What are the improved Condorcet methods you’re thinking of? I do recall seeing that Ranked Pairs and Schulze have very favorable strategy-backfire to strategy-works ratios in simulations, but I don’t know what you’re thinking of for sure. If those are it, then if you approach it right, Schulze isn’t that hard to work through and demonstrate an election result (wikipedia now has an example).
Actually, I was talking about the kind of methods discussed here.
As to Schulze and Ranked Pairs, these two are very similar in philosophy. In terms of criteria compliances and VSE, RP is slightly superior; but Schulze has the advantage of Markus Schulze’s energetic promotion.
In terms of explaining the result, I think Schulze is much better. You can do that very compactly and with only simple, understandable steps. The best I can see doing with RP is more time-consuming and the steps have potential to be more complicated.
As far as promotion is concerned, I haven’t run into it; since it’s so similar to RP, I think non-algorithmic factors like I mentioned above begin to be more important.
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The page you linked there has some undefined terms like u/a (it says it’s defined in previous articles, but I don’t see a link).
>it certainly doesn’t prevent Beatpath (and other TUC methods) from being a strategic mess, without known strategy,
Isn’t that a… good thing? With the fog of reality, strategy looking like 60% stabbing yourself, 30% accomplishing nothing, 10% getting what you want… how is that a bad trait for a system to have?
In particular, as far as strategic messes are concerned, I would definitely feel more pressure to use strategy of equivocation in SICT than in beatpath (Schulze), because it would feel a lot less drastic/scary/risky.
Note that I don’t endorse that page I linked to, it’s just the best source I could find for definitions of “improved Condorcet” methods.
“U/A” is some strange class of voting scenarios where voters have a clear a priori idea about what is “unacceptable” versus “acceptable” and strategize accordingly. I don’t think it’s analytically very helpful.
I see. I figured U/A meant something like that. I think it’s potentially useful to consider that case, but I wouldn’t design a system entirely around it.
What are the improved Condorcet methods you’re thinking of? I do recall seeing that Ranked Pairs and Schulze have very favorable strategy-backfire to strategy-works ratios in simulations, but I don’t know what you’re thinking of for sure. If those are it, then if you approach it right, Schulze isn’t that hard to work through and demonstrate an election result (wikipedia now has an example).
Actually, I was talking about the kind of methods discussed here.
As to Schulze and Ranked Pairs, these two are very similar in philosophy. In terms of criteria compliances and VSE, RP is slightly superior; but Schulze has the advantage of Markus Schulze’s energetic promotion.
In terms of explaining the result, I think Schulze is much better. You can do that very compactly and with only simple, understandable steps. The best I can see doing with RP is more time-consuming and the steps have potential to be more complicated.
As far as promotion is concerned, I haven’t run into it; since it’s so similar to RP, I think non-algorithmic factors like I mentioned above begin to be more important.
~~~~
The page you linked there has some undefined terms like u/a (it says it’s defined in previous articles, but I don’t see a link).
>it certainly doesn’t prevent Beatpath (and other TUC methods) from being a strategic mess, without known strategy,
Isn’t that a… good thing? With the fog of reality, strategy looking like 60% stabbing yourself, 30% accomplishing nothing, 10% getting what you want… how is that a bad trait for a system to have?
In particular, as far as strategic messes are concerned, I would definitely feel more pressure to use strategy of equivocation in SICT than in beatpath (Schulze), because it would feel a lot less drastic/scary/risky.
Note that I don’t endorse that page I linked to, it’s just the best source I could find for definitions of “improved Condorcet” methods.
“U/A” is some strange class of voting scenarios where voters have a clear a priori idea about what is “unacceptable” versus “acceptable” and strategize accordingly. I don’t think it’s analytically very helpful.
I see. I figured U/A meant something like that. I think it’s potentially useful to consider that case, but I wouldn’t design a system entirely around it.