I still want to figure out games (like PD) in the oracle setting first. After the abortive attempt on the list, I didn’t yet get around to rethinking the problem. Care to take a stab?
The symmetric case (identical payoffs and identical algorithms) is trivial in the oracle setting. Non-identical algorithms seems to be moderately difficult, our candidate solutions in the non-oracle setting only work because they privilege one of the outcomes apriori, like Loebian cooperation. Non-identical payoffs seems to be very difficult, we have no foothold at all.
I think we have a nice enough story for “fair” problems (where easy proofs of moral arguments exist), and no good story for even slightly “unfair” problems (like ASP or non-symmetric PD). Maybe the writeup should emphasize the line between these two kinds of problems. It’s clear enough in my mind.
Part of the motivation was to avoid specifying agents as algorithms, specifying them as (more general) propositions about actions instead. It’s unclear to me how to combine this with possibility of reasoning about such agents (by other agents).
That’s very speculative, I don’t remember any nontrivial results in this vein so far. Maybe the writeup shouldn’t need to wait until this gets cleared up.
I still want to figure out games (like PD) in the oracle setting first. After the abortive attempt on the list, I didn’t yet get around to rethinking the problem. Care to take a stab?
The symmetric case (identical payoffs and identical algorithms) is trivial in the oracle setting. Non-identical algorithms seems to be moderately difficult, our candidate solutions in the non-oracle setting only work because they privilege one of the outcomes apriori, like Loebian cooperation. Non-identical payoffs seems to be very difficult, we have no foothold at all.
I think we have a nice enough story for “fair” problems (where easy proofs of moral arguments exist), and no good story for even slightly “unfair” problems (like ASP or non-symmetric PD). Maybe the writeup should emphasize the line between these two kinds of problems. It’s clear enough in my mind.
Part of the motivation was to avoid specifying agents as algorithms, specifying them as (more general) propositions about actions instead. It’s unclear to me how to combine this with possibility of reasoning about such agents (by other agents).
That’s very speculative, I don’t remember any nontrivial results in this vein so far. Maybe the writeup shouldn’t need to wait until this gets cleared up.