I’m assuming that the movie star is at least reasonably smart. The first thing that comes to mind is periodic payments that decrease over time, with the value hovering just above what magazines are willing to pay + bragging rights, since people are less impressed with a 10 year old sex tape than a brand new one.
Eventually the payments would be stopped when either the man has more to lose from releasing the tape than staying quiet (eg, he’s settled down and married now) or the movie star values money more than the loss of prestige from a scandal (eg, another scandal breaks or she stops getting roles anyway).
I’m sure there are other ways to solve the problem as well, but regardless it’s a technical hurdle rather than an absolute one.
Continuum behaviors are discussed in some detail by Schelling, and interestingly they can be used by both parties. Here they make the blackmail more effective. If the payment is lump-sum, the blackmailer can’t be trusted, and so the movie start won’t pay. The continuous payment option gives her a way to pay the blackmailer and expect him to stay quiet, which makes her more vulnerable to blackmail in the first place.
Continuous options can also be used to derail threats, when the person being threatened can act incrementally and there is no bright line to force the action (assuming the threat is to carry out a single action).
But you’re forgetting the man’s best option: get lots of money from the movie star and get a smaller amount from the press.
Edit: Ah, not lump-sum payment. I can see how that would work then.
And be a lot more vulnerable to criminal charges for the blackmail.
I’m assuming that the movie star is at least reasonably smart. The first thing that comes to mind is periodic payments that decrease over time, with the value hovering just above what magazines are willing to pay + bragging rights, since people are less impressed with a 10 year old sex tape than a brand new one.
Eventually the payments would be stopped when either the man has more to lose from releasing the tape than staying quiet (eg, he’s settled down and married now) or the movie star values money more than the loss of prestige from a scandal (eg, another scandal breaks or she stops getting roles anyway).
I’m sure there are other ways to solve the problem as well, but regardless it’s a technical hurdle rather than an absolute one.
Continuum behaviors are discussed in some detail by Schelling, and interestingly they can be used by both parties. Here they make the blackmail more effective. If the payment is lump-sum, the blackmailer can’t be trusted, and so the movie start won’t pay. The continuous payment option gives her a way to pay the blackmailer and expect him to stay quiet, which makes her more vulnerable to blackmail in the first place.
Continuous options can also be used to derail threats, when the person being threatened can act incrementally and there is no bright line to force the action (assuming the threat is to carry out a single action).