If Omega is 100% sure you’re one-boxing, you can one-box and get $1,000,000 or you can two-box and get $1,001,000. You cannot make the argument that one-boxing is better in this case unless you argue that your decision affects Omega’s prediction, and that would be backwards causality. If you think backwards causality is a possibility, that’s fine and you should one-box; but then you still have to agree that under the assumption that backwards causality cannot exist, two-boxing wins.
If you think backwards causality is a possibility, that’s fine and you should one-box; but then you still have to agree that under the assumption that backwards causality cannot exist, two-boxing wins.
Backwards causality cannot exist. I still take one box. I get the money. You don’t. Your reasoning fails.
On a related note: The universe is (as far as I know) entirely deterministic. I still have free will.
It’s not completely clear what “backward causality” (or any causality, outside the typical contexts) means, so maybe it can exist. Better to either ignore the concept in this context (as it doesn’t seem relevant) or taboo/clarify it.
It’s not completely clear what “backward causality” (or any causality, outside the typical contexts) means, so maybe it can exist. Better to either ignore the concept in this context (as it doesn’t seem relevant) or taboo/clarify it.
The meaning of what Andreas was saying was sufficiently clear. He means “you know, stuff like flipping time travel and changing the goddamn past”. Trying to taboo causality and sending everyone off to read Pearl would be a distraction. Possibly a more interesting distraction than another “CDT one boxes! Oh, um.… wait… No, Newcomb’s doesn’t exist. Err… I mean CDT two boxes and it is right to do so so there!” conversation but not an overwhelmingly relevant one.
He means “you know, stuff like flipping time travel and changing the goddamn past”.
We are in a certain sense talking about determining the past, the distinction is between shared structure (as in, the predictor has your source code) and time machines. The main problem seems to be unwillingness to carefully consider the meaning of implausible hypotheticals, and continued distraction by the object level dispute doesn’t seem to help.
(“Changing” vs. “determining” point should probably be discussed in the context of the future, where implausibility and fiction are less of a distraction.)
If backwards causality cannot exist, would you say that your decision can affect the prediction that Omega made before you made your decision?
No. Both the prediction and my decision came about due to past states of the universe (including my brain). They do not influence each other directly. I still take one box and get $1,000,000 and that is the best possible outcome.o. Both the prediction and my decision came about due to past states of the universe (including my brain). I still take one box and get $1,000,000 and that is the best possible outcome I can expect.
Unless you like money, in which case you should one box.
If Omega is 100% sure you’re one-boxing, you can one-box and get $1,000,000 or you can two-box and get $1,001,000. You cannot make the argument that one-boxing is better in this case unless you argue that your decision affects Omega’s prediction, and that would be backwards causality. If you think backwards causality is a possibility, that’s fine and you should one-box; but then you still have to agree that under the assumption that backwards causality cannot exist, two-boxing wins.
Backwards causality cannot exist. I still take one box. I get the money. You don’t. Your reasoning fails.
On a related note: The universe is (as far as I know) entirely deterministic. I still have free will.
It’s not completely clear what “backward causality” (or any causality, outside the typical contexts) means, so maybe it can exist. Better to either ignore the concept in this context (as it doesn’t seem relevant) or taboo/clarify it.
The meaning of what Andreas was saying was sufficiently clear. He means “you know, stuff like flipping time travel and changing the goddamn past”. Trying to taboo causality and sending everyone off to read Pearl would be a distraction. Possibly a more interesting distraction than another “CDT one boxes! Oh, um.… wait… No, Newcomb’s doesn’t exist. Err… I mean CDT two boxes and it is right to do so so there!” conversation but not an overwhelmingly relevant one.
We are in a certain sense talking about determining the past, the distinction is between shared structure (as in, the predictor has your source code) and time machines. The main problem seems to be unwillingness to carefully consider the meaning of implausible hypotheticals, and continued distraction by the object level dispute doesn’t seem to help.
(“Changing” vs. “determining” point should probably be discussed in the context of the future, where implausibility and fiction are less of a distraction.)
If backwards causality cannot exist, would you say that your decision can affect the prediction that Omega made before you made your decision?
No. Both the prediction and my decision came about due to past states of the universe (including my brain). They do not influence each other directly. I still take one box and get $1,000,000 and that is the best possible outcome.o. Both the prediction and my decision came about due to past states of the universe (including my brain). I still take one box and get $1,000,000 and that is the best possible outcome I can expect.