Sometimes it is considered wrong to judge people by changeable traits, for example how they are dressed.
Can you give any example of people saying the two types of judgment are comparable? As you say, there’s a sense in modern society that unchosen traits should not be treated with moral disdain. But the analysis is totally different for chosen traits.
In the first case, people are protesting against claim that “dressing like a slut increases the probability that the woman will be raped”. Of course the discussion is not strictly Bayesian, but mostly about connotations.
In the second case, people are protesting the fact that looking like a criminal, while not being a criminal increases their probability of being killed in a supposed self-defense.
(The second example seems like an ad-absurdum version of anti-discrimination, but apparently those people mean it.)
Behaviors can change in frequency. Debates about whether to punish behaviors are debates about whether a decrease in frequency of the behavior (dressing sexually provocatively or conforming to the norms of a lower-status subgroup) is desired.
But contrast, non-behavior characteristics don’t change frequency. Productive social reactions are about whether the characteristic should be accommodated (red heads—yes, ax-crazy murders—no).
The difference in the topics of the two debates makes me think that attempting to draw them in parallel is misleading.
Debates about whether to punish behaviors are debates about whether a decrease in frequency of the behavior is desired.
Whether a decrease in the frequency of the behavior is desired is only one piece of the debate. Other important pieces (from a consequentialist perspective) include how effective the punishment will be, how costly it will be to implement the punishment and what the side effects will be. Even if, for example, society collectively decides that if fewer women dressed like sluts there would be fewer rapes, it does not immediately follow that dressing that way should be a punishable offense.
Can you give any example of people saying the two types of judgment are comparable? As you say, there’s a sense in modern society that unchosen traits should not be treated with moral disdain. But the analysis is totally different for chosen traits.
Two real-world examples, but both can also be interpreted differently:
SlutWalks
hoodies
In the first case, people are protesting against claim that “dressing like a slut increases the probability that the woman will be raped”. Of course the discussion is not strictly Bayesian, but mostly about connotations.
In the second case, people are protesting the fact that looking like a criminal, while not being a criminal increases their probability of being killed in a supposed self-defense.
(The second example seems like an ad-absurdum version of anti-discrimination, but apparently those people mean it.)
Behaviors can change in frequency. Debates about whether to punish behaviors are debates about whether a decrease in frequency of the behavior (dressing sexually provocatively or conforming to the norms of a lower-status subgroup) is desired.
But contrast, non-behavior characteristics don’t change frequency. Productive social reactions are about whether the characteristic should be accommodated (red heads—yes, ax-crazy murders—no).
The difference in the topics of the two debates makes me think that attempting to draw them in parallel is misleading.
Whether a decrease in the frequency of the behavior is desired is only one piece of the debate. Other important pieces (from a consequentialist perspective) include how effective the punishment will be, how costly it will be to implement the punishment and what the side effects will be. Even if, for example, society collectively decides that if fewer women dressed like sluts there would be fewer rapes, it does not immediately follow that dressing that way should be a punishable offense.