Another consideration is the effects of your decision criteria on the lesser evil itself. All else being equal, and assuming your politics aren’t so unbelievably unimaginative that you see yourself somewhere between the two mainstream alternatives, you should prefer the lesser evil to be more beholden to its base. The logic of this should be most evident in parliamentary systems, where third party voters can explicitly coordinate and sometimes back and sometimes withdraw support from their nearest mainstream parties, depending on policy concessions.
assuming your politics aren’t so unbelievably unimaginative that you see yourself somewhere between the two mainstream alternatives, you should prefer the lesser evil to be more beholden to its base
The assumption you appear to be making here is that you’re either between the two mainstream parties (and “unbelievably unimaginative”) or further out than one of them along the axis running between them, somewhere near to where “their base” lives (and presumably not so unimaginative).
I think this assumption is very wrong, and I don’t see any reason for accepting it. It’s wrong for at least two reasons. (1) Politics is not one-dimensional. You might be fairly near the middle on that primary axis but far from the two mainstream options on some other axis. (2) You may be further out than “between the two mainstream alternatives” but the nearest applicable “base” may be further out and highly undesirable. (For instance, you might consider that the centre ground between Republicans and Democrats is too far left while thinking the Tea Party is too far right—or, for that matter, too far out on some other axis.)
Politics is not one-dimensional. You might be fairly near the middle on that primary axis but far from the two mainstream options on some other axis.
Statistically speaking, politics is largely one-dimensional, and there is no plausible case to be made for anything beyond two dimensions. The single axis covers >80%, the two-axis graph covers 95%+ of voting behavior, and the rest is more likely to be overfitting than any actual additional axis.
Two is enough to invalidate the assumption I think Oligopsony made, but in any case what’s true “statistically speaking” is relevant only to those who are statistically fairly typical. LW is full of people who are, in various ways, unusual, and there is some reason to think that quite a few LW participants have unconventional political opinions. (And Oligopsony was specifically addressing the less-conventional, I think; hence “assuming your politics aren’t so unbelievably unimaginative …”.)
you should prefer the lesser evil to be more beholden to its base
How would you go about achieving this? The only interpretation that occurs to me is to minimise the number of votes for the less-dispreferred main party subject to the constraint that it wins, thereby making it maximally indebted to (which seems an unlikely way for politicians to think) and maximally (apparently) dependent upon its strongest supporters.
To provide a concrete example, this seems to suggest that a person who favours the Republicans over the Democrats and expects the Republicans to do well in the midterms should vote for a Libertarian, thereby making the Republicans more dependent on the Tea Party. This is counterintuitive, to say the least.
I disagree with the initial claim. While moving away from centre for an electoral term might lead to short-term gains (e.g. passing something that is mainly favoured by more extreme voters), it might also lead to short-term losses (by causing stalemate and gridlock). In the longer term, taking a wingward stance seems likely to polarise views of the party, strengthening support from diehards but weakening appeal to centrists.
To provide a concrete example, this seems to suggest that a person who favours the Republicans over the Democrats and expects the Republicans to do well in the midterms should vote for a Libertarian, thereby making the Republicans more dependent on the Tea Party. This is counterintuitive, to say the least.
Is it? Again, I haven’t done the math, but look at the behavior of minor parties in parliamentary systems. They typically demand a price for their support. If the Republican will get your vote regardless why should they care about you?
I agree that voting for a third party which better represents your ideals can make the closer main party move in that direction. The problem is that this strategy makes the main party more dependent upon its other supporters, which can lead to identity politics and legislative gridlock. If there were no Libertarian party, for example, libertarian candidates would have stood as Republicans, thereby shifting internal debate towards libertarianism.
Another effect of voting for a third party is that it affects the electoral strategy of politically distant main parties. If a main party is beaten by a large enough margin it is likely to try to reinvent itself, or at least to replace key figures. If a large third party takes a share of the votes, especially of those disillusioned with main parties, it may have significant effects on long-term strategies.
The problem is that this strategy makes the main party more dependent upon its other supporters, which can lead to identity politics and legislative gridlock.
Legislative gridlock is better than bad laws being passed.
Really? By whose definition of “bad laws”? There are an awful lot of laws that I don’t like (for exaple, ones mandating death for homosexual sex) but that doesn’t mean I’d like to screw up the governance of an entire country by not allowing any bills whatsoever to pass until a reform bill passed. That’s a pretty good way to get a civil war. Look, for example, at Thailand, which is close to separating into two states because the parties are so opposed. Add two years of legislative gridlock and they’d hate each other even more; I am reasonably confident that gridlock in Thailand would lead to mass civil unrest and a potential secession of the northeast, which might well be violent.
but that doesn’t mean I’d like to screw up the governance of an entire country by not allowing any bills whatsoever to pass until a reform bill passed.
I disagree with the premise that countries need a constant supply of new laws to function.
That’s a pretty good way to get a civil war. Look, for example, at Thailand, which is close to separating into two states because the parties are so opposed. Add two years of legislative gridlock and they’d hate each other even more; I am reasonably confident that gridlock in Thailand would lead to mass civil unrest and a potential secession of the northeast, which might well be violent.
The problem in Thailand is not gridlock itself, it’s that different factions have very different ideas about what the laws should be.
I disagree with the premise that countries need a constant supply of new laws to function.
In many countries, the budget or appropriations bills must be passed as a new law every year for things to keep moving. In the US, not having appropriations for even a month was considered unpleasant, and it was getting increasingly so as the effects percolated through the various layers of buffering between the US Treasury and actual paychecks.
Traditionally, in a parliamentary system, if the budget fails, that’s a vote of no confidence and requires new elections—things can’t just keep going.
Abstracting, it seems like constitutions are deliberately designed so that the government can’t go on autopilot—if it were possible for the country to run without new legislation for years, that would weaken the legislature compared to the executive, and it’s widely believed that unchecked executive power is dangerous to liberty.
Another consideration is the effects of your decision criteria on the lesser evil itself. All else being equal, and assuming your politics aren’t so unbelievably unimaginative that you see yourself somewhere between the two mainstream alternatives, you should prefer the lesser evil to be more beholden to its base. The logic of this should be most evident in parliamentary systems, where third party voters can explicitly coordinate and sometimes back and sometimes withdraw support from their nearest mainstream parties, depending on policy concessions.
The assumption you appear to be making here is that you’re either between the two mainstream parties (and “unbelievably unimaginative”) or further out than one of them along the axis running between them, somewhere near to where “their base” lives (and presumably not so unimaginative).
I think this assumption is very wrong, and I don’t see any reason for accepting it. It’s wrong for at least two reasons. (1) Politics is not one-dimensional. You might be fairly near the middle on that primary axis but far from the two mainstream options on some other axis. (2) You may be further out than “between the two mainstream alternatives” but the nearest applicable “base” may be further out and highly undesirable. (For instance, you might consider that the centre ground between Republicans and Democrats is too far left while thinking the Tea Party is too far right—or, for that matter, too far out on some other axis.)
Statistically speaking, politics is largely one-dimensional, and there is no plausible case to be made for anything beyond two dimensions. The single axis covers >80%, the two-axis graph covers 95%+ of voting behavior, and the rest is more likely to be overfitting than any actual additional axis.
Two is enough to invalidate the assumption I think Oligopsony made, but in any case what’s true “statistically speaking” is relevant only to those who are statistically fairly typical. LW is full of people who are, in various ways, unusual, and there is some reason to think that quite a few LW participants have unconventional political opinions. (And Oligopsony was specifically addressing the less-conventional, I think; hence “assuming your politics aren’t so unbelievably unimaginative …”.)
How would you go about achieving this? The only interpretation that occurs to me is to minimise the number of votes for the less-dispreferred main party subject to the constraint that it wins, thereby making it maximally indebted to (which seems an unlikely way for politicians to think) and maximally (apparently) dependent upon its strongest supporters.
To provide a concrete example, this seems to suggest that a person who favours the Republicans over the Democrats and expects the Republicans to do well in the midterms should vote for a Libertarian, thereby making the Republicans more dependent on the Tea Party. This is counterintuitive, to say the least.
I disagree with the initial claim. While moving away from centre for an electoral term might lead to short-term gains (e.g. passing something that is mainly favoured by more extreme voters), it might also lead to short-term losses (by causing stalemate and gridlock). In the longer term, taking a wingward stance seems likely to polarise views of the party, strengthening support from diehards but weakening appeal to centrists.
Is it? Again, I haven’t done the math, but look at the behavior of minor parties in parliamentary systems. They typically demand a price for their support. If the Republican will get your vote regardless why should they care about you?
I agree that voting for a third party which better represents your ideals can make the closer main party move in that direction. The problem is that this strategy makes the main party more dependent upon its other supporters, which can lead to identity politics and legislative gridlock. If there were no Libertarian party, for example, libertarian candidates would have stood as Republicans, thereby shifting internal debate towards libertarianism.
Another effect of voting for a third party is that it affects the electoral strategy of politically distant main parties. If a main party is beaten by a large enough margin it is likely to try to reinvent itself, or at least to replace key figures. If a large third party takes a share of the votes, especially of those disillusioned with main parties, it may have significant effects on long-term strategies.
Legislative gridlock is better than bad laws being passed.
Really? By whose definition of “bad laws”? There are an awful lot of laws that I don’t like (for exaple, ones mandating death for homosexual sex) but that doesn’t mean I’d like to screw up the governance of an entire country by not allowing any bills whatsoever to pass until a reform bill passed. That’s a pretty good way to get a civil war. Look, for example, at Thailand, which is close to separating into two states because the parties are so opposed. Add two years of legislative gridlock and they’d hate each other even more; I am reasonably confident that gridlock in Thailand would lead to mass civil unrest and a potential secession of the northeast, which might well be violent.
I disagree with the premise that countries need a constant supply of new laws to function.
The problem in Thailand is not gridlock itself, it’s that different factions have very different ideas about what the laws should be.
In many countries, the budget or appropriations bills must be passed as a new law every year for things to keep moving. In the US, not having appropriations for even a month was considered unpleasant, and it was getting increasingly so as the effects percolated through the various layers of buffering between the US Treasury and actual paychecks.
Traditionally, in a parliamentary system, if the budget fails, that’s a vote of no confidence and requires new elections—things can’t just keep going.
Abstracting, it seems like constitutions are deliberately designed so that the government can’t go on autopilot—if it were possible for the country to run without new legislation for years, that would weaken the legislature compared to the executive, and it’s widely believed that unchecked executive power is dangerous to liberty.