I think there is such a thing as “communicating well” where “well” picks out internal norms of communication (not, e.g. in such a way as to conduce instrumentally to my interests or to my having truer beliefs—bc it could happen that lying to you serves either of those ends) and that is what I mean by “communicating rationally”
The goals of such communication are what I called (in the tweet thread) “bidirectional likemindedness”—that we think the same thing, but not bc it’s determined in advance that you will think what I (independently) thought or that I will think what you (independently) thought.
So I do think it makes sense to have philosopher societies where the focus is on sharing information in such a way that we jointly converge on the truth (I’m not sure if this is quite the same thing you’re getting at with communicative rationality.). And I think there is benefit to trying to get broader society to adopt more truthseeking styles of communication, which includes more reasoned arguments on the margin.
But, this doesn’t imply that it’s always the right thing to do, when interacting with people who don’t share your truthseeking principles. (for extreme example, I wouldn’t try to give reasoned arguments to someone attacking me on the street)
I have some sense of why communicative rationality is important to you, but not why it should be (overwhelmingly) important to me.
I think there is sometimes benefit to people standing by their principles, to get society to change around them. (i.e. you can be a hero of communicative rationality, maybe even trying to make reasoned arguments to an attacker on the street, to highlight that clear communication is a cause worth dying for). But, this is a supererogatory thing. I wouldn’t want everyone who was interested in philosophy to feel like interest-in-philosophy meant giving up their ability to defend themselves, or give up the ability to communicate in ways that other cultures understand or respect.
That would probably result in fewer people being willing to incorporate philosophy into their life.
My own conception of rationality (note: Vaniver may or may not endorse this) is to be a robust agent – someone who reliably makes good decisions in a variety of circumstances, regardless of how other agents are interacting with me and how the environment might change. This includes clear communication, but also includes knowing how to defend yourself, and credibly communicating when you will defend yourself, and how, so that people can coordinate with you.
My conception of “rationalist hero” is someone who understands when it is the right time to defend “communication via reasoned arguments”, and when is the right to defend other foundational norms (via incentives or whatnot)
I think this is legitimately tricky (part of being a rationalist hero in my book is having the good judgment to know the difference, and it can be hard sometimes). But, right now it seems to me that it’s more important to be incentivizing the Times to not de-anonymize people, rather than to focus on persuading them that it is wrong to do so using reasoned arguments.
Yes, good point, thanks for the request for clarification.
I think there is a third kind of rationality, called “communicative rationality”
See this tweet: https://twitter.com/AgnesCallard/status/1276531044024451073?s=20
(and also my replies to questions therein)
I think there is such a thing as “communicating well” where “well” picks out internal norms of communication (not, e.g. in such a way as to conduce instrumentally to my interests or to my having truer beliefs—bc it could happen that lying to you serves either of those ends) and that is what I mean by “communicating rationally”
The goals of such communication are what I called (in the tweet thread) “bidirectional likemindedness”—that we think the same thing, but not bc it’s determined in advance that you will think what I (independently) thought or that I will think what you (independently) thought.
So I do think it makes sense to have philosopher societies where the focus is on sharing information in such a way that we jointly converge on the truth (I’m not sure if this is quite the same thing you’re getting at with communicative rationality.). And I think there is benefit to trying to get broader society to adopt more truthseeking styles of communication, which includes more reasoned arguments on the margin.
But, this doesn’t imply that it’s always the right thing to do, when interacting with people who don’t share your truthseeking principles. (for extreme example, I wouldn’t try to give reasoned arguments to someone attacking me on the street)
I have some sense of why communicative rationality is important to you, but not why it should be (overwhelmingly) important to me.
I think there is sometimes benefit to people standing by their principles, to get society to change around them. (i.e. you can be a hero of communicative rationality, maybe even trying to make reasoned arguments to an attacker on the street, to highlight that clear communication is a cause worth dying for). But, this is a supererogatory thing. I wouldn’t want everyone who was interested in philosophy to feel like interest-in-philosophy meant giving up their ability to defend themselves, or give up the ability to communicate in ways that other cultures understand or respect.
That would probably result in fewer people being willing to incorporate philosophy into their life.
My own conception of rationality (note: Vaniver may or may not endorse this) is to be a robust agent – someone who reliably makes good decisions in a variety of circumstances, regardless of how other agents are interacting with me and how the environment might change. This includes clear communication, but also includes knowing how to defend yourself, and credibly communicating when you will defend yourself, and how, so that people can coordinate with you.
My conception of “rationalist hero” is someone who understands when it is the right time to defend “communication via reasoned arguments”, and when is the right to defend other foundational norms (via incentives or whatnot)
I think this is legitimately tricky (part of being a rationalist hero in my book is having the good judgment to know the difference, and it can be hard sometimes). But, right now it seems to me that it’s more important to be incentivizing the Times to not de-anonymize people, rather than to focus on persuading them that it is wrong to do so using reasoned arguments.