By “metaphysic” I mean a high-level model for phenomena or concepts that you can’t immediately falsify because, though the model explains all of the phenomena you are aware of, the model is also very general. E.g., if you look at a computer processor you can say “ah, it is performing a computation”, and this constrains your anticipations quite a bit; but if you look at a desk or a chair and say “ah, it is performing a computation”, then you’ve gotten into metaphysical territory: you can abstract away the concept of computation and apply it to basically everything, but it’s unclear whether or not doing so means that computation is very fundamental, or if you’re just overapplying a contingent model. Sometimes when theorizing it’s necessary to choose a certain metaphysic: e.g., I will say that I am an instance of a computation, and thus that a computer could make an exact simulation of me and I would exist twice as much, thus making me less surprised to find myself as me rather than someone else. Now, such a line of reasoning requires quite a few metaphysical assumptions—assumptions about the generalizability of certain models that we’re not sure do or don’t break down—but metaphysical speculation is the best we can do because we don’t have a way of simulating people or switching conscious experience flows with other people.
That’s one possible explanation of “metaphysic”/”metaphysics”, but honestly I should look into the relevant metaphilosophy—it’s very possible that my explanation is essentially wrong or misleading in some way.
Why would generality be opposed to falsifiability? Wouldn’t having a model be more general lead to easier falsifiability, given that the model should apply more broadly?
In order to tell whether something is performing a computation, you try to find some way to get the object to exhibit the computation it is (allegedly) making. So—if I understand correctly—then a model is metaphysical, in the things you write, if applying it to a particular phenomenon requires an interpretation step which may or may not be known to be possible. How does this differ from any other model, except that you’re allowing yourself to be sloppy with it?
If you just replace “metaphysic” by “model”, “metaphysical assumptions” by “assumptions about our models and their applicability”, “metaphysical speculation” by “speculations based on our models”, I think the things you’re trying to say become clearer. If a bit less fancy-sounding.
If the thing I understood is the thing you tried to say.
I could replace all my uses of the word “metaphysical” with “sloppily-general”, I guess, but I’m not sure it has quite the right connotations, and “metaphysical” is already the standard terminology. “Metaphysical” is vague in a somewhat precise way that “sloppily-general” isn’t. I appreciate the general need for down-to-earth language, but I also don’t want to consent to the norm of encouraging people to take pains to write in such a way as to be understood by the greatest common factor of readers.
“X is a metaphysic” becomes “X is somehow a model (of something), but I’m not sure how”.
“Y is metaphysical” becomes “Y is about or related to a model (somehow)”.
I assume my understanding is correct, since you didn’t correct it.
“sloppily-general” is then indeed kind of far from the intended meaning, but that’s just because it’s a terrible coinage.
Elsewhere, somebody posted a link to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s definition of metaphysics. They say right in the intro that they haven’t found a good way to define it. The Wikipedia article on metaphysics’s body implies a different definition than its opening paragraph. In common parlance, it’s used for some vague spiritualish thing. And your definition is different from all of these. Do you think that the term could reasonably be expected to be understood the way you intended it to?
“Metaphysical” isn’t vague in a somewhat precise way. It isn’t even evocative, as its convoluted etymology prevents even that. It’s just vague and used by philosophers.
The greatest common factor of readers isn’t even here. The point is more to be understood by readers at all. Don’t make your writing more obscure than it needs to be. Hard concepts are hard enough as is, without making the fricking idea of “somehow a model” worth 3 hours’ worth of discussion.
By “metaphysic” I mean a high-level model for phenomena or concepts that you can’t immediately falsify because, though the model explains all of the phenomena you are aware of, the model is also very general. E.g., if you look at a computer processor you can say “ah, it is performing a computation”, and this constrains your anticipations quite a bit; but if you look at a desk or a chair and say “ah, it is performing a computation”, then you’ve gotten into metaphysical territory: you can abstract away the concept of computation and apply it to basically everything, but it’s unclear whether or not doing so means that computation is very fundamental, or if you’re just overapplying a contingent model. Sometimes when theorizing it’s necessary to choose a certain metaphysic: e.g., I will say that I am an instance of a computation, and thus that a computer could make an exact simulation of me and I would exist twice as much, thus making me less surprised to find myself as me rather than someone else. Now, such a line of reasoning requires quite a few metaphysical assumptions—assumptions about the generalizability of certain models that we’re not sure do or don’t break down—but metaphysical speculation is the best we can do because we don’t have a way of simulating people or switching conscious experience flows with other people.
That’s one possible explanation of “metaphysic”/”metaphysics”, but honestly I should look into the relevant metaphilosophy—it’s very possible that my explanation is essentially wrong or misleading in some way.
Why would generality be opposed to falsifiability? Wouldn’t having a model be more general lead to easier falsifiability, given that the model should apply more broadly?
In order to tell whether something is performing a computation, you try to find some way to get the object to exhibit the computation it is (allegedly) making. So—if I understand correctly—then a model is metaphysical, in the things you write, if applying it to a particular phenomenon requires an interpretation step which may or may not be known to be possible. How does this differ from any other model, except that you’re allowing yourself to be sloppy with it?
If you just replace “metaphysic” by “model”, “metaphysical assumptions” by “assumptions about our models and their applicability”, “metaphysical speculation” by “speculations based on our models”, I think the things you’re trying to say become clearer. If a bit less fancy-sounding.
If the thing I understood is the thing you tried to say.
I could replace all my uses of the word “metaphysical” with “sloppily-general”, I guess, but I’m not sure it has quite the right connotations, and “metaphysical” is already the standard terminology. “Metaphysical” is vague in a somewhat precise way that “sloppily-general” isn’t. I appreciate the general need for down-to-earth language, but I also don’t want to consent to the norm of encouraging people to take pains to write in such a way as to be understood by the greatest common factor of readers.
“X is a metaphysic” becomes “X is somehow a model (of something), but I’m not sure how”. “Y is metaphysical” becomes “Y is about or related to a model (somehow)”. I assume my understanding is correct, since you didn’t correct it. “sloppily-general” is then indeed kind of far from the intended meaning, but that’s just because it’s a terrible coinage.
Elsewhere, somebody posted a link to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s definition of metaphysics. They say right in the intro that they haven’t found a good way to define it. The Wikipedia article on metaphysics’s body implies a different definition than its opening paragraph. In common parlance, it’s used for some vague spiritualish thing. And your definition is different from all of these. Do you think that the term could reasonably be expected to be understood the way you intended it to?
“Metaphysical” isn’t vague in a somewhat precise way. It isn’t even evocative, as its convoluted etymology prevents even that. It’s just vague and used by philosophers.
The greatest common factor of readers isn’t even here. The point is more to be understood by readers at all. Don’t make your writing more obscure than it needs to be. Hard concepts are hard enough as is, without making the fricking idea of “somehow a model” worth 3 hours’ worth of discussion.
Sorry, I was just too lazy to correct it. Still too lazy.
I give up. Good night.