No, there wouldn’t be. Indeed, the point of this post is to provide a 3rd-person account of why people would claim to have irreducible 1st-person experiences.
Another way of stating my claim in the last part is that you shouldn’t think of
What if my internal experience/qualia of redness is the same thing as, from an external observer, some patterns of neuronal activation in my brain
as being true or false, but rather, a type error. The point of your brain is to construct world-models that can predict your experiences. Asking if those experiences are equal to some part of that world-model, or someone else’s world model, does not type-check.
I think we agree. To, say, 95%, on this particular topic.
Though to me, the idea that “these two different aspect of my mental-model/experience are generated by the same underlying feature of reality” is a very important conclusion to draw.
No, there wouldn’t be. Indeed, the point of this post is to provide a 3rd-person account of why people would claim to have irreducible 1st-person experiences.
Another way of stating my claim in the last part is that you shouldn’t think of
as being true or false, but rather, a type error. The point of your brain is to construct world-models that can predict your experiences. Asking if those experiences are equal to some part of that world-model, or someone else’s world model, does not type-check.
I think we agree. To, say, 95%, on this particular topic.
Though to me, the idea that “these two different aspect of my mental-model/experience are generated by the same underlying feature of reality” is a very important conclusion to draw.
Sure. I mean, fundamentally, yes.