If it helps (which I don’t expect it does), I’ve been pursuing the trail of this (and related things) here.
Thus far his response seems to be that certain beliefs don’t require evidence (or, at least, don’t require “independent justification,” which may not be the same thing), and that his beliefs about zombies “cohere well” with his other beliefs (though I’m not sure which beliefs they cohere well with, or whether they coheres better with them than their negation does), and that there’s no reason to believe it’s false (though it’s not clear what role reasons for belief play in his decision-making in the first place).
So, the Bayesian translation of his position would seem to be that he has a high prior on zombies being conceivable. But of course, that in turn translates to “zombies are conceivable for reasons I’m not being explicit about”. Which is, naturally, the point: I’d like to know what he thinks he knows that I don’t.
Regarding coherence, and reasons to believe it’s false: the historical success of reductionism is a very good reason to believe it’s false, it seems to me. Despite Richard’s protestations, it really does appear to me that this is a case of undue reluctance on the part of philosophers to update their intuitions, or at least to let them be outweighed by something else.
If it helps (which I don’t expect it does), I’ve been pursuing the trail of this (and related things) here.
Thus far his response seems to be that certain beliefs don’t require evidence (or, at least, don’t require “independent justification,” which may not be the same thing), and that his beliefs about zombies “cohere well” with his other beliefs (though I’m not sure which beliefs they cohere well with, or whether they coheres better with them than their negation does), and that there’s no reason to believe it’s false (though it’s not clear what role reasons for belief play in his decision-making in the first place).
So, the Bayesian translation of his position would seem to be that he has a high prior on zombies being conceivable. But of course, that in turn translates to “zombies are conceivable for reasons I’m not being explicit about”. Which is, naturally, the point: I’d like to know what he thinks he knows that I don’t.
Regarding coherence, and reasons to believe it’s false: the historical success of reductionism is a very good reason to believe it’s false, it seems to me. Despite Richard’s protestations, it really does appear to me that this is a case of undue reluctance on the part of philosophers to update their intuitions, or at least to let them be outweighed by something else.