I suppose it makes sense? I think I had thoughts like that before, “why should the base building blocks of our experience be explainainable/reducible in simpler terms, internally speaking”.
Externally is a different question. What if my internal experience/qualia of redness is the same thing as, from an external observer, some patterns of neuronal activation in my brain (not just caused by it, but exactly the same thing, only seen from two different perspective). Would there be any contradiction in that?
At which point the believer of the “hard problem of consciousness” usually slips into asking “but how could you possibly prove that is the case”. Well, I obviously cannot prove it, but it a perfectly plausible explanation for consciousness, and the only such explanation I am familiar with that is based in known physics, so I feel it is likely to be true.
No, there wouldn’t be. Indeed, the point of this post is to provide a 3rd-person account of why people would claim to have irreducible 1st-person experiences.
Another way of stating my claim in the last part is that you shouldn’t think of
What if my internal experience/qualia of redness is the same thing as, from an external observer, some patterns of neuronal activation in my brain
as being true or false, but rather, a type error. The point of your brain is to construct world-models that can predict your experiences. Asking if those experiences are equal to some part of that world-model, or someone else’s world model, does not type-check.
I think we agree. To, say, 95%, on this particular topic.
Though to me, the idea that “these two different aspect of my mental-model/experience are generated by the same underlying feature of reality” is a very important conclusion to draw.
I suppose it makes sense? I think I had thoughts like that before, “why should the base building blocks of our experience be explainainable/reducible in simpler terms, internally speaking”.
Externally is a different question. What if my internal experience/qualia of redness is the same thing as, from an external observer, some patterns of neuronal activation in my brain (not just caused by it, but exactly the same thing, only seen from two different perspective). Would there be any contradiction in that?
At which point the believer of the “hard problem of consciousness” usually slips into asking “but how could you possibly prove that is the case”. Well, I obviously cannot prove it, but it a perfectly plausible explanation for consciousness, and the only such explanation I am familiar with that is based in known physics, so I feel it is likely to be true.
No, there wouldn’t be. Indeed, the point of this post is to provide a 3rd-person account of why people would claim to have irreducible 1st-person experiences.
Another way of stating my claim in the last part is that you shouldn’t think of
as being true or false, but rather, a type error. The point of your brain is to construct world-models that can predict your experiences. Asking if those experiences are equal to some part of that world-model, or someone else’s world model, does not type-check.
I think we agree. To, say, 95%, on this particular topic.
Though to me, the idea that “these two different aspect of my mental-model/experience are generated by the same underlying feature of reality” is a very important conclusion to draw.
Sure. I mean, fundamentally, yes.