Okay, I don’t get it. I can only parse what you’re saying one of two ways:
“We don’t have any idea of folk ethics works.” But that’s not true, we know it’s not “whatever emperor Ming says”. We can and do observe folk ethics at work, and notice it favors ingroups, is loss averse, is scope insensitive, etc.
“Any attempt to do better won’t be perfectly free of bias. Therefore, you can’t do better. Therefore, the best you can do is to use folk ethics… which has a bunch of known biases.”
You very likely don’t mean either of these, so I don’t know what you’re trying to say.
These statements are a bit crude and exaggerated version of what I had in mind, but they’re actually not that far off the mark.
The basic human folk ethics, shaped within certain bounds by culture, is amazingly successful in ensuring human coordination and cooperation in practice, at both small and large scales. (The fact that we see its occasional bad failures as dramatic and tragic only shows that we’re used to it working great most of the time.) The key issue here is that these coordination problems are extremely hard and largely beyond our understanding. While we can predict with some accuracy how individual humans behave, the problems of coordinating groups of people involve countless complicated issues of game theory, signaling, etc., about which we’re still largely ignorant. In this sense, we really don’t understand how folk ethics works.
Now, the important thing to note is that various aspects of folk ethics may seem as irrational and biased (in the sense that changing them would have positive consequences by some reasonable measure), while in fact the truth is much more complicated. These “biases” may in fact be essential for the way human coordination works in practice for some reason that’s still mysterious to us. Even if they don’t have any direct useful purpose, it may well be that given the constraints of human minds, eliminating them is impossible without breaking something else badly. (A prime example is that once someone goes down the road of breaking intuitively appealing folk ethics principles in the name of consequentialist calculations, it’s practically certain that these calculations will end up being fatally biased.)
Here I have of course handwaved the question of how exactly successful human cooperation depends on the culture-specific content of people’s folk ethics. That question is fascinating, complicated, and impossible to tackle without opening all sorts of ideologically charged issues. But in any case, it presents even further complications and difficulties for any attempt at analyzing and fixing human intuitions by consequentialist reasoning.
(Also, similar reasoning applies not just to folk ethics vs. consequentialism, but also to all sorts of beliefs that may seem as outright irrational from a naive “rationalist” perspective, but whose role in practice is much more complicated and important.)
similar reasoning applies not just to folk ethics vs. consequentialism, but also to all sorts of beliefs that may seem as outright irrational from a naive “rationalist” perspective, but whose role in practice is much more complicated and important.
Yeah, that seems to be the crux of our disagreement. You still trust people, you haven’t seen them march into death and drag their children along with them and reject a thousand warnings along the way with contempt for such absurd and evil suggestions.
I agree that going against social norms is very costly, that we need cooperation more than ever now there’s seven billion of us, and that if something is bad you still need to coordinate against it. But consider this anecdote:
Many years ago, when I was but a child, I wished to search for the best and rightest politician, and to put them in power. And eagerly did I listen to all, and carefully did I consider their arguments, and honestly did I weight them against history and the evening news. And lo, an ideology was born, and I gave it my allegiance. But still doubts nagged and arguments wavered, and I wished for closure.
One day my politician of choice called for a rally, and to the rally I went; filled with doubt, but willing to serve. And such joy came upon me that I knew I was right; this wave of bliss was the true sign that my cause was just. (For I was but a child, and did not know of laws of entanglement; I knew not human psychology told not of world states.)
Then it came to pass that I read a history textbook, and in the book was an excerpt from Robert Brasillach, who too described this joy, and who too claimed it as proof of his ideology. Which was facism. Oops.
Could you say more about what makes folks ethics a form of virtue ethics (or at least sufficiently virtue-based for you to use the term “folk virtue ethics”)? I can see some aspects of it that are virtue-based, but overall it seems like a hodgepodge of different intuitions/emotions/etc.
Yes, it’s certainly not a clear-cut classification. However, I’d say that the principal mechanisms of folk ethics are very much virtue-based, i.e. they revolve around asking what sort of person acts in a particular way, and what can be inferred about others’ actions and one’s own choice of actions from that.
Your praise for folk ethics would be more persuasive to me, Vladimir, if it came with a description of folk ethics—and if that description explained how folk ethics avoids giving ambiguous answers in many important situations—because it seems to me that a large part of this folk ethics of which you speak consists of people attempting to gain advantages over rivals and potential rivals by making folk-ethical claims that advance their personal interests.
In other words, although I am sympathetic to arguments for conservatism in matter of interpersonal relationships and social institutions, your argument would be a whole lot stronger if the process of identifying or determining the thing being argued for did not rely entirely on the phrase “folk virtue ethics”.
I don’t think we need to get into any controversial questions about interpersonal relationships and social institutions here. (Although the arguments I’ve made apply to these too.) I’d rather focus on the entirely ordinary, mundane, and uncontroversial instances of human cooperation and coordination. With this in mind, I think you’re making a mistake when you write:
[I]t seems to me that a large part of this folk ethics of which you speak consists of people attempting to gain advantages over rivals and potential rivals by making folk-ethical claims that advance their personal interests.
In fact, the overwhelming part of folk ethics consists of decisions that are so ordinary and uncontroversial that we don’t even stop to think about them, and of interactions (and the resulting social norms and institutions) that are taken completely for granted by everyone—even though the complexity of the underlying coordination problems is enormous, and the way things really work is still largely mysterious to us. The thesis I’m advancing is that a lot of what may seem like bias and imperfection in folk ethics may in fact somehow be essential for the way these problems get solved, and seemingly airtight consequentialist arguments against clear folk-ethical intuitions may in fact be fatally flawed in this regard. (And I think they nearly always are.)
Now, if we move to the question of what happens in those exceptional situations where there is controversy and conflict, things do get more complicated. Here it’s important to note that the boundary between regular smooth human interactions and conflicts is fuzzy, insofar as the regular interactions often involve conflict resolution in regular and automatic ways, and there are no sharp limits between such events and more overt and dramatic conflict. Also, there is no sharp bound between entirely instinctive folk ethics intuitions and those that are codified in more explicit social (and ultimately legal) norms.
And here we get to the controversies that you mention: the conflict between social and legal norms that embody and formalize folk intuitions of justice, fairness, proper behavior, etc. and evolve spontaneously through tradition, precedent, customary practice, etc., and the attempts to replace such norms by new ones backed by consequentialist arguments. Here, indeed, one can argue in favor of what you call “conservatism in matter of interpersonal relationships and social institutions” using very similar arguments to the mine above. But whether or not you agree with such arguments, my main point can be made without even getting into any controversial issues.
Okay, I don’t get it. I can only parse what you’re saying one of two ways:
“We don’t have any idea of folk ethics works.” But that’s not true, we know it’s not “whatever emperor Ming says”. We can and do observe folk ethics at work, and notice it favors ingroups, is loss averse, is scope insensitive, etc.
“Any attempt to do better won’t be perfectly free of bias. Therefore, you can’t do better. Therefore, the best you can do is to use folk ethics… which has a bunch of known biases.”
You very likely don’t mean either of these, so I don’t know what you’re trying to say.
These statements are a bit crude and exaggerated version of what I had in mind, but they’re actually not that far off the mark.
The basic human folk ethics, shaped within certain bounds by culture, is amazingly successful in ensuring human coordination and cooperation in practice, at both small and large scales. (The fact that we see its occasional bad failures as dramatic and tragic only shows that we’re used to it working great most of the time.) The key issue here is that these coordination problems are extremely hard and largely beyond our understanding. While we can predict with some accuracy how individual humans behave, the problems of coordinating groups of people involve countless complicated issues of game theory, signaling, etc., about which we’re still largely ignorant. In this sense, we really don’t understand how folk ethics works.
Now, the important thing to note is that various aspects of folk ethics may seem as irrational and biased (in the sense that changing them would have positive consequences by some reasonable measure), while in fact the truth is much more complicated. These “biases” may in fact be essential for the way human coordination works in practice for some reason that’s still mysterious to us. Even if they don’t have any direct useful purpose, it may well be that given the constraints of human minds, eliminating them is impossible without breaking something else badly. (A prime example is that once someone goes down the road of breaking intuitively appealing folk ethics principles in the name of consequentialist calculations, it’s practically certain that these calculations will end up being fatally biased.)
Here I have of course handwaved the question of how exactly successful human cooperation depends on the culture-specific content of people’s folk ethics. That question is fascinating, complicated, and impossible to tackle without opening all sorts of ideologically charged issues. But in any case, it presents even further complications and difficulties for any attempt at analyzing and fixing human intuitions by consequentialist reasoning.
(Also, similar reasoning applies not just to folk ethics vs. consequentialism, but also to all sorts of beliefs that may seem as outright irrational from a naive “rationalist” perspective, but whose role in practice is much more complicated and important.)
Yeah, that seems to be the crux of our disagreement. You still trust people, you haven’t seen them march into death and drag their children along with them and reject a thousand warnings along the way with contempt for such absurd and evil suggestions.
I agree that going against social norms is very costly, that we need cooperation more than ever now there’s seven billion of us, and that if something is bad you still need to coordinate against it. But consider this anecdote:
Many years ago, when I was but a child, I wished to search for the best and rightest politician, and to put them in power. And eagerly did I listen to all, and carefully did I consider their arguments, and honestly did I weight them against history and the evening news. And lo, an ideology was born, and I gave it my allegiance. But still doubts nagged and arguments wavered, and I wished for closure.
One day my politician of choice called for a rally, and to the rally I went; filled with doubt, but willing to serve. And such joy came upon me that I knew I was right; this wave of bliss was the true sign that my cause was just. (For I was but a child, and did not know of laws of entanglement; I knew not human psychology told not of world states.)
Then it came to pass that I read a history textbook, and in the book was an excerpt from Robert Brasillach, who too described this joy, and who too claimed it as proof of his ideology. Which was facism. Oops.
So, yeah, never falling for that one again.
Could you say more about what makes folks ethics a form of virtue ethics (or at least sufficiently virtue-based for you to use the term “folk virtue ethics”)? I can see some aspects of it that are virtue-based, but overall it seems like a hodgepodge of different intuitions/emotions/etc.
Yes, it’s certainly not a clear-cut classification. However, I’d say that the principal mechanisms of folk ethics are very much virtue-based, i.e. they revolve around asking what sort of person acts in a particular way, and what can be inferred about others’ actions and one’s own choice of actions from that.
Your praise for folk ethics would be more persuasive to me, Vladimir, if it came with a description of folk ethics—and if that description explained how folk ethics avoids giving ambiguous answers in many important situations—because it seems to me that a large part of this folk ethics of which you speak consists of people attempting to gain advantages over rivals and potential rivals by making folk-ethical claims that advance their personal interests.
In other words, although I am sympathetic to arguments for conservatism in matter of interpersonal relationships and social institutions, your argument would be a whole lot stronger if the process of identifying or determining the thing being argued for did not rely entirely on the phrase “folk virtue ethics”.
I don’t think we need to get into any controversial questions about interpersonal relationships and social institutions here. (Although the arguments I’ve made apply to these too.) I’d rather focus on the entirely ordinary, mundane, and uncontroversial instances of human cooperation and coordination. With this in mind, I think you’re making a mistake when you write:
In fact, the overwhelming part of folk ethics consists of decisions that are so ordinary and uncontroversial that we don’t even stop to think about them, and of interactions (and the resulting social norms and institutions) that are taken completely for granted by everyone—even though the complexity of the underlying coordination problems is enormous, and the way things really work is still largely mysterious to us. The thesis I’m advancing is that a lot of what may seem like bias and imperfection in folk ethics may in fact somehow be essential for the way these problems get solved, and seemingly airtight consequentialist arguments against clear folk-ethical intuitions may in fact be fatally flawed in this regard. (And I think they nearly always are.)
Now, if we move to the question of what happens in those exceptional situations where there is controversy and conflict, things do get more complicated. Here it’s important to note that the boundary between regular smooth human interactions and conflicts is fuzzy, insofar as the regular interactions often involve conflict resolution in regular and automatic ways, and there are no sharp limits between such events and more overt and dramatic conflict. Also, there is no sharp bound between entirely instinctive folk ethics intuitions and those that are codified in more explicit social (and ultimately legal) norms.
And here we get to the controversies that you mention: the conflict between social and legal norms that embody and formalize folk intuitions of justice, fairness, proper behavior, etc. and evolve spontaneously through tradition, precedent, customary practice, etc., and the attempts to replace such norms by new ones backed by consequentialist arguments. Here, indeed, one can argue in favor of what you call “conservatism in matter of interpersonal relationships and social institutions” using very similar arguments to the mine above. But whether or not you agree with such arguments, my main point can be made without even getting into any controversial issues.