But that’s a completely general argument. If the worst thing you can say about phenomenal consciousness is that it is occasionally inapplicable, it is no worse off than heat.
Unlike heat, I can’t imagine any situation in which consciousness as described by the Hard Problem is applicable. Can you give me a situation in which you can make better predictions using the concept?
Note the difference between the phenomenon being explained, the explanandum, and the explanation. There is not much doubt that thunder and lightning exist , but there is much doubt that Zeus or Thor causes them .
Zeus is posited, dobntfully, to explain something for which there is clear evidence. Consciousness is equivalent to the thunder, not the thunder god (particularly under a minimal definition … it’s important not to get misled by the idea that qualia are necessarily nonphyiscal or something).
We can agree that thunder and lightning exist and that Zeus and Thor do not, but not that consciousness exists as posed by the Hard Problem. To resolve that disagreement we need to agree on what it means for something to exist. I proposed this litmus test of additive predictive power.
The litmus test of philosophy is that it must tell the truth. If prediction isn’t available, you should accept that. You shouldn’t argue against X on the basis that it prevents prediction , because you have no reason to believe that the universe is entirely predictable. Science is based on the hope that things are predictable and comprehensible, but not in the certainty.. They are falsifiable claims.
How does one test that a statement is true (or at least not false)? I accept that there may be things that are true that I can’t know are true, but there is an infinite number of such possible things. How would I decide which to believe and which not? And if I did, what would that get me?
The problem is that consciousness, as described by the Hard Problem, is an ontological outgrowth (derived analytically from an existing ontology) that does not have any predictive power.
Why? Where is that proven?
Consciousness as described by the Hard Problem is not derived from any observation that can be independently corroborated. When you claim to observe your own consciousness, you are not observing reality directly, you are observing your own ontology. Your ontology contains consciousness as described by the Hard Problem and that is why you’re seeing it.
Unlike heat, I can’t imagine any situation in which consciousness as described by the Hard Problem is applicable.
Applicable to what? As I said ,it is an explanandum, not an explanation. We have prima facie evidence of consciousness because we are conscious. Also , I dont buy that “consciousness as described by the Hard Problem” is epiphenomneal.
Can you give me a situation in which you can make better predictions using the concept?
I can give you situations where I can make equally good predictions of external behaviour. Pain is a quale, I fI feel pain, I grimace, go “ouch!” etc.
Note the difference between the phenomenon being explained, the explanandum, and the explanation. There is not much doubt that thunder and lightning exist , but there is much doubt that Zeus or Thor causes them .
Zeus is posited, dobntfully, to explain something for which there is clear evidence. Consciousness is equivalent to the thunder, not the thunder god (particularly under a minimal definition … it’s important not to get misled by the idea that qualia are necessarily nonphyiscal or something).
We can agree that thunder and lightning exist and that Zeus and Thor do not, but not that consciousness exists as posed by the Hard Problem.
What does “as posed by the HP” mean? Again, the HP does not state that consciousness is epiphenomenal or nonphysical.
To resolve that disagreement we need to agree on what it means for something to exist. I proposed this litmus test of additive predictive power.
I propose that it is predictive power or, explanatory power , or prima facie evidence.
You can’t just have closed loop of explanatory posits explaining each other. Explanations are explanations of something.
The litmus test of philosophy is that it must tell the truth. If prediction isn’t available, you should accept that. You shouldn’t argue against X on the basis that it prevents prediction , because you have no reason to believe that the universe is entirely predictable. Science is based on the hope that things are predictable and comprehensible, but not in the certainty.. They are falsifiable claims.
How does one test that a statement is true (or at least not false)?
It’s complicated. But persistent failure to explain thing X using method Y is a hint of falsehood.
I accept that there may be things that are true that I can’t know are true, but there is an infinite number of such possible things. How would I decide which to believe and which not?
No one is asking you to believe in things which are invisible and non predictive.
And if I did, what would that get me?
The problem is that consciousness, as described by the Hard Problem, is an ontological outgrowth (derived analytically from an existing ontology) that does not have any predictive power.
Why? Where is that proven?
Consciousness as described by the Hard Problem is not derived from any observation that can be independently corroborated.
No. So what? If you had certain apriori knowledge that everything is objective, that would be a problem for consciousness. If there are fundamentally subjective perceptions, that’s a problem for physicalism.
You have evidence of your own perceptions, whether or not the you can corroborate then. You can make predictions from your own perceptions.
Insisiting on objective evidence is looking for the key under the lamppost.
When you claim to observe your own consciousness, you are not observing reality directly,
When you claim to observe the outside world, you are not observing reality directly.
you are observing your own ontology. Your ontology contains consciousness as described by the Hard Problem and that is why you’re seeing it.
Unless it’s really there. You can’t assume that something necessarily doesn’t exist in the territory, just because it does feature in the map.
As I said ,it is an explanandum, not an explanation. We have prima facie evidence of consciousness because we are conscious.
I believe consciousness exists and that we both have it, but I don’t think either of us have the kind of consciousness that you claim you have, namely consciousness as described by the Hard Problem. By consciousness as described by the Hard Problem I mean the kind of consciousness that is not fully explained by solutions to the Easy Problem.
Why do you believe that solutions to the Easy Problem are not sufficient? Conversely, why do you believe that heat is a sufficient explanation for what happens to one’s finger when touching fire? What does the latter do that the former does not? How do you in general decide that an explanation is sufficient?
I believe consciousness exists and that we both have it, but I don’t think either of us have the kind of consciousness that you claim you have, namely consciousness as described by the Hard Problem.
I believe that consciousness as described by the HP is just phenomenal consciousness...not epiphenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is actually mundane..it’s just how things seem to you, how it feels to be sitting in a seat, looking at a screen , reading these words, right here, right now.
I have that, and I’m pretty sure you do too
By consciousness as described by the Hard Problem I mean the kind of consciousness that is not fully explained by solutions to the Easy Problem.
The kind of consciousness the HP is about isn’t defined as inexplicable. It’s defined as phenomenal … and then noticed as being unexplained.
Why do you believe that solutions to the Easy Problem are not sufficient?
They are not sufficient to explain phenomenal consciousness...ie. my own experience. They may well be sufficient to explain others behaviour.
Conversely, why do you believe that heat is a sufficient explanation for what happens to one’s finger when touching fire?
What happens is an objective process,.my finger gets hotter and a subjective sensation. The latter is not explained by the reductive explanations of heat. Reductive explanations are able to predict and terrorist their explananda. One can predict a temperature, and confirm the prediction , because one can measure temperature.
Unlike heat, I can’t imagine any situation in which consciousness as described by the Hard Problem is applicable. Can you give me a situation in which you can make better predictions using the concept?
We can agree that thunder and lightning exist and that Zeus and Thor do not, but not that consciousness exists as posed by the Hard Problem. To resolve that disagreement we need to agree on what it means for something to exist. I proposed this litmus test of additive predictive power.
How does one test that a statement is true (or at least not false)? I accept that there may be things that are true that I can’t know are true, but there is an infinite number of such possible things. How would I decide which to believe and which not? And if I did, what would that get me?
Consciousness as described by the Hard Problem is not derived from any observation that can be independently corroborated. When you claim to observe your own consciousness, you are not observing reality directly, you are observing your own ontology. Your ontology contains consciousness as described by the Hard Problem and that is why you’re seeing it.
Applicable to what? As I said ,it is an explanandum, not an explanation. We have prima facie evidence of consciousness because we are conscious. Also , I dont buy that “consciousness as described by the Hard Problem” is epiphenomneal.
I can give you situations where I can make equally good predictions of external behaviour. Pain is a quale, I fI feel pain, I grimace, go “ouch!” etc.
What does “as posed by the HP” mean? Again, the HP does not state that consciousness is epiphenomenal or nonphysical.
I propose that it is predictive power or, explanatory power , or prima facie evidence.
You can’t just have closed loop of explanatory posits explaining each other. Explanations are explanations of something.
It’s complicated. But persistent failure to explain thing X using method Y is a hint of falsehood.
No one is asking you to believe in things which are invisible and non predictive.
No. So what? If you had certain apriori knowledge that everything is objective, that would be a problem for consciousness. If there are fundamentally subjective perceptions, that’s a problem for physicalism.
You have evidence of your own perceptions, whether or not the you can corroborate then. You can make predictions from your own perceptions.
Insisiting on objective evidence is looking for the key under the lamppost.
When you claim to observe the outside world, you are not observing reality directly.
Unless it’s really there. You can’t assume that something necessarily doesn’t exist in the territory, just because it does feature in the map.
Well, if you did, scientific realism is dead.
I believe consciousness exists and that we both have it, but I don’t think either of us have the kind of consciousness that you claim you have, namely consciousness as described by the Hard Problem. By consciousness as described by the Hard Problem I mean the kind of consciousness that is not fully explained by solutions to the Easy Problem.
Why do you believe that solutions to the Easy Problem are not sufficient? Conversely, why do you believe that heat is a sufficient explanation for what happens to one’s finger when touching fire? What does the latter do that the former does not? How do you in general decide that an explanation is sufficient?
I believe that consciousness as described by the HP is just phenomenal consciousness...not epiphenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is actually mundane..it’s just how things seem to you, how it feels to be sitting in a seat, looking at a screen , reading these words, right here, right now.
I have that, and I’m pretty sure you do too
The kind of consciousness the HP is about isn’t defined as inexplicable. It’s defined as phenomenal … and then noticed as being unexplained.
They are not sufficient to explain phenomenal consciousness...ie. my own experience. They may well be sufficient to explain others behaviour.
What happens is an objective process,.my finger gets hotter and a subjective sensation. The latter is not explained by the reductive explanations of heat. Reductive explanations are able to predict and terrorist their explananda. One can predict a temperature, and confirm the prediction , because one can measure temperature.
How do you decide whether a candidate explanation is sufficient to explain phenomenal consciousness?