So, the Bayesian translation of his position would seem to be that he has a high prior on zombies being conceivable. But of course, that in turn translates to “zombies are conceivable for reasons I’m not being explicit about”. Which is, naturally, the point: I’d like to know what he thinks he knows that I don’t.
Regarding coherence, and reasons to believe it’s false: the historical success of reductionism is a very good reason to believe it’s false, it seems to me. Despite Richard’s protestations, it really does appear to me that this is a case of undue reluctance on the part of philosophers to update their intuitions, or at least to let them be outweighed by something else.
So, the Bayesian translation of his position would seem to be that he has a high prior on zombies being conceivable. But of course, that in turn translates to “zombies are conceivable for reasons I’m not being explicit about”. Which is, naturally, the point: I’d like to know what he thinks he knows that I don’t.
Regarding coherence, and reasons to believe it’s false: the historical success of reductionism is a very good reason to believe it’s false, it seems to me. Despite Richard’s protestations, it really does appear to me that this is a case of undue reluctance on the part of philosophers to update their intuitions, or at least to let them be outweighed by something else.