No one has a fully reductive explanation for anger either, yet we function acceptably with the explanations we have.
I’m saying that we can have evidence that “X knows what Z is like” even if X cannot explain it to us in a way that makes us able to know what Z is like.
Anger isn’t a example that rescues physicalism from qualiaphilia, since qualiaphiles can and do maintain that emotions are accompanied by ineffable phenomenal feels.
Nagel and co are arguing metaphysics via epistemology. No qualiaphile is asserting that naturalism isn’t delivering results that are good enough fora range of practical purposes. Qualiaphiles are arguing that there are in-principle barriers to full physical understanding of consciousness that could indicate a non-physical component ontologocally.
We can have evidence that entity A knows what it is like to be entity B, but that is irrelevant to Nagel unless such knowledge is both physical and complete.
that is irrelevant to Nagel unless such knowledge is both physical and complete.
I would still claim that incomplete knowledge is evidence against the likelihood of his position (by conservation of expected probability, it has to be, because a lack of any incomplete knowledge would be strong evidence for his position).
No one has a fully reductive explanation for anger either, yet we function acceptably with the explanations we have.
I’m saying that we can have evidence that “X knows what Z is like” even if X cannot explain it to us in a way that makes us able to know what Z is like.
Anger isn’t a example that rescues physicalism from qualiaphilia, since qualiaphiles can and do maintain that emotions are accompanied by ineffable phenomenal feels.
Nagel and co are arguing metaphysics via epistemology. No qualiaphile is asserting that naturalism isn’t delivering results that are good enough fora range of practical purposes. Qualiaphiles are arguing that there are in-principle barriers to full physical understanding of consciousness that could indicate a non-physical component ontologocally.
We can have evidence that entity A knows what it is like to be entity B, but that is irrelevant to Nagel unless such knowledge is both physical and complete.
I would still claim that incomplete knowledge is evidence against the likelihood of his position (by conservation of expected probability, it has to be, because a lack of any incomplete knowledge would be strong evidence for his position).
I dont see why.