No, what I gave is not an argument in favor of moral realism intended to convince the skeptic, it’s merely a response to a common skeptical argument against moral realism. So the conclusion is not supposed to be “Therefore, my moral beliefs are objective and true.” The conclusion is merely that the alleged distinction between moral beliefs and factual beliefs (or epistemic normative beliefs) that you were drawing (viz. that it’s unclear how moral beliefs pay rent) doesn’t actually hold up.
My position on moral realism is simply that belief in universally applicable (though not universally compelling) moral truths is a very central feature of my practical theory of the world, and certain moral inferences (i.e. inferences from descriptive facts to moral claims) are extremely intuitive to me, almost as intuitive as many inductive inferences. So I’m going to need to hear a powerful argument against moral realism to convince me of its falsehood, and I haven’t yet heard one (and I have read quite a bit of the skeptical literature).
It’s not a defense of X, it’s a refutation of an argument against X. It claims that the purported argument doesn’t change the status of X, without asserting what that status is.
But that’s a universal defense of any free-floating belief.
Well, no, because most beliefs don’t have the properties I attributed to moral beiefs (”...central feature of my practical theory of the world… moral inferences are extremely intuitive to me...”), so I couldn’t offer the same defense, at least not honestly. And again, I’m not trying to convince you to be a moral realist here, I’m explaining why I’m a moral realist, and why I think it’s reasonable for me to be one.
Also, I’m not sure what you mean when you refer to my moral beliefs as “free-floating”. If you mean they have no connection to my non-moral beliefs then the characterization is inapt. My moral beliefs are definitely shaped by my beliefs about what the world is like. I also believe moral truths supervene on non-moral truths. You couldn’t have a universe where all the non-moral facts were the same as this one but the moral facts were different. So not free-floating, I think.
For that matter: do you really think the degrees of justification for the rules of induction are similar to those of your moral beliefs?
Not sure what you mean by “degree of justification” here.
No, what I gave is not an argument in favor of moral realism intended to convince the skeptic, it’s merely a response to a common skeptical argument against moral realism. So the conclusion is not supposed to be “Therefore, my moral beliefs are objective and true.” The conclusion is merely that the alleged distinction between moral beliefs and factual beliefs (or epistemic normative beliefs) that you were drawing (viz. that it’s unclear how moral beliefs pay rent) doesn’t actually hold up.
My position on moral realism is simply that belief in universally applicable (though not universally compelling) moral truths is a very central feature of my practical theory of the world, and certain moral inferences (i.e. inferences from descriptive facts to moral claims) are extremely intuitive to me, almost as intuitive as many inductive inferences. So I’m going to need to hear a powerful argument against moral realism to convince me of its falsehood, and I haven’t yet heard one (and I have read quite a bit of the skeptical literature).
But that’s a universal defense of any free-floating belief.
For that matter: do you really think the degrees of justification for the rules of induction are similar to those of your moral beliefs?
It’s not a defense of X, it’s a refutation of an argument against X. It claims that the purported argument doesn’t change the status of X, without asserting what that status is.
Well, no, because most beliefs don’t have the properties I attributed to moral beiefs (”...central feature of my practical theory of the world… moral inferences are extremely intuitive to me...”), so I couldn’t offer the same defense, at least not honestly. And again, I’m not trying to convince you to be a moral realist here, I’m explaining why I’m a moral realist, and why I think it’s reasonable for me to be one.
Also, I’m not sure what you mean when you refer to my moral beliefs as “free-floating”. If you mean they have no connection to my non-moral beliefs then the characterization is inapt. My moral beliefs are definitely shaped by my beliefs about what the world is like. I also believe moral truths supervene on non-moral truths. You couldn’t have a universe where all the non-moral facts were the same as this one but the moral facts were different. So not free-floating, I think.
Not sure what you mean by “degree of justification” here.
If you can pin down the fundamentals of rationality, I’d be glad to hear how.
Side conditions can be added, eg that intuitions need to be used for something else.