Convincing to whom? I mean, I agree completely that a virtue ethicist, for example, would not find it convincing. But neither is the assertion that it is a moral judgment convincing to a consequentialist.
If I’ve understood you, you expect even a consequentialist to say “Oh, you’re right, the judgment that a spiteful act of philanthropy is worse than an altruistic act of philanthropy whose expected consequences are the same is a moral judgment, and therefore moral judgments aren’t really about expected consequences.”
It’s not at all clear to me that a consequentialist who isn’t confused would actually say that.
X: Behold A and B in their hypothetical shenanigans. That you will tend to judge the action of A morally better than that of B is evidence that you make moral evaluations in accordance with moral theory M (on which they are morally dissimilar) rather than moral theory N (according to which they are equivalent). This is evidence for the truth of M.
Y: I grant you that I judge A to be better than B, but this isn’t a moral judgement (and so not evidence for M). This is, rather, an aesthetic judgement.
X: What is your reason for thinking this judgement is aesthetic rather than moral?
Y: I am an Nist. If it were a moral judgement, it would be evidence for M.
X should not find this convincing. Neither should Y, or anyone else. Y’s argument is terrible.
We could fix Y’s argument by having him go back and deny that he judges A’s act to be morally different from B’s. This is what Berry did. Or Y could defend his claim, on independent grounds, that his judgement is aesthetic and not moral. Or Y could go back and deny that his actual moral evaluations being in accordance with M are evidence for M.
(shrug) At the risk of repeating myself: what Y would actually say supposing Y were not a conveniently poor debater is not “I am an Nist” but rather “Because what makes a judgment of an act a moral judgment is N, and the judgment of A to be better than B has nothing to do with N.”
X might disagree with Y about what makes a judgment a moral judgment—in fact, if X is not an Nist, it seems likely that X does disagree—but X simply insisting that “A is better than B” is a moral judgment because X says so is unconvincing.
We could fix Y’s argument by having him go back and deny that he judges A’s act to be morally different from B’s.
There’s no going back involved. In this example Y has said all along that Y doesn’t judge A’s act to be morally different from B’s.
It seems to me that what you’re suggesting constitutes logical rudeness on the consequentialist’s part. The argument ran like this:
Take a hypothetical case involving A and B. You are asked to make a moral judgement. If you judge A and B’s actions differently, you are judging as if M is true. If you judge them to be the same, you are judging as if N is true.
The reply you provided wouldn’t be relevant if you said right away that that A and B’s actions are morally the same. It’s only relevant if you’ve judged them to be different (in some way) in response to the hypothetical. Your reply is then that this judgement turns out not to be a moral judgement at all, but an irrelevant aesthetic judgement. This is logically rude because I asked you to make a moral judgement in the first place. You should have just said right off that you don’t judge the two cases differently.
If someone asks me to make a moral judgment about whether A and B’s actions are morally the same, and I judge that they are morally different, and then later I say that they are morally equivalent, I’m clearly being inconsistent. Perhaps I’m being logically rude, perhaps I’m confused, perhaps I’ve changed my mind.
If someone asks me to compare A and B, and I judge that A is better than B, and then later I say that they are morally equivalent, another possibility is that I was not making what I consider a moral judgment in the first place.
I’m confused as to why, upon being asked for a moral evaluation in the course of a discussion on consequentialism and deontology, someone would offer me an aesthetic evaluation they themselves consider irrelevant to the moral question. I don’t think my request for an evaluation was very ambiguous: Berry understood and answered accordingly, and it would surely be strange to think I had asked for an aesthetic evaluation in the middle of a defense of deontology. So I don’t understand how your suggestion would add anything to the discussion.
In the hypothetical discussion you asked me to consider, X makes an assertion about Y’s moral judgments, and Y replies that what X is referring to isn’t a moral judgment. Hence, I said “In this example Y has said all along that Y doesn’t judge A’s act to be morally different from B’s,” and you replied “It seems to me that what you’re suggesting constitutes logical rudeness on the consequentialist’s part.”
I, apparently incorrectly, assumed we were still talking about your hypothetical example.
Now, it seems you’re talking instead about your earlier conversation with Berry, which I haven’t read. I’ll take your word for it that my suggestion would not add anything to that discussion.
Convincing to whom?
I mean, I agree completely that a virtue ethicist, for example, would not find it convincing.
But neither is the assertion that it is a moral judgment convincing to a consequentialist.
If I’ve understood you, you expect even a consequentialist to say “Oh, you’re right, the judgment that a spiteful act of philanthropy is worse than an altruistic act of philanthropy whose expected consequences are the same is a moral judgment, and therefore moral judgments aren’t really about expected consequences.”
It’s not at all clear to me that a consequentialist who isn’t confused would actually say that.
Me? Hopefully, the consequentialist as well.
Imagine this conversation:
X: Behold A and B in their hypothetical shenanigans. That you will tend to judge the action of A morally better than that of B is evidence that you make moral evaluations in accordance with moral theory M (on which they are morally dissimilar) rather than moral theory N (according to which they are equivalent). This is evidence for the truth of M.
Y: I grant you that I judge A to be better than B, but this isn’t a moral judgement (and so not evidence for M). This is, rather, an aesthetic judgement.
X: What is your reason for thinking this judgement is aesthetic rather than moral?
Y: I am an Nist. If it were a moral judgement, it would be evidence for M.
X should not find this convincing. Neither should Y, or anyone else. Y’s argument is terrible.
We could fix Y’s argument by having him go back and deny that he judges A’s act to be morally different from B’s. This is what Berry did. Or Y could defend his claim, on independent grounds, that his judgement is aesthetic and not moral. Or Y could go back and deny that his actual moral evaluations being in accordance with M are evidence for M.
(shrug) At the risk of repeating myself: what Y would actually say supposing Y were not a conveniently poor debater is not “I am an Nist” but rather “Because what makes a judgment of an act a moral judgment is N, and the judgment of A to be better than B has nothing to do with N.”
X might disagree with Y about what makes a judgment a moral judgment—in fact, if X is not an Nist, it seems likely that X does disagree—but X simply insisting that “A is better than B” is a moral judgment because X says so is unconvincing.
There’s no going back involved. In this example Y has said all along that Y doesn’t judge A’s act to be morally different from B’s.
It seems to me that what you’re suggesting constitutes logical rudeness on the consequentialist’s part. The argument ran like this:
Take a hypothetical case involving A and B. You are asked to make a moral judgement. If you judge A and B’s actions differently, you are judging as if M is true. If you judge them to be the same, you are judging as if N is true.
The reply you provided wouldn’t be relevant if you said right away that that A and B’s actions are morally the same. It’s only relevant if you’ve judged them to be different (in some way) in response to the hypothetical. Your reply is then that this judgement turns out not to be a moral judgement at all, but an irrelevant aesthetic judgement. This is logically rude because I asked you to make a moral judgement in the first place. You should have just said right off that you don’t judge the two cases differently.
If someone asks me to make a moral judgment about whether A and B’s actions are morally the same, and I judge that they are morally different, and then later I say that they are morally equivalent, I’m clearly being inconsistent. Perhaps I’m being logically rude, perhaps I’m confused, perhaps I’ve changed my mind.
If someone asks me to compare A and B, and I judge that A is better than B, and then later I say that they are morally equivalent, another possibility is that I was not making what I consider a moral judgment in the first place.
I’m confused as to why, upon being asked for a moral evaluation in the course of a discussion on consequentialism and deontology, someone would offer me an aesthetic evaluation they themselves consider irrelevant to the moral question. I don’t think my request for an evaluation was very ambiguous: Berry understood and answered accordingly, and it would surely be strange to think I had asked for an aesthetic evaluation in the middle of a defense of deontology. So I don’t understand how your suggestion would add anything to the discussion.
In the hypothetical discussion you asked me to consider, X makes an assertion about Y’s moral judgments, and Y replies that what X is referring to isn’t a moral judgment. Hence, I said “In this example Y has said all along that Y doesn’t judge A’s act to be morally different from B’s,” and you replied “It seems to me that what you’re suggesting constitutes logical rudeness on the consequentialist’s part.”
I, apparently incorrectly, assumed we were still talking about your hypothetical example.
Now, it seems you’re talking instead about your earlier conversation with Berry, which I haven’t read. I’ll take your word for it that my suggestion would not add anything to that discussion.
Dave, I think you’re pulling my leg. Your initial comment to me was from one of my posts to Berry, so of course you read it! I’m going to tap out.