In the scenario where the coin lands tails, nothing interesting happens, and the coin is logically independent of anything else, so let us assume that the coin lands heads. We are assuming (correct me if I’m wrong) that Omega is a perfect predictor. So, in the second scenario, we already know that the person will press the button even before he makes his decision, even before he does it, or else either a). Omega’s prediction is wrong (contradiction) or b). the Earth was destroyed a million years ago (contradiction). The fact that we currently exist gives us information about what people will do in the future, because what people will do in the future is perfectly tied to whether we were destroyed in the past through the logical device of Omega. Hence, in the second scenario, there’s not even a “choice”, because the outcome is known to us ahead of time. The Universe, including “choices”, is deterministic, but we do not call something a “choice” when the outcome is known with complete certainty ahead of time.
I think that, because we have no experience with actual psychics, most of us have no idea what it feels like to have something that’s normally a “choice” be pre-determined. If an actual, perfect predictor says that you are the Chosen One, it doesn’t matter whether you go on a heroic quest, or lay in bed and read magazines all day, because you’re going to wind up saving the Universe regardless. If you are a heroic individual, and a perfect predictor says that you will go on a dangerous quest, either a). there must be zero probability of you deciding to stay home and read magazines, which is fantastically unlikely because zero is a small number and dangerous quests are difficult, or b). you staying at home and reading magazines won’t affect the outcome. How many heroes whose salvation of the universe was prophesied in advance carried out that logic?
“But since copies of us occur more frequently in universes with late filters than in universes with early filters, such a decision (which Robin arrives at via SIA) can be justified on utilitarian grounds under UDT.”
Doesn’t this contradict the title of the post? If I understand correctly, you’re saying, in agreement with Robin, that we should put work into preventing late filters. But anything that you want to put work into preventing is, ipso facto, bad news.
The Universe, including “choices”, is deterministic, but we do not call something a “choice” when the outcome is known with complete certainty ahead of time.
I’m not sure how this relates to the main points of my post. Did you intend for it to be related (in which case please explain how), or is it more of a tangent?
Doesn’t this contradict the title of the post? If I understand correctly, you’re saying, in agreement with Robin, that we should put work into preventing late filters. But anything that you want to put work into preventing is, ipso facto, bad news.
What I meant by the title is that the Great Filter being late is not bad news (compared to it being early). Perhaps I should change the title to make that clearer?
“I’m not sure how this relates to the main points of my post. Did you intend for it to be related (in which case please explain how), or is it more of a tangent?”
You said: “It seems to me that this decision problem is structurally no different from the one faced by the future you in the previous thought experiment, and the correct decision is still to choose the late filter (i.e., press the button).”
This isn’t a decision problem because the outcome is already known ahead of time (you will press the button).
The Universe, including “choices”, is deterministic, but we do not call something a “choice” when the outcome is known with complete certainty ahead of time.
Let W = “The Forces of Good will win an epic battle against the Forces of Evil.”
Let C = “You will be instrumental in winning an epic battle against the Forces of Evil.”
Let B = “There will be an epic battle between the Forces of Good and the Forces of Evil.”
What “You are the Chosen One” usually means in Western fiction is:
B is true, and;
W if and only if C.
Thus, if you are definitely the Chosen One, and you stay home and read magazines, and reading magazines doesn’t help you win epic battles, and epic battles are relatively evenly-matched, then you should expect to observe (B ^ !C ^ !W), i.e., you lose an epic battle on behalf of the Forces of Good.
Fate can compel you to the arena, but it can’t make you win.
If you are a heroic individual and a perfect predictor says that you will go on a dangerous quest, you will go on a dangerous quest even if there is a significant probability that you will not go. After all many things happen that had low probabilities.
Contradiction. If a perfect predictor predicts that you will go on a dangerous quest, then the probability of you not going on a dangerous quest is 0%, which is not “significant”.
There may be a significant probability apart from the fact that a perfect predictor predicted it. You might as well say that either you will go or you will not, so the probability is either 100% or 0%.
“There may be a significant probability apart from the fact that a perfect predictor predicted it. ”
I do not understand your sentence.
“You might as well say that either you will go or you will not, so the probability is either 100% or 0%.”
Exactly. Given omniscience about event X, the probability of event X is always either 100% or 0%. If we got a perfect psychic to predict whether I would win the lottery tomorrow, the probability of me winning the lottery would be either 100% or 0% after the psychic made his prediction.
I was saying that taking into account everything you know except for the fact that a perfect predictor predicted something, there could be a significant probability.
In the scenario where the coin lands tails, nothing interesting happens, and the coin is logically independent of anything else, so let us assume that the coin lands heads. We are assuming (correct me if I’m wrong) that Omega is a perfect predictor. So, in the second scenario, we already know that the person will press the button even before he makes his decision, even before he does it, or else either a). Omega’s prediction is wrong (contradiction) or b). the Earth was destroyed a million years ago (contradiction). The fact that we currently exist gives us information about what people will do in the future, because what people will do in the future is perfectly tied to whether we were destroyed in the past through the logical device of Omega. Hence, in the second scenario, there’s not even a “choice”, because the outcome is known to us ahead of time. The Universe, including “choices”, is deterministic, but we do not call something a “choice” when the outcome is known with complete certainty ahead of time.
I think that, because we have no experience with actual psychics, most of us have no idea what it feels like to have something that’s normally a “choice” be pre-determined. If an actual, perfect predictor says that you are the Chosen One, it doesn’t matter whether you go on a heroic quest, or lay in bed and read magazines all day, because you’re going to wind up saving the Universe regardless. If you are a heroic individual, and a perfect predictor says that you will go on a dangerous quest, either a). there must be zero probability of you deciding to stay home and read magazines, which is fantastically unlikely because zero is a small number and dangerous quests are difficult, or b). you staying at home and reading magazines won’t affect the outcome. How many heroes whose salvation of the universe was prophesied in advance carried out that logic?
“But since copies of us occur more frequently in universes with late filters than in universes with early filters, such a decision (which Robin arrives at via SIA) can be justified on utilitarian grounds under UDT.”
Doesn’t this contradict the title of the post? If I understand correctly, you’re saying, in agreement with Robin, that we should put work into preventing late filters. But anything that you want to put work into preventing is, ipso facto, bad news.
I’m not sure how this relates to the main points of my post. Did you intend for it to be related (in which case please explain how), or is it more of a tangent?
What I meant by the title is that the Great Filter being late is not bad news (compared to it being early). Perhaps I should change the title to make that clearer?
“I’m not sure how this relates to the main points of my post. Did you intend for it to be related (in which case please explain how), or is it more of a tangent?”
You said: “It seems to me that this decision problem is structurally no different from the one faced by the future you in the previous thought experiment, and the correct decision is still to choose the late filter (i.e., press the button).”
This isn’t a decision problem because the outcome is already known ahead of time (you will press the button).
Known to whom?
Hang on.
Let W = “The Forces of Good will win an epic battle against the Forces of Evil.” Let C = “You will be instrumental in winning an epic battle against the Forces of Evil.” Let B = “There will be an epic battle between the Forces of Good and the Forces of Evil.”
What “You are the Chosen One” usually means in Western fiction is:
B is true, and; W if and only if C.
Thus, if you are definitely the Chosen One, and you stay home and read magazines, and reading magazines doesn’t help you win epic battles, and epic battles are relatively evenly-matched, then you should expect to observe (B ^ !C ^ !W), i.e., you lose an epic battle on behalf of the Forces of Good.
Fate can compel you to the arena, but it can’t make you win.
If you are a heroic individual and a perfect predictor says that you will go on a dangerous quest, you will go on a dangerous quest even if there is a significant probability that you will not go. After all many things happen that had low probabilities.
Contradiction. If a perfect predictor predicts that you will go on a dangerous quest, then the probability of you not going on a dangerous quest is 0%, which is not “significant”.
There may be a significant probability apart from the fact that a perfect predictor predicted it. You might as well say that either you will go or you will not, so the probability is either 100% or 0%.
“There may be a significant probability apart from the fact that a perfect predictor predicted it. ”
I do not understand your sentence.
“You might as well say that either you will go or you will not, so the probability is either 100% or 0%.”
Exactly. Given omniscience about event X, the probability of event X is always either 100% or 0%. If we got a perfect psychic to predict whether I would win the lottery tomorrow, the probability of me winning the lottery would be either 100% or 0% after the psychic made his prediction.
I was saying that taking into account everything you know except for the fact that a perfect predictor predicted something, there could be a significant probability.