat helpful. In quantitative terms I’m not sure whether or not he receives more or less criticism-per-content than other people, but suspect that he’s receiving more, because of his status as leader. In qualitative terms though, leaders generally are treated with more respect, and I don’t think that he’s an anomaly in that respect. I think the kind of criticism that he receives is probably generally nicer and better thought out, although he probably also receives more criticisms per content.
Despite that, he also seems more likely to draw the ire of ignorant and especially rude people. He might be receiving more respectful criticism but also more disrespectful criticism, and receiving less criticism with only moderate levels of respect. This is my current belief, now that I’ve thought about it a bit.
I also believe that he’s probably criticized less often by in-group members than other in-group members are. I think that the amount of content he produces makes this tricky to evaluate, though, and this is the conclusion that I’m least certain about.
My comment was tongue in cheek, just a joke. I’m not planning to curse out Eliezer anytime soon. It was enjoyable from my perspective to imagine a stream of hundreds of downvotes flooding my comment and making this profile unusable.
Of course, you said “imagine that ”. And so my reply is that your imagination produced flawed counterfactual predictions of the response and so conveys an incorrect picture of the actual world prior to the counterfactual modification.
I also believe that he’s probably criticized less often by in-group members than other in-group members are.
That would be something I might predict based on general understanding of how social groups work prior to exposure to the actual data stream of less wrong comments. However my actual observations tell me otherwise and so I would happily bet against you were such a thing to be measured. Eliezer is criticized more often than the median in-group member (for most reasonable interpretations of ‘criticism’ and ‘in group member’).
I intend no particular presumption by this so more by way of information: I am one of the most active participants here and suspect I pay a more than typical amount of attention to what is being criticizer by who, how such criticism is received and how the interplay of social dynamics and status (seems to) influence which criticisms can be (or are) given when and to whom. Mere criticism volume is a comparatively simple thing to keep an account of. This gives me enough confidence in how often Eliezer is criticized that I would consider the opportunity to bet at even odds that he is criticized more often than the median in-group member. In fact I would even be willing to strengthen my claim to refer to “criticism relative to contribution volume”.
Falsely making the accusation deserves substantial rebuke
Exactly. wedrifid’s claim appears to be that chaosmosis saying that without being downvoted heavily means that other members of the community have not yet rebuked him, which is evidence that he does not deserve rebuke.
(I don’t think the evidence is that strong because the comments are recent and it’s a Sunday night, but the evidence will strengthen with the passing of time.)
Another function of wedrifid noting that explicitly is to remind people to downvote if they see something that should be rebuked- if the community is failing to downvote bad material, that is cause for shock and confusion.
Exactly. wedrifid’s claim appears to be that chaosmosis saying that without being downvoted heavily means that other members of the community have not yet rebuked him, which is evidence that he does not deserve rebuke.
Certainly.
Another function of wedrifid noting that explicitly is to remind people to downvote if they see something that should be rebuked- if the community is failing to downvote bad material, that is cause for shock and confusion.
I suppose that connotation does come across but I wouldn’t necessarily want to say that in this context. I would estimate that I am more inclined than average to support the use of such a response. I wouldn’t outright encourage the specific language but it certainly wouldn’t bother me and I would either leave it neutral or possible upvote.
What do you think we could use to make arguments, if not logic?
Why should consciousness or aesthetics reduce to arguments of any kind? Why should they be amenable to formalization in agreement with a rather bizarre epistemic position?
It doesn’t justify itself in terms of an undeniable logical proof but in terms of a process that cannot be escaped and which is intrinsic to every aspect of human behavior.
That is an unfortunately narrow encapsulation of human nature.
Fuck off.
You mad bro?
Maybe you should re-calculate your emotions for a more reasonable outcome.
Why should consciousness or aesthetics reduce to arguments of any kind? Why should they be amenable to formalization in agreement with a rather bizarre epistemic position?
Allow me to rephrase: what do we use to distinguish between conflicting intuitions, if not meta-intuitions?
This paragraph moves from (rightly) noting that we cannot establish certainty to, in the very next sentence, a confident assertion of truth without so much as an attempt at justification. Repeating unjustified claims ad nauseam is, despite the LessWrong belief that simply repeating a claim is enough to make it so, only illustrates why this project fails: the lack of justification (minus the invocation of Putnam’s “no miracles” argument, which is not as ironclad as you believe) is a very real problem for the brash and sweeping generalization that “philosophy is diseased and useless”.
As an aside, I find it interesting that you speak to me of “nihilism” given the argument for reductionism of the worst sort. Talk about “values devaluing themselves”; your own position is incompatible with value and meaning!
The lack of respect for philosophy here is telling; the consensus arguments here aren’t even consistent, let alone capable of making informed claims to truth. You cannot simply put forth a metaphysical position—and you are most certainly doing so despite the unwillingness to acknowledge your beliefs—and then handwave it away as “well we think it works so we’re right”.
Works for what? In trivial cases of “common sense” where induction is more or less “right”? For some instances of medicine, electronics, other assorted applications of technology? I’ll grant you that too.
As a totalizing and unassailable account of humanity, the natural world, all possible knowledge? Absolutely not. Given that the consensus around here is that life and mind are reducible to rationality and technology metaphors, I hardly find this position surprising, although it is all but indefensible by your own stated positions.
There is no logical way that I can prove to you that reality exists. If you want one, I am sorry. Nonetheless, my senses tell me that reality exists and that logic works and that my values are good. I accept those senses because the alternative is to embrace groundlessness and the total destruction of meaning.
You do not show how other philosophies can solve the problems I outline. You have no offense against rationalism. Rationalism has offense against other philosophies because rationalism works. Even if rationalism doesn’t work, it appears to, and is the inescapable condition of my life. I can’t help but think in terms of logic and induction and empiricism, and I refuse to embrace any abstract form of truth without a tangible connection to my own internal understanding of the universe.
The choice isn’t between one philosophy and many, which are equally justified, but between one philosophy which is my own and the one that I can’t help but believe, and others which are so abstract and deconnected from my own experiences and understanding that they fail to provide any sort of value in my life.
I don’t believe that reductionism destroys value. That seems like a separate debate, anyways.
I’m not trying to do that. I’m saying that my reality is inescapably the way it currently is. If I didn’t accept the metaphysical condition that I currently accept, I would believe things indiscriminately and have no ability to judge things or discern things or to make choices. However, I want to do those things. Therefore, I accept rationality. This isn’t pretty, from a logical standpoint. But it’s basically inevitable for anyone who wants purpose in their life.
Your alternative philosophy, whatever it might be, is at least as groundless as rationality, if not more so. If you want to reject rationality, please pick a specific paradigm and explain how it would provide an answer to the problem of induction and turtles all the way down. Otherwise, you’re being unfair in your evaluation, because you place a higher burden of proof on rationality than you do on other positions.
Can you give me an example of somewhere where rationality doesn’t work, where some other paradigm does? In my experience, if rationality doesn’t work, it’s in an area where nothing else works either. Moreover, rationality has a history of solving problems that were previously thought to be unsolvable. Therefore, I currently trust it more than alternative positions.
I have no exceptional quarrel with scientific realism nor the existence of an objective and mind-independent reality. I am however skeptical, firstly, of the idea that restricting inquiry into that domain to “rationality” is needlessly constraining, and secondly that privileging “objective” modes of inquiry leaves out very important matters—like consciousness, ethics, and aesthetics, to name a few.
Indeed, I do not show how other philosophies may solve the problems because I question their status as problems at all. To treat everything as a “problem” that can and must be solved by Mighty Intellect is to implicitly endorse a particular epistemic, if not metaphysical, position—a position that takes for granted a particular status of thinking subjects as they relate to mind-independent reality and other beings—and I simply choose not to endorse that position, or more to the point, not to endorse it as uncritically as the locals here are wont to do.
To repeat my earlier point: why should rationalism be given privileged grounds? The no-miracles argument is about the only thing you’ve got to hang a hat on, and it is trivial to point out that there are many instances just in science alone where we don’t have knowledge and may never be able to acquire it. This is without even getting into arguments about why “progress” and “doing things” should be the ultimate measuring stick of usefulness, let alone truth.
I can’t speak for everyone of course but I find immense value in aesthetics and in other non-rational modes of human experience, and equally, I find myself wary of philosophies that exclude such values and treat them as meaningless.
In reality all this article has done is show that philosophy is far from dead; LessWrong has simply chosen to adopt a particularly limiting form of it and decry everything outside that sphere.
I think that rationality encompasses all of those things entirely and don’t understand why you believe differently. Rationality is the tool that we use to distinguish the claims about aesthetics and consciousness and ethics that make sense from the ones that don’t. A refusal to use this tool seems like it would be crippling. Other tools might still prove useful, and there are issues as to what we should do if our tools conflict, but I think rationality is the ultimate tool because it is very good at making comparisons between different things, because it uses such generalized ideas like logic. If one aesthetic claim contradicts another, only rationality can recognize that as a problem and work towards solving it.
This epistemic condition is inevitable, because you ARE a thinking subject. If you prioritize a different epistemic condition above this one I don’t understand how you can go about living your life.
There’s no logical reason to give rationality privileged grounds. But I think that people should choose epistemic systems which connect to their own understanding of the way reality works. I think this on a value-level basis, not a logical metaphysical one. (Side Note: I believe that values, not logical truths, are the ultimate metaphysical justification because they inherently connect to motivational states. However, I arrived at this position through the heavy use of logic, such as by trying to think of a solution to the is-ought problem. Values are the ultimate metaphysical foundation but rationality is the ultimate metaphysical tool that we use to weigh values against each other and to consider the implications of certain values, etc.)
I don’t believe that aesthetics is meaningless. I don’t know why you think rationality believes that.
Please show me the quote. I don’t believe that LessWrong has disavowed anything that you’ve said you valued.
I don’t believe it because I am persuaded by arguments against treating consciousness and some features of consciousness as rational (that “useless” Continental philosophy as well as related arguments by John Searle, if you’d like a look).
It clearly isn’t inevitable if I am a thinking subject and do not accept that everything in reality boils down to formal rationality, which I do not.
I have no issue with this reasoning (although I obviously disagree with it). The issue arises from bold claims to capital-T Truth status, which are built on flimsy grounds.
Because aesthetic enjoyment is non-rational.
I don’t know, the process of recognizing beauty seems pretty rational to me. I may not have introspective access to my modules that calculate beauty, but introspective access and rationality are different things.
This is why these arguments are not taken seriously.
Why should I (or anyone outside this circle) accept that this is a claim to be taken seriously? It sounds like you’ve found a fine metaphor that you believe can encompass any and all forms of mental activity and thus can “explain” anything put to it.
Freudian psychoanalysis can make the same claim to truth about the mind, of course, so you’ve offered up on rational case for why anyone should accept this as true.
See what happens when you ignore philosophy?
Do you think this is a pretty piece of music? Please just listen to it, without being primed by the description, comments, or related videos; it’ll only take 2 minutes.
I didn’t enjoy listening to it on its own terribly much, but I think it’d be OK as a soundtrack for a video or something.
First, you claim that rationality is exclusive and ignores other legitimate fields of inquiry. Now, you claim that rationality is overly inclusive, trying to incorporate too many things. You’re a bit of an idiot.
It’s almost like they aren’t mutually exclusive claims.
Show your calculations for this argument.
I think you’re using a different definition of rationality than is common on this site.
I need more detail to be able to evaluate what you are saying here.
I think you might accept it but have hidden flaws within your reasoning process that lead you to misunderstand your own beliefs. I think that if you truly rejected this position then you would be unable to make decisions or understand arguments in aesthetic or ethical or consciousness related domains. I think getting to such a rejection would be impossible for a human being but that some human beings might mislead themselves to believe in arguments for that conclusion and to selectively believe in that conclusion, and to believe that they believe in that conclusion fully. This is why I said such a rejection would be a form of abstract nihilism.
I think that rationality is capital-T insofar as it is the best paradigm. It has no ultimate foundation, but the foundation that it does have is intrinsic to the very mode of our existence and our values, and that makes it the best.
Also, I don’t understand why you disagree with this reasoning. It seems very similar to what you claim.
I don’t understand what you mean by “non-rational” or why you believe that aesthetics is that. Also, rationality doesn’t believe that values are logical truths, but that doesn’t mean that rationality thinks that values are valueless. Anyone who isn’t using rationality extremely badly will recognize that values are valuable and not valueless. Your thinking is confused.
Prove it.
This speaks more to the limitations of your ability to think outside your box than it does to problems with my, or anyone else’s, thinking. You’re so married to the Computer Metaphor that the possibility of thought and experience outside of it is simply inconceivable; of course this leaves you wide-open to charges of pseudo-science.
If it is intrinsic to our mode of existence then it does have a foundation, so which is it?
I still find it hilarious (and not in a good way) that you’re so insistent on treating your particular notion of values as justification for what is “best”; as if there is no such thing as a historical contingency or accident that might just call that into question on a deep level.
Even Kant figured this out in the 1700s. Score one more for philosophy.
Well, I can’t do so all by myself. You’ll need to do some introspection to help me out. I don’t feel like you’re considering my arguments fairly, you’ve been combative and demanding and hostile throughout this conversation. This means I might stop wasting my time on you soon.
What do you think we could use to make arguments, if not logic?
A big part of my argument is that we are limited. I don’t have the ability to use things other than logic to make decisions, my decisions never seem to work out when I don’t. If you do, then you are a superhero and you should definitely use your powers to the fullest extent.
It has a foundation. It doesn’t justify itself in terms of an undeniable logical proof but in terms of a process that cannot be escaped and which is intrinsic to every aspect of human behavior.
“Best” is a brute fact about what my values say. If your values are different, I can’t argue with you.
On a side note, I’m pretty convinced that you’re an arrogant asshole. You don’t seem to be on a quest for truth, you seem to be on a quest to show that you are smarter than me. You came into this conversation claiming that you wanted to teach LessWrongers about the value of epistemic tolerance, but you’ve mocked me and my arguments throughout this entire discussion. I think you’re more about proving to yourself how smart you are than actually figuring out the way the world works and how you should live your life. Fuck off.
You said this on lesswrong and got away with it without sanction (as of the time of the post). That says a lot. Specifically it says you are probably right and blatantly so! I haven’t read the preceding discussion but if I do so and find that I don’t agree with your assessment then I will be shocked and confused.
I was:
Testing the limits of LessWrong’s tolerance. I was curious under what circumstances I could get away with language.
Trying to alter the motivational state of the commenter by pointing out that they were being rude and hypocritical. I think the root of the problem is that there’s no real incentive for the commenter to change their beliefs, because they didn’t seem to be thinking through what I was saying. I also wanted it to be memorable, so that they might think back to this at a later point in time when they’re more amenable to the kind of arguments I’ve been making.
Also: I think there are times when LessWrong does need greater epistemic tolerance and that the commenter was making it harder for those times to happen. I was trying to signal that I support pragmatism now, so that I would be more likely to be trusted while arguing for epistemic tolerance in other situations.
I think I don’t understand your point here.
Why should this language deserve sanction? It asserts that the counter-party to the debate isn’t interested in discussion leading to improved thinking—a grave insult in this community. But simply making the accusation doesn’t deserve punishment. Falsely making the accusation deserves substantial rebuke, but given the systematic high variance in the value of true and false accusations, why should we care about the average value of these types of accusations.
Alternatively, I am entirely missing your intended point.
The intended point was the literal one.
If someone can be told they are and asshole and to fuck off and that is accepted then they probably really are behaving like asshole.
Or they are not a member of the in-group. Both are probably relevant, in this instance.
Imagine if I did that to Yudkowsky.
When Eliezer behaves poorly criticizm of said behavior tends to be well received. People pay a lot of attention to Eliezer when he makes his rationality posts but also care a lot more when he does things they don’t like. Because what it says and does (in this context) matters a lot more.
If in doubt either that direct criticism of Yudkowsky can be well received or that said comments can be upvoted dramatically grab Wei_Dai’s user comments script, grab mine, and sort by vote. Last time I checked a couple of the top ten are actually examples of just that.
Sure, I have never called Yudkowsky an asshole (because he isn’t one) and even when I have criticized him I criticized a specific behavior rather than alleging an innate trait. I also have never told him to “fuck off”, although I have given him (sincere) advice to delegate his moderation authority to a SingInst minion who has better social skills and is more equipped to translate his goals into achieved outcomes.
I reject the claim that Eliezer gets anti-criticism privileges.
My comment was tongue in cheek, just a joke. I’m not planning to curse out Eliezer anytime soon. It was enjoyable from my perspective to imagine a stream of hundreds of downvotes flooding my comment and making this profile unusable.
I don’t think that Eliezer is immune to criticism. I do think he gets extra respect and politeness. The reasons for this are tied very closely to his past history of good content, but I bet that being a de facto leader of this site is also somewhat helpful. In quantitative terms I’m not sure whether or not he receives more or less criticism-per-content than other people, but suspect that he’s receiving more, because of his status as leader. In qualitative terms though, leaders generally are treated with more respect, and I don’t think that he’s an anomaly in that respect. I think the kind of criticism that he receives is probably generally nicer and better thought out, although he probably also receives more criticisms per content.
Despite that, he also seems more likely to draw the ire of ignorant and especially rude people. He might be receiving more respectful criticism but also more disrespectful criticism, and receiving less criticism with only moderate levels of respect. This is my current belief, now that I’ve thought about it a bit.
I also believe that he’s probably criticized less often by in-group members than other in-group members are. I think that the amount of content he produces makes this tricky to evaluate, though, and this is the conclusion that I’m least certain about.
Of course, you said “imagine that ”. And so my reply is that your imagination produced flawed counterfactual predictions of the response and so conveys an incorrect picture of the actual world prior to the counterfactual modification.
That would be something I might predict based on general understanding of how social groups work prior to exposure to the actual data stream of less wrong comments. However my actual observations tell me otherwise and so I would happily bet against you were such a thing to be measured. Eliezer is criticized more often than the median in-group member (for most reasonable interpretations of ‘criticism’ and ‘in group member’).
I intend no particular presumption by this so more by way of information: I am one of the most active participants here and suspect I pay a more than typical amount of attention to what is being criticizer by who, how such criticism is received and how the interplay of social dynamics and status (seems to) influence which criticisms can be (or are) given when and to whom. Mere criticism volume is a comparatively simple thing to keep an account of. This gives me enough confidence in how often Eliezer is criticized that I would consider the opportunity to bet at even odds that he is criticized more often than the median in-group member. In fact I would even be willing to strengthen my claim to refer to “criticism relative to contribution volume”.
Exactly. wedrifid’s claim appears to be that chaosmosis saying that without being downvoted heavily means that other members of the community have not yet rebuked him, which is evidence that he does not deserve rebuke.
(I don’t think the evidence is that strong because the comments are recent and it’s a Sunday night, but the evidence will strengthen with the passing of time.)
Another function of wedrifid noting that explicitly is to remind people to downvote if they see something that should be rebuked- if the community is failing to downvote bad material, that is cause for shock and confusion.
Certainly.
I suppose that connotation does come across but I wouldn’t necessarily want to say that in this context. I would estimate that I am more inclined than average to support the use of such a response. I wouldn’t outright encourage the specific language but it certainly wouldn’t bother me and I would either leave it neutral or possible upvote.
Why should consciousness or aesthetics reduce to arguments of any kind? Why should they be amenable to formalization in agreement with a rather bizarre epistemic position?
That is an unfortunately narrow encapsulation of human nature.
You mad bro?
Maybe you should re-calculate your emotions for a more reasonable outcome.
Allow me to rephrase: what do we use to distinguish between conflicting intuitions, if not meta-intuitions?
Sometimes a coin.