Consider reading Scott Aaronson on the matter. Here is an excerpt:
In my opinion, how to construct a theory that tells us which physical systems are conscious and which aren’t—giving answers that agree with “common sense” whenever the latter renders a verdict—is one of the deepest, most fascinating problems in all of science. Since I don’t know a standard name for the problem, I hereby call it the Pretty-Hard Problem of Consciousness. Unlike with the Hard Hard Problem, I don’t know of any philosophical reason why the Pretty-Hard Problem should be inherently unsolvable; but on the other hand, humans seem nowhere close to solving it (if we had solved it, then we could reduce the abortion, animal rights, and strong AI debates to “gentlemen, let us calculate!”).
All “explanations” of consciousness reduce to assertions about magic. It’s strange that the attitude that’s most mystical on first examination, that even a rock is conscious (if in a sense orders below the consciousness of a gnat) provokes the least amount of quasi-magical auxiliary assertions to support it (i.e. attempting to ground consciousness in quantum phenomena...seems like confusion on two topics naturally leads to an attempt to synthesize them).
So is Aaronson really asking “the right question”? Asking “which physical systems are conscious” is begging the question somewhat. Here’s a thought: is one who assigns greater probability to the notion that physical systems display consciousness when in particular configurations (without knowing any possible reason for such a restriction) than to the notion that physical systems in general are conscious commiting the conjunction fallacy?
The same way the Tononi’s IIT is testable (and false): it predicts that a Vandermonde matrix multiplier is conscious, and more so that you and I, if the matrix is large enough.
Nobody knows yet. That’s what makes it the Pretty-Hard Problem. Our ignorance of how to test it should not be projected onto the world and mistaken for proof that it is untestable.
It’s not merely the “pretty hard problem”. It’s the “impossible to attack, by definition” problem. If you use “consciousness” as a synonym for something such as “intelligence” then it becomes tractable, at least in principle, but you will always have those who insist you’ve simply changed the subject (including me).
Our ignorance of how to test for something we insist exists is not proof of anything, but it is strong evidence of a conceptual muddle.
Our ignorance of how to test for something we insist exists is not proof of anything, but it is strong evidence of a conceptual muddle.
In the case of consciousness, we do not have to insist on anything. We can simply point to our internal experience, and say, “this is what we mean, when we talk about consciousness.” That we have no explanation for how there could possibly be any such thing does not invalidate the experience, for even a faultily conceptualised experience is still an experience. No matter how the experience is reinterpreted, it obstinately remains an experience.
The conceptual muddle is in thinking that because we do not understand a thing, it therefore does not exist.
No, you are misinterpreting the conjunction fallacy. If someone assigns a greater probability to the claim that “humans are conscious and rocks are not” than to the claim that “humans are conscious”, then this will be the conjunction fallacy. But it will also be the conjunction fallacy to believe that it is more likely that “physical systems in general are conscious” than that “humans are conscious.”
The conjunction fallacy is basically not relevant to comparing “humans are conscious and rocks are not” to “both humans and rocks are conscious.”
the claim that “humans are conscious and rocks are not” than to the claim that “humans are conscious”, then this will be the conjunction fallacy
Indeed. Thank you.
it will also be the conjunction fallacy to believe that it is more likely that “physical systems in general are conscious” than that “humans are conscious.”
Forget humans for a second. Just focus on the statement “only physical systems in a particular type of configuration will be conscious”; without knowing which type you mean. You cannot assign a higher probability to any particular system without already having some deciding criteria. It’s when you fix your deciding criteria on the statement “x is human” that the conjunction fallacy comes back on you.
Ofcourse it’s not more likely for a human and a rock to be conscious than just for the human, you have to grant the latter just to avoid being obtuse. But who’s arguing that being human is the deciding criteria for whether a system may be conscious? That’s defenestrating any hope of investigating the phenomenon in other systems which does not do much to assist an empiricist framework for it.
“Only humans are conscious” should indeed have a lower prior probability than “Only physical systems specified in some way are conscious”, since the latter must be true for the former to be true but not the other way around.
However, whether or not only humans are conscious is not the issue. Most people think that many or all animals are conscious, but they do not think that “all physical systems are conscious.” And this is not because of the prior probabilities, but is a conclusion drawn from evidence. The reason people think this way is that they see that they themselves appear to do certain things because they are conscious, and other people and animals do similar things, so it is reasonable to suppose that the reason they do these things is that they are conscious as well. There is no corresponding reason to believe that rocks are conscious. It is not even clear what it would mean to say that they are, since it would take away the ordinary meaning of the word (e.g. you yourself are sometimes conscious and sometimes not, so it cannot be universal).
“Only humans are conscious” should indeed have a lower prior probability than “Only physical systems specified in some way are conscious”
Yes, but not lower than “only physical systems specified in some way are conscious, and that specification criteria is not “x is one of {human, dog, parakeet...}”″. If your idea of a “particular configuration” is a defined by a set of examplars then yes, “only physical systems of some particular configuration” follows. Given that, as you yourself say, whether humans are conscious or not is not the issue, we should consider “particular configurations” determined by some theoretical principle instead. And it seems to me my original argument concerning the conjunction fallacy does hold, given these caveats.
It is not even clear what it would mean to say that they are
That I must concede. But it’s not clear what it means to say a human being is conscious either (were it clear, there would not be so many impenetrable tomes of philosophy on the topic). Ofcourse it’s even less clear in the case of rocks, but at least it admits of the possibility of the rock’s inherent, latent consciousness being amplified by rearranging it into some particular configuration of matter as opposed to flashing into awareness at once upon the reconfiguration.
Consider reading Scott Aaronson on the matter. Here is an excerpt:
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1951
Aaronson asks the right questions, rather than settle for “dissolving”, the way Eliezer tends to do.
All “explanations” of consciousness reduce to assertions about magic. It’s strange that the attitude that’s most mystical on first examination, that even a rock is conscious (if in a sense orders below the consciousness of a gnat) provokes the least amount of quasi-magical auxiliary assertions to support it (i.e. attempting to ground consciousness in quantum phenomena...seems like confusion on two topics naturally leads to an attempt to synthesize them).
So is Aaronson really asking “the right question”? Asking “which physical systems are conscious” is begging the question somewhat. Here’s a thought: is one who assigns greater probability to the notion that physical systems display consciousness when in particular configurations (without knowing any possible reason for such a restriction) than to the notion that physical systems in general are conscious commiting the conjunction fallacy?
He is asking a question whose answer would be testable, so no “assertions about magic”. That’s the best one can do.
How does one test a machine for consciousness?
The same way the Tononi’s IIT is testable (and false): it predicts that a Vandermonde matrix multiplier is conscious, and more so that you and I, if the matrix is large enough.
Where can I find the experiments that tested the Vandermonde matrix multiplier for consciousness?
Nobody knows yet. That’s what makes it the Pretty-Hard Problem. Our ignorance of how to test it should not be projected onto the world and mistaken for proof that it is untestable.
It’s not merely the “pretty hard problem”. It’s the “impossible to attack, by definition” problem. If you use “consciousness” as a synonym for something such as “intelligence” then it becomes tractable, at least in principle, but you will always have those who insist you’ve simply changed the subject (including me).
Our ignorance of how to test for something we insist exists is not proof of anything, but it is strong evidence of a conceptual muddle.
In the case of consciousness, we do not have to insist on anything. We can simply point to our internal experience, and say, “this is what we mean, when we talk about consciousness.” That we have no explanation for how there could possibly be any such thing does not invalidate the experience, for even a faultily conceptualised experience is still an experience. No matter how the experience is reinterpreted, it obstinately remains an experience.
The conceptual muddle is in thinking that because we do not understand a thing, it therefore does not exist.
Descartes said all that in three words.
The conceptual muddle is in thinking that because a thing exists, we must be capable of understanding it!
No, you are misinterpreting the conjunction fallacy. If someone assigns a greater probability to the claim that “humans are conscious and rocks are not” than to the claim that “humans are conscious”, then this will be the conjunction fallacy. But it will also be the conjunction fallacy to believe that it is more likely that “physical systems in general are conscious” than that “humans are conscious.”
The conjunction fallacy is basically not relevant to comparing “humans are conscious and rocks are not” to “both humans and rocks are conscious.”
Indeed. Thank you.
Forget humans for a second. Just focus on the statement “only physical systems in a particular type of configuration will be conscious”; without knowing which type you mean. You cannot assign a higher probability to any particular system without already having some deciding criteria. It’s when you fix your deciding criteria on the statement “x is human” that the conjunction fallacy comes back on you.
Ofcourse it’s not more likely for a human and a rock to be conscious than just for the human, you have to grant the latter just to avoid being obtuse. But who’s arguing that being human is the deciding criteria for whether a system may be conscious? That’s defenestrating any hope of investigating the phenomenon in other systems which does not do much to assist an empiricist framework for it.
“Only humans are conscious” should indeed have a lower prior probability than “Only physical systems specified in some way are conscious”, since the latter must be true for the former to be true but not the other way around.
However, whether or not only humans are conscious is not the issue. Most people think that many or all animals are conscious, but they do not think that “all physical systems are conscious.” And this is not because of the prior probabilities, but is a conclusion drawn from evidence. The reason people think this way is that they see that they themselves appear to do certain things because they are conscious, and other people and animals do similar things, so it is reasonable to suppose that the reason they do these things is that they are conscious as well. There is no corresponding reason to believe that rocks are conscious. It is not even clear what it would mean to say that they are, since it would take away the ordinary meaning of the word (e.g. you yourself are sometimes conscious and sometimes not, so it cannot be universal).
Yes, but not lower than “only physical systems specified in some way are conscious, and that specification criteria is not “x is one of {human, dog, parakeet...}”″. If your idea of a “particular configuration” is a defined by a set of examplars then yes, “only physical systems of some particular configuration” follows. Given that, as you yourself say, whether humans are conscious or not is not the issue, we should consider “particular configurations” determined by some theoretical principle instead. And it seems to me my original argument concerning the conjunction fallacy does hold, given these caveats.
That I must concede. But it’s not clear what it means to say a human being is conscious either (were it clear, there would not be so many impenetrable tomes of philosophy on the topic). Ofcourse it’s even less clear in the case of rocks, but at least it admits of the possibility of the rock’s inherent, latent consciousness being amplified by rearranging it into some particular configuration of matter as opposed to flashing into awareness at once upon the reconfiguration.