Given all of this, we’d love feedback and discussion, either as comments here, or as emails, etc.
I don’t agree with the argument that infinite impacts of our choices are of Pascalian improbability, in fact I think we probably face them as a consequence of one-boxing decision theory, and some of the more plausible routes to local infinite impact are missing from the paper:
The decision theory section misses the simplest argument for infinite value: in an infinite inflationary universe with infinite copies of me, then my choices are multiplied infinitely. If I would one-box on Newcomb’s Problem, then I would take the difference between eating the sandwich and not to be scaled out infinitely. I think this argument is in fact correct and follows from our current cosmological models combine with one-boxing decision theories.
Under ‘rejecting physics’ I didn’t see any mention of baby universes, e.g. Lee Smolin’s cosmological natural selection. If that picture were right, or anything else in which we can affect the occurrence of new universes/inflationary bubbles forming, then that would permit infinite impacts.
The simulation hypothesis is a plausible way for our physics models to be quite wrong about the world in which the simulation is conducted, and further there would be reason to think simulations would be disproportionately conducted under physical laws that are especially conducive to abundant computation
If I understand you initial point, I agree that the route to infinite value wouldn’t be through infinitesimal probabilities, as we say in the paper. I’m less sure what you mean by “one-boxing decision theory”—we do discuss alternative decision theories briefly, but find only a limited impact of even non-causal decision theories without also accepting multiverses, and not renormalizing value.
Regarding “in an infinite inflationary universe with infinite copies of me,” we point out in the paper that the universe cannot support infinite copies of anything, since it’s bounded in mass, space, and time—see A.2.1 and A.4. You suggest that there may be ways around this in your next two claims.
Regarding baby universes, perhaps we should have addressed it—as we noted in the introduction, we limited the discussion to a fairly prosaic setting. However, assuming Smolin’s model, we still have no influence on the contents of the baby universe. If we determined that those universes were of positive value, despite having no in-principle way of determining their content or accessing them, then I could imagine tiling the universe with black holes to maximize the number of such universes is a possible optimal strategy—and the only impact of our actions with infinite values is the number of black holes we create.
Finally, if we accept the simulation hypothesis, we again have no necessary access to the simulators’ universe. Only if we both accept the hypothesis and believe we can influence the parent universe in determinable ways can we make decisions that have an infinite impact. In that case, infinite value is again only accessible via this route.
Finally, if we accept the simulation hypothesis, we again have no necessary access to the simulators’ universe. Only if we both accept the hypothesis and believe we can influence the parent universe in determinable ways can we make decisions that have an infinite impact. In that case, infinite value is again only accessible via this route.
This seems like an isolated demand for… something. If we accept the simulation hypothesis, we still have a credence distribution over what the simulators’ universe might be like, including what the simulators are like, what their purpose in creating the simulation is, etc. We don’t need to believe we can influence the parent universe “in determinable ways” to make decisions that take into account possible effects on the parent universe. We certainly don’t need “necessary access.” We don’t have necessary access to anything pretty much. Or maybe I just don’t know what you mean by these quoted phrases?
That’s fair. What I meant by necessary access, but said unclearly, was that for there to be infinite value, we need to not only accept the simulation hypothesis, but also require that there be some possible influence / access—it’s necessary to assume both. And yes, if we have some finite probability that both the simulation hypothesis is true and that our actions could affect the simulators, I agree that we can have some credence over how we could influence their universe, which means that we could have access to infinite value. But as noted, the entire access to infinite value is still conditional on whatever probability we assign to this join condition. And in that case, if we care about total value, 100% of all expected value is riding on that single possibility.
I suppose by ‘the universe’ I meant what you would call the inflationary multiverse, that is including distant regions we are now out of contact with. I personally tend not to call regions separated by mere distance separate universes.
”and the only impact of our actions with infinite values is the number of black holes we create.”
Yes, that would be the infinite impact I had in mind, doubling the number would double the number of infinite branching trees of descendant universes.
Re simulations, yes, there is indeed a possibility of influencing other levels, although we would be more clueless, and it is a way for us to be in a causally connected patch with infinite future.
We tried to be clear that we were discussing influenceable value, i.e. value relevant for decisions. Unreachable parts of our universe, which are uninfluenceable, may not be finite, but not in a way that changes any decision we would make. I agree that they are part of the universe, but I think that if we assume standard theories of physics, i.e. without child universes and without assuming simulation, the questions in infinite ethics don’t make them relevant. But we should probably qualify these points more clearly in the paper.
Thanks David, this looks like a handy paper!
I don’t agree with the argument that infinite impacts of our choices are of Pascalian improbability, in fact I think we probably face them as a consequence of one-boxing decision theory, and some of the more plausible routes to local infinite impact are missing from the paper:
The decision theory section misses the simplest argument for infinite value: in an infinite inflationary universe with infinite copies of me, then my choices are multiplied infinitely. If I would one-box on Newcomb’s Problem, then I would take the difference between eating the sandwich and not to be scaled out infinitely. I think this argument is in fact correct and follows from our current cosmological models combine with one-boxing decision theories.
Under ‘rejecting physics’ I didn’t see any mention of baby universes, e.g. Lee Smolin’s cosmological natural selection. If that picture were right, or anything else in which we can affect the occurrence of new universes/inflationary bubbles forming, then that would permit infinite impacts.
The simulation hypothesis is a plausible way for our physics models to be quite wrong about the world in which the simulation is conducted, and further there would be reason to think simulations would be disproportionately conducted under physical laws that are especially conducive to abundant computation
Thanks for this!
If I understand you initial point, I agree that the route to infinite value wouldn’t be through infinitesimal probabilities, as we say in the paper. I’m less sure what you mean by “one-boxing decision theory”—we do discuss alternative decision theories briefly, but find only a limited impact of even non-causal decision theories without also accepting multiverses, and not renormalizing value.
Regarding “in an infinite inflationary universe with infinite copies of me,” we point out in the paper that the universe cannot support infinite copies of anything, since it’s bounded in mass, space, and time—see A.2.1 and A.4. You suggest that there may be ways around this in your next two claims.
Regarding baby universes, perhaps we should have addressed it—as we noted in the introduction, we limited the discussion to a fairly prosaic setting. However, assuming Smolin’s model, we still have no influence on the contents of the baby universe. If we determined that those universes were of positive value, despite having no in-principle way of determining their content or accessing them, then I could imagine tiling the universe with black holes to maximize the number of such universes is a possible optimal strategy—and the only impact of our actions with infinite values is the number of black holes we create.
Finally, if we accept the simulation hypothesis, we again have no necessary access to the simulators’ universe. Only if we both accept the hypothesis and believe we can influence the parent universe in determinable ways can we make decisions that have an infinite impact. In that case, infinite value is again only accessible via this route.
This seems like an isolated demand for… something. If we accept the simulation hypothesis, we still have a credence distribution over what the simulators’ universe might be like, including what the simulators are like, what their purpose in creating the simulation is, etc. We don’t need to believe we can influence the parent universe “in determinable ways” to make decisions that take into account possible effects on the parent universe. We certainly don’t need “necessary access.” We don’t have necessary access to anything pretty much. Or maybe I just don’t know what you mean by these quoted phrases?
That’s fair. What I meant by necessary access, but said unclearly, was that for there to be infinite value, we need to not only accept the simulation hypothesis, but also require that there be some possible influence / access—it’s necessary to assume both. And yes, if we have some finite probability that both the simulation hypothesis is true and that our actions could affect the simulators, I agree that we can have some credence over how we could influence their universe, which means that we could have access to infinite value. But as noted, the entire access to infinite value is still conditional on whatever probability we assign to this join condition. And in that case, if we care about total value, 100% of all expected value is riding on that single possibility.
I suppose by ‘the universe’ I meant what you would call the inflationary multiverse, that is including distant regions we are now out of contact with. I personally tend not to call regions separated by mere distance separate universes.
”and the only impact of our actions with infinite values is the number of black holes we create.”
Yes, that would be the infinite impact I had in mind, doubling the number would double the number of infinite branching trees of descendant universes.
Re simulations, yes, there is indeed a possibility of influencing other levels, although we would be more clueless, and it is a way for us to be in a causally connected patch with infinite future.
We tried to be clear that we were discussing influenceable value, i.e. value relevant for decisions. Unreachable parts of our universe, which are uninfluenceable, may not be finite, but not in a way that changes any decision we would make. I agree that they are part of the universe, but I think that if we assume standard theories of physics, i.e. without child universes and without assuming simulation, the questions in infinite ethics don’t make them relevant. But we should probably qualify these points more clearly in the paper.
As I said, the story was in combination with one-boxing decision theories and our duplicate counterparts.