It seems like some people are using “conceivable” to mean “imaginable at some resolution”, and some to mean “coherently imaginable at any resolution”, or something. By which I mean, the first group would say that they could conceive of “America lost the Revolutionary War” or “heavier objects fall faster” or “we are composed of sentient superstrings, and the properties of matter are their tiny, tiny emotions” or “the president has been kidnapped by ninjas”; whereas the second group would say these things are not conceivable.
As a result, group A wouldn’t really consider the conceivability of p-zombies as evidence of their possibility (well, it’d technically be extremely weak evidence), whereas group B would consider the problem of the conceivability of p-zombies as essentially equivalent to the actuality of p-zombies. (There may be other groups, such as those who think “If it’s imaginable, then it’s coherent,” but based on my brief glance the discussion hasn’t actually made it that far yet.)
Is this right? I’d think the whole thing could be resolved if you taboo’d “conceivable”...?
Talking about “the” possibility of p-zombies is pretty pointless, because of the important
difference between logical and physical impossibility. Even Chalmers thinks PZs are
physically/naturally impossible.
I don’t think the coherent/incoherent distinction you are making is clear. Of course, in a universe where everything is exactly the same, heavier objects would not fall faster in vacuo. But then we understand gravity and acceleration, so we can say what the contradictions would be. We don’t understand what the contradictions would be in the case of p-zombies, because we don’t have the psychophysical laws.Physicalism is Not An Explanation.
By ‘coherent’, I mean something like ‘consistent’ (to make an analogy to logic) - given all our observations, and extrapolating the concept as needed, there are no contradictions. “Heavier objects fall faster” leads to contradictions pretty quickly. Some people believe that “p-zombies are possible” (in some sense, which might match up with what you mean by either logical or physical) also leads to a contradiction, though we of course don’t understand the laws that would cause this.
This is beside the point! I’m not arguing for or against p-zombies (here), I’m saying I think the people in this argument are talking past each other because they have diverging definitions.
“Heavier objects fall faster” is imaginable at a particular resolution. Once you ask, say, “what happens if you glue two stones together?”, it contradicts more deeply-held notions, and the concept falls apart at that resolution.
Some people believe that p-zombies are incoherent if analyzed sufficiently, or expect that they necessitate a severe contradiction of much more deeply-held beliefs.
Moreover, it is possible to hold that we don’t know the laws that would contradict p-zombies but that they are nevertheless contradicted—as it is possible to hold that things should not fall up without knowing the laws of gravitation (leaving aside that some things do fall up).
Do you disagree with my central assertion, or just my definition of coherence?
The stone-gluing can be worked around with auxilliary laws. To assume those laws
are absent is to assume some other laws.
People can believe what they like. If you are going to stake a claim that there
is a literal self contradiction in p-zombies, you need to say what it is. However
most cases of aleged self contradiction turn out to be contradiction with unexamined
background assumptions—laws, again. Talk of “resolution” is misleading: this is cognitive, not pictorial.
It is in fact the philosopher’s point that p-zombies are really, for unknown
reasons, impossible. They are not arguing zombies in order to argue zombies!
Non-philosophers keep misunderstanding that.
It seems like some people are using “conceivable” to mean “imaginable at some resolution”, and some to mean “coherently imaginable at any resolution”, or something. By which I mean, the first group would say that they could conceive of “America lost the Revolutionary War” or “heavier objects fall faster” or “we are composed of sentient superstrings, and the properties of matter are their tiny, tiny emotions” or “the president has been kidnapped by ninjas”; whereas the second group would say these things are not conceivable.
As a result, group A wouldn’t really consider the conceivability of p-zombies as evidence of their possibility (well, it’d technically be extremely weak evidence), whereas group B would consider the problem of the conceivability of p-zombies as essentially equivalent to the actuality of p-zombies. (There may be other groups, such as those who think “If it’s imaginable, then it’s coherent,” but based on my brief glance the discussion hasn’t actually made it that far yet.)
Is this right? I’d think the whole thing could be resolved if you taboo’d “conceivable”...?
Talking about “the” possibility of p-zombies is pretty pointless, because of the important difference between logical and physical impossibility. Even Chalmers thinks PZs are physically/naturally impossible.
I don’t think the coherent/incoherent distinction you are making is clear. Of course, in a universe where everything is exactly the same, heavier objects would not fall faster in vacuo. But then we understand gravity and acceleration, so we can say what the contradictions would be. We don’t understand what the contradictions would be in the case of p-zombies, because we don’t have the psychophysical laws.Physicalism is Not An Explanation.
By ‘coherent’, I mean something like ‘consistent’ (to make an analogy to logic) - given all our observations, and extrapolating the concept as needed, there are no contradictions. “Heavier objects fall faster” leads to contradictions pretty quickly. Some people believe that “p-zombies are possible” (in some sense, which might match up with what you mean by either logical or physical) also leads to a contradiction, though we of course don’t understand the laws that would cause this.
This is beside the point! I’m not arguing for or against p-zombies (here), I’m saying I think the people in this argument are talking past each other because they have diverging definitions.
“Heavier objects fall faster” leads to contradictions with a theory,
If we don’t know the laws that would contradict p-zombies, there is no see-able contradiction in them, and conceivability=logical possibility follows.
“Heavier objects fall faster” is imaginable at a particular resolution. Once you ask, say, “what happens if you glue two stones together?”, it contradicts more deeply-held notions, and the concept falls apart at that resolution.
Some people believe that p-zombies are incoherent if analyzed sufficiently, or expect that they necessitate a severe contradiction of much more deeply-held beliefs.
Moreover, it is possible to hold that we don’t know the laws that would contradict p-zombies but that they are nevertheless contradicted—as it is possible to hold that things should not fall up without knowing the laws of gravitation (leaving aside that some things do fall up).
Do you disagree with my central assertion, or just my definition of coherence?
The stone-gluing can be worked around with auxilliary laws. To assume those laws are absent is to assume some other laws.
People can believe what they like. If you are going to stake a claim that there is a literal self contradiction in p-zombies, you need to say what it is. However most cases of aleged self contradiction turn out to be contradiction with unexamined background assumptions—laws, again. Talk of “resolution” is misleading: this is cognitive, not pictorial.
It is in fact the philosopher’s point that p-zombies are really, for unknown reasons, impossible. They are not arguing zombies in order to argue zombies! Non-philosophers keep misunderstanding that.
So, ah, just the latter then?
That’s all right, and I admit it’s a fuzzy term. But if you want to make any progress, I suggest you consider the former point instead.