I believe consciousness exists and that we both have it, but I don’t think either of us have the kind of consciousness that you claim you have, namely consciousness as described by the Hard Problem.
I believe that consciousness as described by the HP is just phenomenal consciousness...not epiphenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is actually mundane..it’s just how things seem to you, how it feels to be sitting in a seat, looking at a screen , reading these words, right here, right now.
I have that, and I’m pretty sure you do too
By consciousness as described by the Hard Problem I mean the kind of consciousness that is not fully explained by solutions to the Easy Problem.
The kind of consciousness the HP is about isn’t defined as inexplicable. It’s defined as phenomenal … and then noticed as being unexplained.
Why do you believe that solutions to the Easy Problem are not sufficient?
They are not sufficient to explain phenomenal consciousness...ie. my own experience. They may well be sufficient to explain others behaviour.
Conversely, why do you believe that heat is a sufficient explanation for what happens to one’s finger when touching fire?
What happens is an objective process,.my finger gets hotter and a subjective sensation. The latter is not explained by the reductive explanations of heat. Reductive explanations are able to predict and terrorist their explananda. One can predict a temperature, and confirm the prediction , because one can measure temperature.
I believe that consciousness as described by the HP is just phenomenal consciousness...not epiphenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is actually mundane..it’s just how things seem to you, how it feels to be sitting in a seat, looking at a screen , reading these words, right here, right now.
I have that, and I’m pretty sure you do too
The kind of consciousness the HP is about isn’t defined as inexplicable. It’s defined as phenomenal … and then noticed as being unexplained.
They are not sufficient to explain phenomenal consciousness...ie. my own experience. They may well be sufficient to explain others behaviour.
What happens is an objective process,.my finger gets hotter and a subjective sensation. The latter is not explained by the reductive explanations of heat. Reductive explanations are able to predict and terrorist their explananda. One can predict a temperature, and confirm the prediction , because one can measure temperature.
How do you decide whether a candidate explanation is sufficient to explain phenomenal consciousness?