Reputation is a way to change many one-time Prisonner’s Dilemmas into one big Iterated Prisonner’s Dilemma, where mutual cooperation is the best strategy for rational players. But how exactly does it work in real life?
I guess it works better when a small group of people interact again and again; and it works worse in a large group of people where many interactions are with strangers. So we should expect more cooperation in a village than in a big city.
Even in big cities people can create smaller units and interact more frequently within these units. So they would trust more their neighbors, coworkers, etc. But here is an opportunity for exploitation by people who don’t mind frequent migration or changing jobs—they often reset their social karma, so they should be trusted less. We should be also suspicious about other karma resetting moves, such as when a company changes their name.
Even if we don’t know someone in person, we can do some probabilistic reasoning by thinking about their reference class: “Do I have an experience of people with traits X, Y, Z cooperating or defecting?” However, this kind of reasoning may be frowned upon socially, sometimes even illegal. It is said that people should not be punished for having a bad reference class because of a trait they didn’t choose voluntarily and cannot change. Sometimes it is considered wrong to judge people by changeable traits, for example how they are dressed. On the other hand, reference classes like “people having a university diploma” are socially allowed.
Here is an interesting (potentially mindkilling) prediction: When it is legally forbidden to use reference classes and other forms of evaluating prestige, the rate of defection increases. (An extreme situation would be when you are legally required to cooperate regardless of what your opponent does.)
Even in big cities people can create smaller units and interact more frequently within these units. So they would trust more their neighbors, coworkers, etc. But here is an opportunity for exploitation by people who don’t mind frequent migration or changing jobs—they often reset their social karma, so they should be trusted less.
And they are—itinerant people are universally less trusted than the ones with home addresses.
Reputation is a way to change many one-time Prisonner’s Dilemmas into one big Iterated Prisonner’s Dilemma, where mutual cooperation is the best strategy for rational players. But how exactly does it work in real life?
People are hard-wired to obey social norms and cooperate with members of their communities even in the absence of personal consequences like reputation. Most people would not steal from a stranger even if they knew they would not be caught.
People are hard-wired to obey social norms and cooperate with members of their communities even in the absence of personal consequences like reputation.
People are hard-wired to manage reputation through some forms of cooperation without explicitly thinking about the consequences to reputation in each instance.
Sometimes it is considered wrong to judge people by changeable traits, for example how they are dressed.
Can you give any example of people saying the two types of judgment are comparable? As you say, there’s a sense in modern society that unchosen traits should not be treated with moral disdain. But the analysis is totally different for chosen traits.
In the first case, people are protesting against claim that “dressing like a slut increases the probability that the woman will be raped”. Of course the discussion is not strictly Bayesian, but mostly about connotations.
In the second case, people are protesting the fact that looking like a criminal, while not being a criminal increases their probability of being killed in a supposed self-defense.
(The second example seems like an ad-absurdum version of anti-discrimination, but apparently those people mean it.)
Behaviors can change in frequency. Debates about whether to punish behaviors are debates about whether a decrease in frequency of the behavior (dressing sexually provocatively or conforming to the norms of a lower-status subgroup) is desired.
But contrast, non-behavior characteristics don’t change frequency. Productive social reactions are about whether the characteristic should be accommodated (red heads—yes, ax-crazy murders—no).
The difference in the topics of the two debates makes me think that attempting to draw them in parallel is misleading.
Debates about whether to punish behaviors are debates about whether a decrease in frequency of the behavior is desired.
Whether a decrease in the frequency of the behavior is desired is only one piece of the debate. Other important pieces (from a consequentialist perspective) include how effective the punishment will be, how costly it will be to implement the punishment and what the side effects will be. Even if, for example, society collectively decides that if fewer women dressed like sluts there would be fewer rapes, it does not immediately follow that dressing that way should be a punishable offense.
Here is an interesting (potentially mindkilling) prediction: When it is legally forbidden to use reference classes and other forms of evaluating prestige, the rate of defection increases. (An extreme situation would be when you are legally required to cooperate regardless of what your opponent does.)
Just my prediction. An example in my mind was an interaction between a state (represented by some person) and individual: e.g. if you are entitled to receive a support in unemployment, you will get it, even if the common sense makes it obvious that you are just abusing the rules; as long as you pretend to follow them.
This is open to interpretation, but my understanding is: “help unemployed people” = cooperate, “let them die” = defect; “inform truthfully about your employment” = cooperate, “falsely pretend to be unemployed (while making money illegally)” = defect.
I suppose there are more examples like that, which could be generalized that a state (or other big organization) becomes a CooperateBot when trying to achieve a win/win situation, and is abused later.
Reputation is a way to change many one-time Prisonner’s Dilemmas into one big Iterated Prisonner’s Dilemma, where mutual cooperation is the best strategy for rational players. But how exactly does it work in real life?
I guess it works better when a small group of people interact again and again; and it works worse in a large group of people where many interactions are with strangers. So we should expect more cooperation in a village than in a big city.
Even in big cities people can create smaller units and interact more frequently within these units. So they would trust more their neighbors, coworkers, etc. But here is an opportunity for exploitation by people who don’t mind frequent migration or changing jobs—they often reset their social karma, so they should be trusted less. We should be also suspicious about other karma resetting moves, such as when a company changes their name.
Even if we don’t know someone in person, we can do some probabilistic reasoning by thinking about their reference class: “Do I have an experience of people with traits X, Y, Z cooperating or defecting?” However, this kind of reasoning may be frowned upon socially, sometimes even illegal. It is said that people should not be punished for having a bad reference class because of a trait they didn’t choose voluntarily and cannot change. Sometimes it is considered wrong to judge people by changeable traits, for example how they are dressed. On the other hand, reference classes like “people having a university diploma” are socially allowed.
Here is an interesting (potentially mindkilling) prediction: When it is legally forbidden to use reference classes and other forms of evaluating prestige, the rate of defection increases. (An extreme situation would be when you are legally required to cooperate regardless of what your opponent does.)
And they are—itinerant people are universally less trusted than the ones with home addresses.
People are hard-wired to obey social norms and cooperate with members of their communities even in the absence of personal consequences like reputation. Most people would not steal from a stranger even if they knew they would not be caught.
People are hard-wired to manage reputation through some forms of cooperation without explicitly thinking about the consequences to reputation in each instance.
Can you give any example of people saying the two types of judgment are comparable? As you say, there’s a sense in modern society that unchosen traits should not be treated with moral disdain. But the analysis is totally different for chosen traits.
Two real-world examples, but both can also be interpreted differently:
SlutWalks
hoodies
In the first case, people are protesting against claim that “dressing like a slut increases the probability that the woman will be raped”. Of course the discussion is not strictly Bayesian, but mostly about connotations.
In the second case, people are protesting the fact that looking like a criminal, while not being a criminal increases their probability of being killed in a supposed self-defense.
(The second example seems like an ad-absurdum version of anti-discrimination, but apparently those people mean it.)
Behaviors can change in frequency. Debates about whether to punish behaviors are debates about whether a decrease in frequency of the behavior (dressing sexually provocatively or conforming to the norms of a lower-status subgroup) is desired.
But contrast, non-behavior characteristics don’t change frequency. Productive social reactions are about whether the characteristic should be accommodated (red heads—yes, ax-crazy murders—no).
The difference in the topics of the two debates makes me think that attempting to draw them in parallel is misleading.
Whether a decrease in the frequency of the behavior is desired is only one piece of the debate. Other important pieces (from a consequentialist perspective) include how effective the punishment will be, how costly it will be to implement the punishment and what the side effects will be. Even if, for example, society collectively decides that if fewer women dressed like sluts there would be fewer rapes, it does not immediately follow that dressing that way should be a punishable offense.
Interesting. Source?
Just my prediction. An example in my mind was an interaction between a state (represented by some person) and individual: e.g. if you are entitled to receive a support in unemployment, you will get it, even if the common sense makes it obvious that you are just abusing the rules; as long as you pretend to follow them.
This is open to interpretation, but my understanding is: “help unemployed people” = cooperate, “let them die” = defect; “inform truthfully about your employment” = cooperate, “falsely pretend to be unemployed (while making money illegally)” = defect.
I suppose there are more examples like that, which could be generalized that a state (or other big organization) becomes a CooperateBot when trying to achieve a win/win situation, and is abused later.