You said “I assume people would say close to 0”. I don’t know why you said that. I don’t know how you arrived at that number, or why you would impute it to people in general. The most likely way I could find to arrive at a “close to 0″ number was to make an error that I have seen a few times in the context of students calculating probabilities, but not previously in self-locating probabilities.
How did you arrive at the idea that “people would say close to 0”?
Because the thirder camp is currently the dominating opinion for the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Because Self-Indication Assumption has way more supporters than Self-Sampling Assumption. Self-Indication Assumption treats “I” as a randomly selected observer from all potentially existing observers. Which in this case would give a probability of being the Original close to 0.
I am not saying you have to agree with it. But do you have a method in mind to arrive at a different probability? If so what is the method? Or do you think there is no sensible probability value for this case?
P(mad scientist created no valid clones) = 0.99 as given in problem description, P(me being the original | no clones exist) = 1, therefore P(me being the original & no clones exist) = 0.99.
P(mad scientist created 10000 clones) = 0.01, P(me being the original | 10000 clones) ~= 0.00009999. Therefore P(me being the original & 10000 clones exist) ~= 0.0000009999.
P(me being the original) = P(me being the original & no clones exist) + P(me being the original & 10000 clones exist) ~= 0.9900009999 as these are disjoint exhaustive events.
You just stated Self-Sampling Assumption’s calculation.
Given you said “The most likely way I could find to arrive at a “close to 0″ number was to make an error that I have seen a few times in the context of students calculating probabilities, but not previously in self-locating probabilities.” about Self-Indication Assumption’s method.
Are you endorsing SSA over SIA? Or you are just listing the different camps in anthropic paradoxes?
No, I just forgot about the exact statement of Bostrom’s original SIA. It doesn’t apply in this case anyway, since it’s only applied other things being equal, and here they aren’t equal.
You said “I assume people would say close to 0”. I don’t know why you said that. I don’t know how you arrived at that number, or why you would impute it to people in general. The most likely way I could find to arrive at a “close to 0″ number was to make an error that I have seen a few times in the context of students calculating probabilities, but not previously in self-locating probabilities.
How did you arrive at the idea that “people would say close to 0”?
Because the thirder camp is currently the dominating opinion for the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Because Self-Indication Assumption has way more supporters than Self-Sampling Assumption. Self-Indication Assumption treats “I” as a randomly selected observer from all potentially existing observers. Which in this case would give a probability of being the Original close to 0.
I am not saying you have to agree with it. But do you have a method in mind to arrive at a different probability? If so what is the method? Or do you think there is no sensible probability value for this case?
One possible derivation:
P(mad scientist created no valid clones) = 0.99 as given in problem description, P(me being the original | no clones exist) = 1, therefore P(me being the original & no clones exist) = 0.99.
P(mad scientist created 10000 clones) = 0.01, P(me being the original | 10000 clones) ~= 0.00009999. Therefore P(me being the original & 10000 clones exist) ~= 0.0000009999.
P(me being the original) = P(me being the original & no clones exist) + P(me being the original & 10000 clones exist) ~= 0.9900009999 as these are disjoint exhaustive events.
0.9900009999 is not “close to 0”.
You just stated Self-Sampling Assumption’s calculation.
Given you said “The most likely way I could find to arrive at a “close to 0″ number was to make an error that I have seen a few times in the context of students calculating probabilities, but not previously in self-locating probabilities.” about Self-Indication Assumption’s method.
Are you endorsing SSA over SIA? Or you are just listing the different camps in anthropic paradoxes?
No, I just forgot about the exact statement of Bostrom’s original SIA. It doesn’t apply in this case anyway, since it’s only applied other things being equal, and here they aren’t equal.