but that doesn’t mean I’d like to screw up the governance of an entire country by not allowing any bills whatsoever to pass until a reform bill passed.
I disagree with the premise that countries need a constant supply of new laws to function.
That’s a pretty good way to get a civil war. Look, for example, at Thailand, which is close to separating into two states because the parties are so opposed. Add two years of legislative gridlock and they’d hate each other even more; I am reasonably confident that gridlock in Thailand would lead to mass civil unrest and a potential secession of the northeast, which might well be violent.
The problem in Thailand is not gridlock itself, it’s that different factions have very different ideas about what the laws should be.
I disagree with the premise that countries need a constant supply of new laws to function.
In many countries, the budget or appropriations bills must be passed as a new law every year for things to keep moving. In the US, not having appropriations for even a month was considered unpleasant, and it was getting increasingly so as the effects percolated through the various layers of buffering between the US Treasury and actual paychecks.
Traditionally, in a parliamentary system, if the budget fails, that’s a vote of no confidence and requires new elections—things can’t just keep going.
Abstracting, it seems like constitutions are deliberately designed so that the government can’t go on autopilot—if it were possible for the country to run without new legislation for years, that would weaken the legislature compared to the executive, and it’s widely believed that unchecked executive power is dangerous to liberty.
I disagree with the premise that countries need a constant supply of new laws to function.
The problem in Thailand is not gridlock itself, it’s that different factions have very different ideas about what the laws should be.
In many countries, the budget or appropriations bills must be passed as a new law every year for things to keep moving. In the US, not having appropriations for even a month was considered unpleasant, and it was getting increasingly so as the effects percolated through the various layers of buffering between the US Treasury and actual paychecks.
Traditionally, in a parliamentary system, if the budget fails, that’s a vote of no confidence and requires new elections—things can’t just keep going.
Abstracting, it seems like constitutions are deliberately designed so that the government can’t go on autopilot—if it were possible for the country to run without new legislation for years, that would weaken the legislature compared to the executive, and it’s widely believed that unchecked executive power is dangerous to liberty.