But, even if we can’t ethically test it as a prediction, we can at least try to test it as a postdiction. Consider people who’ve committed atrocities ranging from gang violence to the Holocaust, such that punishment comes late and unexpectedly. From the accounts I’ve read, it seems to me the following are both true and what we would expect based on this theory:
While the perpetrators are riding high, in their circle of fellow perpetrators, subject to no disapproval and apparently safe from punishment, they don’t feel particularly guilty.
Later, when it all comes crashing down and they’re in the power of a wider society that despises them and is likely to punish them for their crimes, they often feel—not just consciously fake, but genuinely feel—a great deal of guilt.
That sounds more like an argument in favor of Tooby and Cosmides’ theory; at the very least it doesn’t seem kosher that I used the opposite as support for my theory in the paragraph starting “guilt is just as associated with good outcomes as bad outcomes”. Maybe I didn’t think it through enough.
Hmm. Thinking about it a little more myself, it seems to me the social is much more important than the material in this regard. In other words, someone who secretly commits a crime and gains great material benefit therefrom, but will be punished if ever caught, is likely to feel guilty. But if the crime is known and approved of by his social circle—even if that’s only a gang or terrorist group—and even if he gained no material benefit, he’s much less likely to feel guilty (until and unless that social circle is broken and he finds himself in prison).
Maybe this is a big reason why recidivism of imprisoned people is so high. After committing a crime, they get removed from the society in which they’d experience guilt and placed in with people who’ve done similar things. Or worse things.
So the guy who’s in prison for selling a kilo of cannabis hears the stories of a hardened home robber, and absorbs the robber’s ability to rob guilt-free.
Hmm, so, considering the way guilt really plays out with modern adults, I don’t think guilt is much more than a conditioned response of submission learned in childhood. It feels bad to be forced to be submissive, and we internalize that bad feeling as a conditioned response to doing something we know is bad.
As another interesting data point, in the early centuries of the Ottoman Empire, the regular succession procedure involved the new sultan killing off his brothers to eliminate any chance of usurpation preemptively. Sultans would often have numerous children with their harem of concubines, so an ascension to the throne often involved a mass killing of the new sultan’s half-brothers.
As far as I know, the sultans were not known to be tormented by fratricidal guilt.
I don’t think this is a disproof—if you’re expected to do something you don’t have to feel guilty about it because you could still be trustworthy.
Trustworthy? When you’re the one with all the power (and your subjects don’t have the option of conveniently relocating away) what you need in the Machiavellian sense is for your subjects to trust that you’ll kill anyone who makes themselves a threat.
Fascinating and horrifying. But how could that be stable? Wouldn’t the brothers figure out ahead of time that they were going to be killed, and all try to kill each other as soon as they realized it?
:D I do actually enjoy a lot of the Ottoman system, and don’t enjoy playing them in Diplomacy. It’s such a nasty little corner, and their administrative innovations don’t come into play (and weren’t helping them very much at that point in history).
The main thing I enjoy about the Ottoman method of finding successors is it makes the most of good genetics (the leader can select the best women and probably has a good supply himself) and education (if you only have 30 potential leaders, you can afford to tutor all of them extensively, which is prohibitively expensive to do for the general population at earlier tech levels) while also minimizing the variance, which is the main problem with normal hereditary rule (if the eldest son gets the throne, you get one shot at a good ruler; if the best son gets the throne, you get the best of 15 shots; if the best child gets the throne, you get the best of 30).
I do have a healthy Burkean respect for monarchism- speaking loosely, the theory that no ruler can be worse than a civil war- and trying to ensure that succession conflicts happen within the confines of the palace means that as little collateral damage is done as possible. Of course, this doesn’t always pan out (there were a few wars of succession that were proper civil wars).
From what I understand, in the earlier rough and martial times, sultans were mostly busy campaigning and had relatively few sons, who would occupy various military and government posts when they reached adulthood. Upon sultan’s death, the sons were expected to fight it out to determine the successor, and this occasional period of instability or even civil war was considered normal. I suppose the brothers would prepare for that moment as best they could.
As the rulers became more decadent and started spending more time siring numerous children with their harems, while the government system became less hands-on, their sons effectively became prisoners of palace factions, which were the real powers clashing over succession on sultan’s death. Once in charge, the new sultan would have no problem killing his captive and powerless brothers. (Sometimes, if he was without sons, he’d keep them alive until he got a son to make sure the dynasty doesn’t die out.) Often the slaughter was extended to other family members as well, just to make sure.
Later the custom was made more merciful, and the brothers would be kept imprisoned for life instead. This institution also served as a reserve of potential successors in case the sultan and his sons died out unexpectedly.
As another interesting data point, in the early centuries of the Ottoman Empire, the regular succession procedure involved the new sultan killing off his brothers to eliminate any chance of usurpation preemptively
I have the impression that this was relatively common among rulers when it came to succession in general. Almost as common as brothers actually usurping their sibling to claim power. With great power comes great inclination to get more!
Seeing this topic discussed always reminds me of Stardust (the movie or book). The king was outright encouraging his sons to defenestrate each other. He was a little disappointed in them—he had killed all his brothers by this age and didn’t think they were living up to his standards.
If the crime is approved by his social circle, as far as his mind is concerned it’s not really a crime.
After all, if you help massacre the rival tribe and take their stuff, there’s no reason to feel guilty about this among one’s tribe. One only needs to display guilt when dealing with other tribes that are considering forming an alliance against your tribe.
But, even if we can’t ethically test it as a prediction, we can at least try to test it as a postdiction. Consider people who’ve committed atrocities ranging from gang violence to the Holocaust, such that punishment comes late and unexpectedly. From the accounts I’ve read, it seems to me the following are both true and what we would expect based on this theory:
While the perpetrators are riding high, in their circle of fellow perpetrators, subject to no disapproval and apparently safe from punishment, they don’t feel particularly guilty.
Later, when it all comes crashing down and they’re in the power of a wider society that despises them and is likely to punish them for their crimes, they often feel—not just consciously fake, but genuinely feel—a great deal of guilt.
That sounds more like an argument in favor of Tooby and Cosmides’ theory; at the very least it doesn’t seem kosher that I used the opposite as support for my theory in the paragraph starting “guilt is just as associated with good outcomes as bad outcomes”. Maybe I didn’t think it through enough.
Hmm. Thinking about it a little more myself, it seems to me the social is much more important than the material in this regard. In other words, someone who secretly commits a crime and gains great material benefit therefrom, but will be punished if ever caught, is likely to feel guilty. But if the crime is known and approved of by his social circle—even if that’s only a gang or terrorist group—and even if he gained no material benefit, he’s much less likely to feel guilty (until and unless that social circle is broken and he finds himself in prison).
Maybe this is a big reason why recidivism of imprisoned people is so high. After committing a crime, they get removed from the society in which they’d experience guilt and placed in with people who’ve done similar things. Or worse things.
So the guy who’s in prison for selling a kilo of cannabis hears the stories of a hardened home robber, and absorbs the robber’s ability to rob guilt-free.
Hmm, so, considering the way guilt really plays out with modern adults, I don’t think guilt is much more than a conditioned response of submission learned in childhood. It feels bad to be forced to be submissive, and we internalize that bad feeling as a conditioned response to doing something we know is bad.
As another interesting data point, in the early centuries of the Ottoman Empire, the regular succession procedure involved the new sultan killing off his brothers to eliminate any chance of usurpation preemptively. Sultans would often have numerous children with their harem of concubines, so an ascension to the throne often involved a mass killing of the new sultan’s half-brothers.
As far as I know, the sultans were not known to be tormented by fratricidal guilt.
I don’t think this is a disproof—if you’re expected to do something you don’t have to feel guilty about it because you could still be trustworthy.
Trustworthy? When you’re the one with all the power (and your subjects don’t have the option of conveniently relocating away) what you need in the Machiavellian sense is for your subjects to trust that you’ll kill anyone who makes themselves a threat.
Fascinating and horrifying. But how could that be stable? Wouldn’t the brothers figure out ahead of time that they were going to be killed, and all try to kill each other as soon as they realized it?
I suspect that’s a feature. Part of the genius of the Ottoman method is the only sons that become Sultans are survivors.
It’s good to know you still take your responsibility to defend the Ottomans seriously.
:D I do actually enjoy a lot of the Ottoman system, and don’t enjoy playing them in Diplomacy. It’s such a nasty little corner, and their administrative innovations don’t come into play (and weren’t helping them very much at that point in history).
The main thing I enjoy about the Ottoman method of finding successors is it makes the most of good genetics (the leader can select the best women and probably has a good supply himself) and education (if you only have 30 potential leaders, you can afford to tutor all of them extensively, which is prohibitively expensive to do for the general population at earlier tech levels) while also minimizing the variance, which is the main problem with normal hereditary rule (if the eldest son gets the throne, you get one shot at a good ruler; if the best son gets the throne, you get the best of 15 shots; if the best child gets the throne, you get the best of 30).
I do have a healthy Burkean respect for monarchism- speaking loosely, the theory that no ruler can be worse than a civil war- and trying to ensure that succession conflicts happen within the confines of the palace means that as little collateral damage is done as possible. Of course, this doesn’t always pan out (there were a few wars of succession that were proper civil wars).
From what I understand, in the earlier rough and martial times, sultans were mostly busy campaigning and had relatively few sons, who would occupy various military and government posts when they reached adulthood. Upon sultan’s death, the sons were expected to fight it out to determine the successor, and this occasional period of instability or even civil war was considered normal. I suppose the brothers would prepare for that moment as best they could.
As the rulers became more decadent and started spending more time siring numerous children with their harems, while the government system became less hands-on, their sons effectively became prisoners of palace factions, which were the real powers clashing over succession on sultan’s death. Once in charge, the new sultan would have no problem killing his captive and powerless brothers. (Sometimes, if he was without sons, he’d keep them alive until he got a son to make sure the dynasty doesn’t die out.) Often the slaughter was extended to other family members as well, just to make sure.
Later the custom was made more merciful, and the brothers would be kept imprisoned for life instead. This institution also served as a reserve of potential successors in case the sultan and his sons died out unexpectedly.
I interpreted this to mean that once a sultan takes the throne, he has his brothers killed, rather than the other way around. Not sure which is right!
You kill all the brothers, then get the throne because of it. Not the other way around.
Ok, I’ll try that next time it comes up :)
Heh.
Tell me how that turns out. ;)
I have the impression that this was relatively common among rulers when it came to succession in general. Almost as common as brothers actually usurping their sibling to claim power. With great power comes great inclination to get more!
Seeing this topic discussed always reminds me of Stardust (the movie or book). The king was outright encouraging his sons to defenestrate each other. He was a little disappointed in them—he had killed all his brothers by this age and didn’t think they were living up to his standards.
If the crime is approved by his social circle, as far as his mind is concerned it’s not really a crime.
After all, if you help massacre the rival tribe and take their stuff, there’s no reason to feel guilty about this among one’s tribe. One only needs to display guilt when dealing with other tribes that are considering forming an alliance against your tribe.