I don’t think we need to get into any controversial questions about interpersonal relationships and social institutions here. (Although the arguments I’ve made apply to these too.) I’d rather focus on the entirely ordinary, mundane, and uncontroversial instances of human cooperation and coordination. With this in mind, I think you’re making a mistake when you write:
[I]t seems to me that a large part of this folk ethics of which you speak consists of people attempting to gain advantages over rivals and potential rivals by making folk-ethical claims that advance their personal interests.
In fact, the overwhelming part of folk ethics consists of decisions that are so ordinary and uncontroversial that we don’t even stop to think about them, and of interactions (and the resulting social norms and institutions) that are taken completely for granted by everyone—even though the complexity of the underlying coordination problems is enormous, and the way things really work is still largely mysterious to us. The thesis I’m advancing is that a lot of what may seem like bias and imperfection in folk ethics may in fact somehow be essential for the way these problems get solved, and seemingly airtight consequentialist arguments against clear folk-ethical intuitions may in fact be fatally flawed in this regard. (And I think they nearly always are.)
Now, if we move to the question of what happens in those exceptional situations where there is controversy and conflict, things do get more complicated. Here it’s important to note that the boundary between regular smooth human interactions and conflicts is fuzzy, insofar as the regular interactions often involve conflict resolution in regular and automatic ways, and there are no sharp limits between such events and more overt and dramatic conflict. Also, there is no sharp bound between entirely instinctive folk ethics intuitions and those that are codified in more explicit social (and ultimately legal) norms.
And here we get to the controversies that you mention: the conflict between social and legal norms that embody and formalize folk intuitions of justice, fairness, proper behavior, etc. and evolve spontaneously through tradition, precedent, customary practice, etc., and the attempts to replace such norms by new ones backed by consequentialist arguments. Here, indeed, one can argue in favor of what you call “conservatism in matter of interpersonal relationships and social institutions” using very similar arguments to the mine above. But whether or not you agree with such arguments, my main point can be made without even getting into any controversial issues.
I don’t think we need to get into any controversial questions about interpersonal relationships and social institutions here. (Although the arguments I’ve made apply to these too.) I’d rather focus on the entirely ordinary, mundane, and uncontroversial instances of human cooperation and coordination. With this in mind, I think you’re making a mistake when you write:
In fact, the overwhelming part of folk ethics consists of decisions that are so ordinary and uncontroversial that we don’t even stop to think about them, and of interactions (and the resulting social norms and institutions) that are taken completely for granted by everyone—even though the complexity of the underlying coordination problems is enormous, and the way things really work is still largely mysterious to us. The thesis I’m advancing is that a lot of what may seem like bias and imperfection in folk ethics may in fact somehow be essential for the way these problems get solved, and seemingly airtight consequentialist arguments against clear folk-ethical intuitions may in fact be fatally flawed in this regard. (And I think they nearly always are.)
Now, if we move to the question of what happens in those exceptional situations where there is controversy and conflict, things do get more complicated. Here it’s important to note that the boundary between regular smooth human interactions and conflicts is fuzzy, insofar as the regular interactions often involve conflict resolution in regular and automatic ways, and there are no sharp limits between such events and more overt and dramatic conflict. Also, there is no sharp bound between entirely instinctive folk ethics intuitions and those that are codified in more explicit social (and ultimately legal) norms.
And here we get to the controversies that you mention: the conflict between social and legal norms that embody and formalize folk intuitions of justice, fairness, proper behavior, etc. and evolve spontaneously through tradition, precedent, customary practice, etc., and the attempts to replace such norms by new ones backed by consequentialist arguments. Here, indeed, one can argue in favor of what you call “conservatism in matter of interpersonal relationships and social institutions” using very similar arguments to the mine above. But whether or not you agree with such arguments, my main point can be made without even getting into any controversial issues.