Ok. The vampire know’s what it is like to be a bat. Let them express the knowledge in terms of physical reductionism and Nagel is defeated by direct demonstration. Excuse them for not doing so, and nothing significant is changed; now the set of creatures who know what it is like to be a bat is expanded to (bats, vampires)
A transsexual can provide us with some evidence that confirms that they “know what it’s like to be a man and a woman” without needing to provide a full reductionist explanation. In fact, no-one currently can provide their knowledge of what it’s like to be anything in full reductionist form. I’m claiming that we can have evidence of “X knows what it’s like to be Z”, without needing a full explanation.
If it is true that no one can explain what it it likes be anything, that only reinforces Nagels point. It also doesn’t affect Nagels point that we can have evidence that entity V has some essentially mysterious knowledge of what it is like to be entity B,because mysterious, physically inexplicable knowledge would just another physically inexplicable thing. Nagels point is about physicalism and physical understanding. “Here is physical knowledge of what it is like to be a bat”defeats Nagel, “Here is mysterious knowledge...” does not...nor does partial knowledge.
No one has a fully reductive explanation for anger either, yet we function acceptably with the explanations we have.
I’m saying that we can have evidence that “X knows what Z is like” even if X cannot explain it to us in a way that makes us able to know what Z is like.
Anger isn’t a example that rescues physicalism from qualiaphilia, since qualiaphiles can and do maintain that emotions are accompanied by ineffable phenomenal feels.
Nagel and co are arguing metaphysics via epistemology. No qualiaphile is asserting that naturalism isn’t delivering results that are good enough fora range of practical purposes. Qualiaphiles are arguing that there are in-principle barriers to full physical understanding of consciousness that could indicate a non-physical component ontologocally.
We can have evidence that entity A knows what it is like to be entity B, but that is irrelevant to Nagel unless such knowledge is both physical and complete.
that is irrelevant to Nagel unless such knowledge is both physical and complete.
I would still claim that incomplete knowledge is evidence against the likelihood of his position (by conservation of expected probability, it has to be, because a lack of any incomplete knowledge would be strong evidence for his position).
Ok. The vampire know’s what it is like to be a bat. Let them express the knowledge in terms of physical reductionism and Nagel is defeated by direct demonstration. Excuse them for not doing so, and nothing significant is changed; now the set of creatures who know what it is like to be a bat is expanded to (bats, vampires)
A transsexual can provide us with some evidence that confirms that they “know what it’s like to be a man and a woman” without needing to provide a full reductionist explanation. In fact, no-one currently can provide their knowledge of what it’s like to be anything in full reductionist form. I’m claiming that we can have evidence of “X knows what it’s like to be Z”, without needing a full explanation.
If it is true that no one can explain what it it likes be anything, that only reinforces Nagels point. It also doesn’t affect Nagels point that we can have evidence that entity V has some essentially mysterious knowledge of what it is like to be entity B,because mysterious, physically inexplicable knowledge would just another physically inexplicable thing. Nagels point is about physicalism and physical understanding. “Here is physical knowledge of what it is like to be a bat”defeats Nagel, “Here is mysterious knowledge...” does not...nor does partial knowledge.
No one has a fully reductive explanation for anger either, yet we function acceptably with the explanations we have.
I’m saying that we can have evidence that “X knows what Z is like” even if X cannot explain it to us in a way that makes us able to know what Z is like.
Anger isn’t a example that rescues physicalism from qualiaphilia, since qualiaphiles can and do maintain that emotions are accompanied by ineffable phenomenal feels.
Nagel and co are arguing metaphysics via epistemology. No qualiaphile is asserting that naturalism isn’t delivering results that are good enough fora range of practical purposes. Qualiaphiles are arguing that there are in-principle barriers to full physical understanding of consciousness that could indicate a non-physical component ontologocally.
We can have evidence that entity A knows what it is like to be entity B, but that is irrelevant to Nagel unless such knowledge is both physical and complete.
I would still claim that incomplete knowledge is evidence against the likelihood of his position (by conservation of expected probability, it has to be, because a lack of any incomplete knowledge would be strong evidence for his position).
I dont see why.