Not if, as is at least conceivable*, enough Friendly superintelligences model the past and reconstruct people from it that eventually most of your measure comes from them. (Or other, mostly less pleasant but seemingly much less likely possibilities.)
* It actually seems a lot more than “at least conceivable” to me, but I trust this seeming very little, since the idea is so comforting.
That requires a double assumption about not just quantum immortality, but about “subjective measure / what happens next” continuing into all copies of a computation, rather than just the local causal future of a computation.
Right, MWI has a different causal structure than other multiverses and quantum immortality is a distinct case of, call it ‘modal-realist immortality’. I do tend to forget that.
Not if, as is at least conceivable*, enough Friendly superintelligences model the past and reconstruct people from it that eventually most of your measure comes from them. (Or other, mostly less pleasant but seemingly much less likely possibilities.)
* It actually seems a lot more than “at least conceivable” to me, but I trust this seeming very little, since the idea is so comforting.
That requires a double assumption about not just quantum immortality, but about “subjective measure / what happens next” continuing into all copies of a computation, rather than just the local causal future of a computation.
Right, MWI has a different causal structure than other multiverses and quantum immortality is a distinct case of, call it ‘modal-realist immortality’. I do tend to forget that.
Sorry, could you repeat that? Both clauses?