I don’t follow. Many low probability and unordered worlds are highly preferable. Conversely, many high probability worlds are not. I don’t see a correlation.
It’s a simplification. If preference satisfies expected utility axioms, it can be decomposed on probability and utility, and in this sense probability is a component of preference and shows how much you care about a given possibility. This doesn’t mean that utility is high on those possibilities as well, or that the possibilities with high utility will have high probability. See my old post for more on this.
I understand this move but I don’t like it. I think that in the fullness of time, we’ll see that probability is not a kind of preference, and there is a “fact of the matter” about the effects that actions have, i.e. that reality is objective not subjective.
But I don’t like arguments from subjective anticipation, subjective anticipation is a projective error that humans make, as many worlds QM has already proved.
Indeed MW QM combined with Robin’s Mangled Worlds is a good microcosm for how the multiverse at other levels ought to turn out. Subjective anticipation out, but still objective facts about what happens.
I note that since the argument from subjective anticipation is invalid, there is still the possibility that we live in an infinite structure with no canonical measure, in which case Vladimir would be right.
I understand this move but I don’t like it. I think that in the fullness of time, we’ll see that probability is not a kind of preference, and there is a “fact of the matter” about the effects that actions have, i.e. that reality is objective not subjective.
I think that probability is a tool for preference, but I also think that there is a fact of the matter about the effects of actions, and that reality of that effect is objective. This effect is at the level of the sample space (based on all mathematical structures maybe) though, of “brittle math”, while the ways you measure the “probability” of a given (objective) event depend on what preference (subjective goals) you are trying to optimize for.
Not if you interpret your preference about those worlds as assigning most of them low probability, so that only the ordered ones matter.
I don’t follow. Many low probability and unordered worlds are highly preferable. Conversely, many high probability worlds are not. I don’t see a correlation.
It’s a simplification. If preference satisfies expected utility axioms, it can be decomposed on probability and utility, and in this sense probability is a component of preference and shows how much you care about a given possibility. This doesn’t mean that utility is high on those possibilities as well, or that the possibilities with high utility will have high probability. See my old post for more on this.
I understand this move but I don’t like it. I think that in the fullness of time, we’ll see that probability is not a kind of preference, and there is a “fact of the matter” about the effects that actions have, i.e. that reality is objective not subjective.
But I don’t like arguments from subjective anticipation, subjective anticipation is a projective error that humans make, as many worlds QM has already proved.
Indeed MW QM combined with Robin’s Mangled Worlds is a good microcosm for how the multiverse at other levels ought to turn out. Subjective anticipation out, but still objective facts about what happens.
I note that since the argument from subjective anticipation is invalid, there is still the possibility that we live in an infinite structure with no canonical measure, in which case Vladimir would be right.
I think that probability is a tool for preference, but I also think that there is a fact of the matter about the effects of actions, and that reality of that effect is objective. This effect is at the level of the sample space (based on all mathematical structures maybe) though, of “brittle math”, while the ways you measure the “probability” of a given (objective) event depend on what preference (subjective goals) you are trying to optimize for.
To rephrase, “unless you interpret your preference as denying the multiverse hypothesis” :-)
You don’t have to assign exactly no value to anything, which makes all structures relevant (to some extent).