Okay, hypothetical: Dying human. They believed in God their entire life and have lived as basically decent according to their own ethics, and therefore think they’re going to be blissing out for the rest of infinity. They will believe this for the next couple of minutes, and then stop existing.
Would you, given the opportunity, dispel their illusion?
Depends on what I expected the result of doing so to be.
If I expected the result to be that they are more unhappy than they otherwise would be for the rest of their lives with no other compensating benefit (which is certainly the conclusion your hypothetical encourages), then no I wouldn’t.
If I expected the result to be either that they are happier than they otherwise would be for the rest of their lives, or that there is some other compensating benefit to them knowing what will actually happen, then yes I would.
Because this is (to my mind) an example of a situation where the facts aren’t friendly and the truth is harmful—thus (hopefully) justifying my objection to the original quote.
Dispel all their illusions, including the one that assigned negative utility to unavoidable dying. There are better things to do with 2 minutes than expecting fun you won’t receive.
If you know of any illusions that give inevitably ceasing to exist negative utility to someone leading a positive-utility life, I would love to have them dispelled for me.
Hmm. I may be a bit biased because I don’t really have a high valuation on being alive as such (which is to say utility[X] is nearly the same as utility[X and Julian is alive] for me, all other things being equal—it’s why I am not signed up for cryonics).
However I think that any utility calculus that negatively values the fun you’re not going to have when inevitably dead is as silly as negatively valuing the fun you didn’t get to have because said events preceded your birth, and you inevitably can’t extend your life into the past. You get more chance to fulfil your values in the real world by making use of your 2 minutes than by anticipating values that are not going to happen. And I do very much place utility on my values being fulfilled in a real, rather than self deceptive way.
...and if it turned out that believing that particular falsehood didn’t have consequences that left you less satisfied.
Okay, hypothetical: Dying human. They believed in God their entire life and have lived as basically decent according to their own ethics, and therefore think they’re going to be blissing out for the rest of infinity. They will believe this for the next couple of minutes, and then stop existing.
Would you, given the opportunity, dispel their illusion?
Depends on what I expected the result of doing so to be.
If I expected the result to be that they are more unhappy than they otherwise would be for the rest of their lives with no other compensating benefit (which is certainly the conclusion your hypothetical encourages), then no I wouldn’t.
If I expected the result to be either that they are happier than they otherwise would be for the rest of their lives, or that there is some other compensating benefit to them knowing what will actually happen, then yes I would.
Why do you ask?
Because this is (to my mind) an example of a situation where the facts aren’t friendly and the truth is harmful—thus (hopefully) justifying my objection to the original quote.
OK. Thanks for clarifying.
Dispel all their illusions, including the one that assigned negative utility to unavoidable dying. There are better things to do with 2 minutes than expecting fun you won’t receive.
If you know of any illusions that give inevitably ceasing to exist negative utility to someone leading a positive-utility life, I would love to have them dispelled for me.
Sorry for the slow reply.
Hmm. I may be a bit biased because I don’t really have a high valuation on being alive as such (which is to say utility[X] is nearly the same as utility[X and Julian is alive] for me, all other things being equal—it’s why I am not signed up for cryonics).
However I think that any utility calculus that negatively values the fun you’re not going to have when inevitably dead is as silly as negatively valuing the fun you didn’t get to have because said events preceded your birth, and you inevitably can’t extend your life into the past. You get more chance to fulfil your values in the real world by making use of your 2 minutes than by anticipating values that are not going to happen. And I do very much place utility on my values being fulfilled in a real, rather than self deceptive way.