“Heavier objects fall faster” is imaginable at a particular resolution. Once you ask, say, “what happens if you glue two stones together?”, it contradicts more deeply-held notions, and the concept falls apart at that resolution.
Some people believe that p-zombies are incoherent if analyzed sufficiently, or expect that they necessitate a severe contradiction of much more deeply-held beliefs.
Moreover, it is possible to hold that we don’t know the laws that would contradict p-zombies but that they are nevertheless contradicted—as it is possible to hold that things should not fall up without knowing the laws of gravitation (leaving aside that some things do fall up).
Do you disagree with my central assertion, or just my definition of coherence?
The stone-gluing can be worked around with auxilliary laws. To assume those laws
are absent is to assume some other laws.
People can believe what they like. If you are going to stake a claim that there
is a literal self contradiction in p-zombies, you need to say what it is. However
most cases of aleged self contradiction turn out to be contradiction with unexamined
background assumptions—laws, again. Talk of “resolution” is misleading: this is cognitive, not pictorial.
It is in fact the philosopher’s point that p-zombies are really, for unknown
reasons, impossible. They are not arguing zombies in order to argue zombies!
Non-philosophers keep misunderstanding that.
“Heavier objects fall faster” leads to contradictions with a theory,
If we don’t know the laws that would contradict p-zombies, there is no see-able contradiction in them, and conceivability=logical possibility follows.
“Heavier objects fall faster” is imaginable at a particular resolution. Once you ask, say, “what happens if you glue two stones together?”, it contradicts more deeply-held notions, and the concept falls apart at that resolution.
Some people believe that p-zombies are incoherent if analyzed sufficiently, or expect that they necessitate a severe contradiction of much more deeply-held beliefs.
Moreover, it is possible to hold that we don’t know the laws that would contradict p-zombies but that they are nevertheless contradicted—as it is possible to hold that things should not fall up without knowing the laws of gravitation (leaving aside that some things do fall up).
Do you disagree with my central assertion, or just my definition of coherence?
The stone-gluing can be worked around with auxilliary laws. To assume those laws are absent is to assume some other laws.
People can believe what they like. If you are going to stake a claim that there is a literal self contradiction in p-zombies, you need to say what it is. However most cases of aleged self contradiction turn out to be contradiction with unexamined background assumptions—laws, again. Talk of “resolution” is misleading: this is cognitive, not pictorial.
It is in fact the philosopher’s point that p-zombies are really, for unknown reasons, impossible. They are not arguing zombies in order to argue zombies! Non-philosophers keep misunderstanding that.
So, ah, just the latter then?
That’s all right, and I admit it’s a fuzzy term. But if you want to make any progress, I suggest you consider the former point instead.