Hmm. I may be a bit biased because I don’t really have a high valuation on being alive as such (which is to say utility[X] is nearly the same as utility[X and Julian is alive] for me, all other things being equal—it’s why I am not signed up for cryonics).
However I think that any utility calculus that negatively values the fun you’re not going to have when inevitably dead is as silly as negatively valuing the fun you didn’t get to have because said events preceded your birth, and you inevitably can’t extend your life into the past. You get more chance to fulfil your values in the real world by making use of your 2 minutes than by anticipating values that are not going to happen. And I do very much place utility on my values being fulfilled in a real, rather than self deceptive way.
Sorry for the slow reply.
Hmm. I may be a bit biased because I don’t really have a high valuation on being alive as such (which is to say utility[X] is nearly the same as utility[X and Julian is alive] for me, all other things being equal—it’s why I am not signed up for cryonics).
However I think that any utility calculus that negatively values the fun you’re not going to have when inevitably dead is as silly as negatively valuing the fun you didn’t get to have because said events preceded your birth, and you inevitably can’t extend your life into the past. You get more chance to fulfil your values in the real world by making use of your 2 minutes than by anticipating values that are not going to happen. And I do very much place utility on my values being fulfilled in a real, rather than self deceptive way.