it’s not clear why we should privilege one’s experience other the other
Because in the argument as described, Lemon does have more than his experience to go on—he also has the agricultural definition. That’s why we invented definitions. To resolve these arguments.
In the same way, wheat is both a grain and a vegetable.
Isn’t this another clear example of prioritizing the technical definition (and, in fact, an arbitrary one of several overlapping technical definitions) over the common usage, which you appeared to be arguing against? If you tell someone you’re cooking vegetables, and they come over to find you with a bowl of cream of wheat, you’ve been misleading, and I don’t see how that’s a productive use of language.
As a rule of thumb, I prioritize the precise definition unless it’s misleading in the given context. When I say “the performance was so bad, they threw rotten fruit,” no one will be confused if some of the projectiles were tomatoes. But I wouldn’t say “I’m serving fruit and cheese” when I plan to put out tomato slices with mozzarella. It’s true, but it creates a false expectation.
Because in the argument as described, Lemon does have more than his experience to go on—he also has the agricultural definition. That’s why we invented definitions. To resolve these arguments.
It seems to me that introducing the definition is what starts this argument, not what resolves it. But playing along, are eggplants fruit? Green peppers? String beans? If my hypothesis is that “fruit” means “fruiting body of a plant” and my experiment is to ask people whether things that fit the definition are fruit, does the hypothesis anticipate the results of the experiment?
When I say “the performance was so bad, they threw rotten fruit,” no one will be confused if some of the projectiles were tomatoes.
Do you think anyone would be confused if some of them were turnips?
If you tell someone you’re cooking vegetables, and they come over to find you with a bowl of cream of wheat, you’ve been misleading, and I don’t see how that’s a productive use of language.
But I wouldn’t say “I’m serving fruit and cheese” when I plan to put out tomato slices with mozzarella. It’s true, but it creates a false expectation.
These are much more clever ways of making my point. There are exceptions, I think—I’d prefer if people stopped using “theory” to mean “guess”—but in many cases, it would only be confusing if people used a particular definition of a word to decide their usage.
Was your point, then, that you should use words in the way which is most likely to be clear and useful? If so, I agree, and would rather address it directly.
The clear and useful definition varies, of course, with context—a plant biologist and a pastry chef use the word “fruit” differently, and that’s okay! The trouble arises when you have two people in conversation trying to use a word for which they have different contexts, as is the case when lay people interpret “theory” as “guess,” since that’s what it often means in prose. In such cases, more or different words are needed to ensure the right meaning is being interpreted.
My point was that “fruit” is the flip-side of Eliezer’s bird example. A bird is a feathered flying thing. What about an ostrich? What about a penguin? A fruit is the seed pod of a plant. What about eggplants? What about cucumbers? My intention wasn’t to give any advice about how to pick and choose definitions or interpret words generally or in a particular context.
The reason I started the discussion is because I think examples like “fruit” where the common usage of the word deviates from any strict definition can help us to understand language and language acquisition better. But this means that we should be asking people why they don’t think cucumbers are fruit, not insisting that cucumbers are fruit by definition of the word fruit.
The reason I started the discussion is because I think examples like “fruit” where the common usage of the word deviates from any strict definition can help us to understand language and language acquisition better.
I suggest reading up on Eleanor Rosch’s prototype theory, it explains the whole categorisation thing very clearly. The basic theory is that our categories aren’t Aristotelian classes, but are fuzzy, and formed from seeing exemplars of a class and extracting the most common features. It’s a well-understood property of cognition and has plenty of experimental backing.
In the case of cucumbers, I’d say it fails the ‘fruit’ test because it lacks almost all the features I associate with fruit: it’s not red/yellow, it’s not sweet, I don’t eat it for a snack or dessert, and it doesn’t have obvious seeds or pits inside. Therefore I would look at you very oddly if you told me that it was.
Because in the argument as described, Lemon does have more than his experience to go on—he also has the agricultural definition. That’s why we invented definitions. To resolve these arguments.
Isn’t this another clear example of prioritizing the technical definition (and, in fact, an arbitrary one of several overlapping technical definitions) over the common usage, which you appeared to be arguing against? If you tell someone you’re cooking vegetables, and they come over to find you with a bowl of cream of wheat, you’ve been misleading, and I don’t see how that’s a productive use of language.
As a rule of thumb, I prioritize the precise definition unless it’s misleading in the given context. When I say “the performance was so bad, they threw rotten fruit,” no one will be confused if some of the projectiles were tomatoes. But I wouldn’t say “I’m serving fruit and cheese” when I plan to put out tomato slices with mozzarella. It’s true, but it creates a false expectation.
It seems to me that introducing the definition is what starts this argument, not what resolves it. But playing along, are eggplants fruit? Green peppers? String beans? If my hypothesis is that “fruit” means “fruiting body of a plant” and my experiment is to ask people whether things that fit the definition are fruit, does the hypothesis anticipate the results of the experiment?
Do you think anyone would be confused if some of them were turnips?
These are much more clever ways of making my point. There are exceptions, I think—I’d prefer if people stopped using “theory” to mean “guess”—but in many cases, it would only be confusing if people used a particular definition of a word to decide their usage.
Was your point, then, that you should use words in the way which is most likely to be clear and useful? If so, I agree, and would rather address it directly.
The clear and useful definition varies, of course, with context—a plant biologist and a pastry chef use the word “fruit” differently, and that’s okay! The trouble arises when you have two people in conversation trying to use a word for which they have different contexts, as is the case when lay people interpret “theory” as “guess,” since that’s what it often means in prose. In such cases, more or different words are needed to ensure the right meaning is being interpreted.
My point was that “fruit” is the flip-side of Eliezer’s bird example. A bird is a feathered flying thing. What about an ostrich? What about a penguin? A fruit is the seed pod of a plant. What about eggplants? What about cucumbers? My intention wasn’t to give any advice about how to pick and choose definitions or interpret words generally or in a particular context.
The reason I started the discussion is because I think examples like “fruit” where the common usage of the word deviates from any strict definition can help us to understand language and language acquisition better. But this means that we should be asking people why they don’t think cucumbers are fruit, not insisting that cucumbers are fruit by definition of the word fruit.
I suggest reading up on Eleanor Rosch’s prototype theory, it explains the whole categorisation thing very clearly. The basic theory is that our categories aren’t Aristotelian classes, but are fuzzy, and formed from seeing exemplars of a class and extracting the most common features. It’s a well-understood property of cognition and has plenty of experimental backing.
In the case of cucumbers, I’d say it fails the ‘fruit’ test because it lacks almost all the features I associate with fruit: it’s not red/yellow, it’s not sweet, I don’t eat it for a snack or dessert, and it doesn’t have obvious seeds or pits inside. Therefore I would look at you very oddly if you told me that it was.
Thanks for the recommendation.