Context: The quotes here are taken from the C.S. Lewis sci-fi novel Perelandra in which protagonist, Ransom, goes to an extremely ideal Venus to have philosophical discoveries and box with a man possessed by a demon.
These quotes come from the beginning of the novel when Ransom is attempting to describe the experience of having been transported through space by extraterrestrial means which had augmented his body to protect it from cold and hunger and atrophy for the duration of the journey.
This discussion (taking place in a debate over the Christian afterlife) touches upon certain sentiments about how the augmentation (or, for Lewis, glorification) of modern human bodies does not lessen us as humans but instead only improves that which is there.
‘Oh, don’t you see, you ass, that there’s a difference between a trans-sensuous life and a non-sensuous life?’
What emerged was that in Ransom’s opinion the present functions and appetites of the body would disappear, not because they were atrophied but because they were, as he said, ‘engulfed.’ He used the word ‘trans-sexual’ I remember and began to hunt about for some similar words to apply to eating (after rejecting ‘trans-gastronomic’), and since he was not the only philologist present, that diverted the conversation into different channels.
I was questioning him on the subject and had incautiously said, ‘Of course I realise it’s all rather too vague for you to put into words,’ when he took me up rather sharply, for such a patient man, by saying, ‘On the contrary, it is words that are vague. The reason why the thing can’t be expressed is that it’s too definite for language.’
The reason why the thing can’t be expressed is that it’s too definite for language.
This feels like a combination of words that are supposed to sound Wisely, but don’t actually make sense. (I guess Lewis uses this technique frequently.)
How specifically could being “definite” be a a problem for language? Take any specific thing, apply an arbitrary label, and you are done.
There could be a problem when a person X experienced some “qualia” that other people have never experienced, so they can’t match the verbal description with anything in their experience. Or worse, they have something similar, which they match instead, even when told not to. And this seems like a situation described in the text. -- But then the problem is not having the shared experience. If they did, they would just need to apply an arbitrary label, and somehow make sure they refer to the same thing when using the label. The language would have absolutely no problem with that.
Since any attempt to defend the quote itself will only come off as a desire to shoehorn my chosen author into the rationality camp, I’ll just give the simple reason why I chose to include that quote instead of stopping with the two previous:
How specifically could being “definite” be a a problem for language? Take any specific thing, apply an arbitrary label, and you are done.
This remark seems to flow from an oversimplified view of how language works. In the context of, for example, a person or a chair, this paradigm seems pretty solid… at least, it gets you a lot. You can ostend the thing (‘take’ it, as it were) and then appy the label. But in the case of lots of “objects” there is nothing analogous to such ‘taking’ as a prior, discrete step from talking. For example, “objects” like happiness, or vagueness or definiteness themselves.
I think you may benefit from reading Wittgenstein, but maybe you’d just hate it. I think you need it though!
Am not sure I follow your comment. I think I get the basic gist of it and I agree with it, but I gotta ask. Did you really mean ostend(or was it a typo?)?. I can’t really find it as a word in m-w.com or on google.
Yep, what The Ancient Geek said. Sorry I didn’t reply in a timely way—I’m not a regular user. I’m glad you basically agree, and pardon me for using such a recherche word (did I just do it again?) needlessly. Philosophical training can do that to you; you get a bit blind to how certain words are, while they could be part of the general intellectual culture, actually only used in very specific circles. (I think ‘precisification’ is another example of this. I used it with an intelligent nerd friend recently and, while of course he understood it—it’s self explanatory—he thought it was terrible, and probably thought I just made it up.)
But then the problem is not having the shared experience. If they did, they would just need to apply an arbitrary label,
Yes.. If they had the shared experience, they would just need to apply an arbitrary label, however given how we learn language(by association based on how they are used by people around us on what we see as objective events/experiences), I am not too confident the labels will match even after having the shared experience. My previous comment assumes this, but did not make it explicit. And I derive the
The reason why the thing can’t be expressed is that it’s too definite for language
quote from that assumption. I may be wrong about the assumption (since it seems to be more of a thought experiment than a practical experiment at the moment) but nevertheless I assign fairly high probability/confidence on that.
And this seems like a situation described in the text. -- But then the problem is not having the shared experience.
I tend to think of language as a symbolic system to denote/share/communicate these experiences with other brains. Ofcourse, there’s the inherent challenge of seldom two experiences are same.(Even if it is an experiment on electrons).
It’s one of the reason, one of my sci-fi favourite scenario is brain-brain interfaces, that figure some way to interpret and transfer the empirical heuristic rules about a probability distribution(of any given event) one person has to another. Or may be am just being too idealistic about people always having such heuristics in their heads. (even if they are not aware of it) . :-)
“How far does it go? Would you still obey the Life-Force if you found it prompting you to murder me?” “Yes.” ”Or to sell England to the Germans?” “Yes.” ”Or to print lies as serious research in a scientific periodical?” “Yes.” ”God help you!” said Ransom.
“You will understand that I must start by asking you certain questions.
In general terms, what are you prepared to do?′
‘Anything that we are capable of,’ said Winston.
O’Brien had turned himself a little in his chair so that he was facing
Winston. He almost ignored Julia, seeming to take it for granted that
Winston could speak for her. For a moment the lids flitted down over his
eyes. He began asking his questions in a low, expressionless voice, as
though this were a routine, a sort of catechism, most of whose answers
were known to him already.
‘You are prepared to give your lives?’
‘Yes.’
‘You are prepared to commit murder?’
‘Yes.’
‘To commit acts of sabotage which may cause the death of hundreds of
innocent people?’
‘Yes.’
‘To betray your country to foreign powers?’
‘Yes.’
‘You are prepared to cheat, to forge, to blackmail, to corrupt the minds
of children, to distribute habit-forming drugs, to encourage prostitution,
to disseminate venereal diseases—to do anything which is likely to cause
demoralization and weaken the power of the Party?’
‘Yes.’
‘If, for example, it would somehow serve our interests to throw sulphuric
acid in a child’s face—are you prepared to do that?’
‘Yes.’
‘You are prepared to lose your identity and live out the rest of your life
as a waiter or a dock-worker?’
‘Yes.’
‘You are prepared to commit suicide, if and when we order you to do so?’
‘Yes.’
‘You are prepared, the two of you, to separate and never see one another
again?’
‘No!’ broke in Julia.
It appeared to Winston that a long time passed before he answered. For a
moment he seemed even to have been deprived of the power of speech. His
tongue worked soundlessly, forming the opening syllables first of one word,
then of the other, over and over again. Until he had said it, he did not
know which word he was going to say. ‘No,’ he said finally.
There’s a passage by Lewis, and probably from Perelandra, which is to the effect that people’s actual choices are from a deeper part of themselves than the conscious mind. Might you happen to know it?
Off hand, I don’t recall. There is a moment at the end of the book where Ransom has a revelatory experience of all life in existence and understands it as an interlocking dance, something that doesn’t fit either his theory of predestination nor free will.
Actually, looked up some quotes and found this:
The whole struggle was over, and yet there seemed to have been no moment of victory. You might say, if you liked, that the power of choice had been simply set aside and an inflexible destiny substituted for it. On the other hand, you might say he had delivered from the rhetoric of his passions and had emerged in unassailable freedom. Ransom could not for the life of him, see any difference between these two statements. Predestination and freedom were apparently identical. He could no longer see any meaning in the many arguments he had heard on the subject.
Context: The quotes here are taken from the C.S. Lewis sci-fi novel Perelandra in which protagonist, Ransom, goes to an extremely ideal Venus to have philosophical discoveries and box with a man possessed by a demon.
These quotes come from the beginning of the novel when Ransom is attempting to describe the experience of having been transported through space by extraterrestrial means which had augmented his body to protect it from cold and hunger and atrophy for the duration of the journey.
This discussion (taking place in a debate over the Christian afterlife) touches upon certain sentiments about how the augmentation (or, for Lewis, glorification) of modern human bodies does not lessen us as humans but instead only improves that which is there.
C.S. Lewis, Perelandra, p. 29.
This feels like a combination of words that are supposed to sound Wisely, but don’t actually make sense. (I guess Lewis uses this technique frequently.)
How specifically could being “definite” be a a problem for language? Take any specific thing, apply an arbitrary label, and you are done.
There could be a problem when a person X experienced some “qualia” that other people have never experienced, so they can’t match the verbal description with anything in their experience. Or worse, they have something similar, which they match instead, even when told not to. And this seems like a situation described in the text. -- But then the problem is not having the shared experience. If they did, they would just need to apply an arbitrary label, and somehow make sure they refer to the same thing when using the label. The language would have absolutely no problem with that.
Since any attempt to defend the quote itself will only come off as a desire to shoehorn my chosen author into the rationality camp, I’ll just give the simple reason why I chose to include that quote instead of stopping with the two previous:
I felt it touched on the subject of inferential distance and discussing reality using labels in a manner that was worthy of attention.
This remark seems to flow from an oversimplified view of how language works. In the context of, for example, a person or a chair, this paradigm seems pretty solid… at least, it gets you a lot. You can ostend the thing (‘take’ it, as it were) and then appy the label. But in the case of lots of “objects” there is nothing analogous to such ‘taking’ as a prior, discrete step from talking. For example, “objects” like happiness, or vagueness or definiteness themselves.
I think you may benefit from reading Wittgenstein, but maybe you’d just hate it. I think you need it though!
Am not sure I follow your comment. I think I get the basic gist of it and I agree with it, but I gotta ask. Did you really mean ostend(or was it a typo?)?. I can’t really find it as a word in m-w.com or on google.
Yep, what The Ancient Geek said. Sorry I didn’t reply in a timely way—I’m not a regular user. I’m glad you basically agree, and pardon me for using such a recherche word (did I just do it again?) needlessly. Philosophical training can do that to you; you get a bit blind to how certain words are, while they could be part of the general intellectual culture, actually only used in very specific circles. (I think ‘precisification’ is another example of this. I used it with an intelligent nerd friend recently and, while of course he understood it—it’s self explanatory—he thought it was terrible, and probably thought I just made it up.)
Hope you look at Wittgenstein!
As in ostention, basically pointing, or a verbal substitute.
Yes.. If they had the shared experience, they would just need to apply an arbitrary label, however given how we learn language(by association based on how they are used by people around us on what we see as objective events/experiences), I am not too confident the labels will match even after having the shared experience. My previous comment assumes this, but did not make it explicit. And I derive the
quote from that assumption. I may be wrong about the assumption (since it seems to be more of a thought experiment than a practical experiment at the moment) but nevertheless I assign fairly high probability/confidence on that.
I tend to think of language as a symbolic system to denote/share/communicate these experiences with other brains. Ofcourse, there’s the inherent challenge of seldom two experiences are same.(Even if it is an experiment on electrons). It’s one of the reason, one of my sci-fi favourite scenario is brain-brain interfaces, that figure some way to interpret and transfer the empirical heuristic rules about a probability distribution(of any given event) one person has to another. Or may be am just being too idealistic about people always having such heuristics in their heads. (even if they are not aware of it) . :-)
While we are quoting Perelandra
A parallel passage from 1984:
“You will understand that I must start by asking you certain questions. In general terms, what are you prepared to do?′
‘Anything that we are capable of,’ said Winston.
O’Brien had turned himself a little in his chair so that he was facing Winston. He almost ignored Julia, seeming to take it for granted that Winston could speak for her. For a moment the lids flitted down over his eyes. He began asking his questions in a low, expressionless voice, as though this were a routine, a sort of catechism, most of whose answers were known to him already.
‘You are prepared to give your lives?’
‘Yes.’
‘You are prepared to commit murder?’
‘Yes.’
‘To commit acts of sabotage which may cause the death of hundreds of innocent people?’
‘Yes.’
‘To betray your country to foreign powers?’
‘Yes.’
‘You are prepared to cheat, to forge, to blackmail, to corrupt the minds of children, to distribute habit-forming drugs, to encourage prostitution, to disseminate venereal diseases—to do anything which is likely to cause demoralization and weaken the power of the Party?’
‘Yes.’
‘If, for example, it would somehow serve our interests to throw sulphuric acid in a child’s face—are you prepared to do that?’
‘Yes.’
‘You are prepared to lose your identity and live out the rest of your life as a waiter or a dock-worker?’
‘Yes.’
‘You are prepared to commit suicide, if and when we order you to do so?’
‘Yes.’
‘You are prepared, the two of you, to separate and never see one another again?’
‘No!’ broke in Julia.
It appeared to Winston that a long time passed before he answered. For a moment he seemed even to have been deprived of the power of speech. His tongue worked soundlessly, forming the opening syllables first of one word, then of the other, over and over again. Until he had said it, he did not know which word he was going to say. ‘No,’ he said finally.
There’s a passage by Lewis, and probably from Perelandra, which is to the effect that people’s actual choices are from a deeper part of themselves than the conscious mind. Might you happen to know it?
Off hand, I don’t recall. There is a moment at the end of the book where Ransom has a revelatory experience of all life in existence and understands it as an interlocking dance, something that doesn’t fit either his theory of predestination nor free will.
Actually, looked up some quotes and found this: