Probably worth noting that folk on LessWrong may be using the word rationality different than the way it sounds like you’re using the word. (This is fine, but it means we need to be careful that we’re understanding each other right)
1. Epistemic rationality: systematically improving the accuracy of your beliefs.
2. Instrumental rationality: systematically achieving your values.
The first concept is simple enough. When you open your eyes and look at the room around you, you’ll locate your laptop in relation to the table, and you’ll locate a bookcase in relation to the wall. If something goes wrong with your eyes, or your brain, then your mental model might say there’s a bookcase where no bookcase exists, and when you go over to get a book, you’ll be disappointed.
This is what it’s like to have a false belief, a map of the world that doesn’t correspond to the territory. Epistemic rationality is about building accurate maps instead. This correspondence between belief and reality is commonly called “truth,” and I’m happy to call it that.1
Instrumental rationality, on the other hand, is about steering reality—sending the future where you want it to go. It’s the art of choosing actions that lead to outcomes ranked higher in your preferences. I sometimes call this “winning.”,
So rationality is about forming true beliefs and making decisions that help you win.
I’m not sure what your conception of rationality is. I’m somewhat interested, but I think it might be better to just cut closer to the issue: why is good to rely on reasoned arguments rather than petitions?
I think there is such a thing as “communicating well” where “well” picks out internal norms of communication (not, e.g. in such a way as to conduce instrumentally to my interests or to my having truer beliefs—bc it could happen that lying to you serves either of those ends) and that is what I mean by “communicating rationally”
The goals of such communication are what I called (in the tweet thread) “bidirectional likemindedness”—that we think the same thing, but not bc it’s determined in advance that you will think what I (independently) thought or that I will think what you (independently) thought.
So I do think it makes sense to have philosopher societies where the focus is on sharing information in such a way that we jointly converge on the truth (I’m not sure if this is quite the same thing you’re getting at with communicative rationality.). And I think there is benefit to trying to get broader society to adopt more truthseeking styles of communication, which includes more reasoned arguments on the margin.
But, this doesn’t imply that it’s always the right thing to do, when interacting with people who don’t share your truthseeking principles. (for extreme example, I wouldn’t try to give reasoned arguments to someone attacking me on the street)
I have some sense of why communicative rationality is important to you, but not why it should be (overwhelmingly) important to me.
I think there is sometimes benefit to people standing by their principles, to get society to change around them. (i.e. you can be a hero of communicative rationality, maybe even trying to make reasoned arguments to an attacker on the street, to highlight that clear communication is a cause worth dying for). But, this is a supererogatory thing. I wouldn’t want everyone who was interested in philosophy to feel like interest-in-philosophy meant giving up their ability to defend themselves, or give up the ability to communicate in ways that other cultures understand or respect.
That would probably result in fewer people being willing to incorporate philosophy into their life.
My own conception of rationality (note: Vaniver may or may not endorse this) is to be a robust agent – someone who reliably makes good decisions in a variety of circumstances, regardless of how other agents are interacting with me and how the environment might change. This includes clear communication, but also includes knowing how to defend yourself, and credibly communicating when you will defend yourself, and how, so that people can coordinate with you.
My conception of “rationalist hero” is someone who understands when it is the right time to defend “communication via reasoned arguments”, and when is the right to defend other foundational norms (via incentives or whatnot)
I think this is legitimately tricky (part of being a rationalist hero in my book is having the good judgment to know the difference, and it can be hard sometimes). But, right now it seems to me that it’s more important to be incentivizing the Times to not de-anonymize people, rather than to focus on persuading them that it is wrong to do so using reasoned arguments.
Probably worth noting that folk on LessWrong may be using the word rationality different than the way it sounds like you’re using the word. (This is fine, but it means we need to be careful that we’re understanding each other right)
The post What Do We Mean By Rationality is a bit old but still roughly captures what most LW-folk mean by the word:
I’m not sure what your conception of rationality is. I’m somewhat interested, but I think it might be better to just cut closer to the issue: why is good to rely on reasoned arguments rather than petitions?
Yes, good point, thanks for the request for clarification.
I think there is a third kind of rationality, called “communicative rationality”
See this tweet: https://twitter.com/AgnesCallard/status/1276531044024451073?s=20
(and also my replies to questions therein)
I think there is such a thing as “communicating well” where “well” picks out internal norms of communication (not, e.g. in such a way as to conduce instrumentally to my interests or to my having truer beliefs—bc it could happen that lying to you serves either of those ends) and that is what I mean by “communicating rationally”
The goals of such communication are what I called (in the tweet thread) “bidirectional likemindedness”—that we think the same thing, but not bc it’s determined in advance that you will think what I (independently) thought or that I will think what you (independently) thought.
So I do think it makes sense to have philosopher societies where the focus is on sharing information in such a way that we jointly converge on the truth (I’m not sure if this is quite the same thing you’re getting at with communicative rationality.). And I think there is benefit to trying to get broader society to adopt more truthseeking styles of communication, which includes more reasoned arguments on the margin.
But, this doesn’t imply that it’s always the right thing to do, when interacting with people who don’t share your truthseeking principles. (for extreme example, I wouldn’t try to give reasoned arguments to someone attacking me on the street)
I have some sense of why communicative rationality is important to you, but not why it should be (overwhelmingly) important to me.
I think there is sometimes benefit to people standing by their principles, to get society to change around them. (i.e. you can be a hero of communicative rationality, maybe even trying to make reasoned arguments to an attacker on the street, to highlight that clear communication is a cause worth dying for). But, this is a supererogatory thing. I wouldn’t want everyone who was interested in philosophy to feel like interest-in-philosophy meant giving up their ability to defend themselves, or give up the ability to communicate in ways that other cultures understand or respect.
That would probably result in fewer people being willing to incorporate philosophy into their life.
My own conception of rationality (note: Vaniver may or may not endorse this) is to be a robust agent – someone who reliably makes good decisions in a variety of circumstances, regardless of how other agents are interacting with me and how the environment might change. This includes clear communication, but also includes knowing how to defend yourself, and credibly communicating when you will defend yourself, and how, so that people can coordinate with you.
My conception of “rationalist hero” is someone who understands when it is the right time to defend “communication via reasoned arguments”, and when is the right to defend other foundational norms (via incentives or whatnot)
I think this is legitimately tricky (part of being a rationalist hero in my book is having the good judgment to know the difference, and it can be hard sometimes). But, right now it seems to me that it’s more important to be incentivizing the Times to not de-anonymize people, rather than to focus on persuading them that it is wrong to do so using reasoned arguments.