I think part of the problem here is that there seems, at first glance, to be a fundamental tension between the ideas that
it’s good to keep track of the difference between good and bad things, and also
it’s good to stop being upset about bad things if doing so isn’t instrumentally useful.
And, like, I’m aware that the second bullet point is phrased somewhat strawmannishly; I did that to emphasize the extent to which, in my native mental ontology, [something-like-the-strawmannish-version] is what it translates to. And even now, typing this, I can’t for the life of me come up with a version that both (1) maintains the intuitive force present in the current version, and (2) sounds less like a strawman.
It seems like, retaining the ability to be upset about bad things is part of what it means to understand the difference between bad things and good things? Like, the reason you’re upset is that it’s bad; that’s part of what it means for something to be bad: that you recognize it and have a justifiable internal reaction to it.
(Flagging that I don’t necessarily think you disagree with this; in particular, it seems like it rhymes pretty strongly with what you said about wanting to defend Being Mad About My Left Arm Being A Rooster.)
Even so, I don’t yet understand how to reconcile the two. This affects me less than it might someone else with this particular intellectual conundrum, since for me it really is mostly intellectual: my brain pretty much does the “acceptance” thing by default, to the point where I often find it difficult to remain upset about things I’d reflectively endorse being upset about. And to the extent that the thing my brain is doing protects me instrumentally from mental health issues such as depression, I (selfishly) want it to keep doing that (even as I for other reasons might sometimes wish the opposite).
But of course, none of that is the same as having a philosophical justification for it, which (again) I don’t have!
I think part of the problem here is that there seems, at first glance, to be a fundamental tension between the ideas that
it’s good to keep track of the difference between good and bad things, and also
it’s good to stop being upset about bad things if doing so isn’t instrumentally useful.
And, like, I’m aware that the second bullet point is phrased somewhat strawmannishly; I did that to emphasize the extent to which, in my native mental ontology, [something-like-the-strawmannish-version] is what it translates to. And even now, typing this, I can’t for the life of me come up with a version that both (1) maintains the intuitive force present in the current version, and (2) sounds less like a strawman.
It seems like, retaining the ability to be upset about bad things is part of what it means to understand the difference between bad things and good things? Like, the reason you’re upset is that it’s bad; that’s part of what it means for something to be bad: that you recognize it and have a justifiable internal reaction to it.
(Flagging that I don’t necessarily think you disagree with this; in particular, it seems like it rhymes pretty strongly with what you said about wanting to defend Being Mad About My Left Arm Being A Rooster.)
Even so, I don’t yet understand how to reconcile the two. This affects me less than it might someone else with this particular intellectual conundrum, since for me it really is mostly intellectual: my brain pretty much does the “acceptance” thing by default, to the point where I often find it difficult to remain upset about things I’d reflectively endorse being upset about. And to the extent that the thing my brain is doing protects me instrumentally from mental health issues such as depression, I (selfishly) want it to keep doing that (even as I for other reasons might sometimes wish the opposite).
But of course, none of that is the same as having a philosophical justification for it, which (again) I don’t have!
I believe I am able to “be upset” about bad things in a way that doesn’t require suffering or any ongoing detriment to my life.